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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on whether the decisions of firms’ external financing activities 
are influenced by ownership structure, market timing, or public media in the UK 
context. Chapter 2 examines the effect of ownership on firm capital structure by 
using a universal sample of UK firms over the period 1998–2009. The empirical 
results show that the relation between managerial share ownership (MSO) and 
leverage level is non-monotonic. This study further investigates the effect of 
ownership on firm financial issuance activities. The finding suggests that firms 
with higher MSO are more likely to choose equity issues instead of bonds, 
supporting the theory that managers have more incentive to avoid the bankruptcy 
risk associated with a bond issue. Further, this study finds a hot (cold) stock 
market valuation strengthens (weakens) this positive effect of higher MSO on the 
likelihood of equity issue.  
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the role of ownership characteristics in a firm’s choice of 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) methods, offer price discount, and market reactions 
to SEO announcements. This chapter examines UK firms’ choices of seasoned 
equity issue methods, particularly the differences between rights offers (ROs), 
placings (PLs), open offers (OOs), and combinations of placing and open offer 
(PLOOs). This study finds that ownership-concentrated firms prefer rights or open 
offers to placings, supporting the argument that large shareholders favour 
right-preserving issues as the SEO method to maintain benefits of control. 
Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the results indicate that 
firms with high managerial ownership are more likely to choose placing as the 
  
SEO method. This study also suggests that firms with lower institutional 
ownership are more likely to conduct placing to improve monitoring.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of the news media in SEOs in the UK market. The 
results show that issuers with positive (negative) media news are likely to price 
SEO shares higher (lower) and have higher (lower) announcement returns. This 
finding supports the argument that the media has impact on stock price through 
affecting investor expectations. Moreover, this study finds that issuers with greater 
pre-SEO media coverage are likely to have a more negative market response to 
the announcement, which strongly supports Merton’s investor recognition model.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The importance of capital structure policy has received increasing attention from 
financial economists, since extensive empirical evidence has shown that the 
management of capital structure has a significant effect on firm value. A firm’s 
capital structure is determined by its financing decisions. To maximize firm value, 
the capital structure should be managed through correct corporate financing 
decision. The financing decision has two components: first is to decide how much 
funds the firm need, which is based on firm’s investment decision. Firm will 
suffer the risk if funds are insufficient or mismanaged (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Second is to choose financing source, debt or equity. 
The incorrect ratio of debt to equity can results in financing distress and even 
bankruptcy (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999).  
 
Given the importance of capital structure, several theories have been proposed to 
explain the reasoning behind firms’ financing decision, such as trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory. However, there has been much evidence that suggests a 
firm’s financing decisions are inconsistent with either trade-off theory or pecking 
order theory. For example, trade-off theory predicts that firms immediately react 
to the changes in market value of equity, and thus they would choose various 
financing method to optimize its leverage. However, many studies find that firms 
are very slow to adjust their capital structure to its target leverage level (e.g., 
Hovakimian et al. 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005). This 
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finding suggests that capital structure is persistent over long period, in which 
firms do not have optimal capital structure. Moreover, Fama and French (2002) 
find that small, young and high-growth firms prefer to issue equity rather than 
debt, while pecking order theory propose that firms choose debt over equity. 
These studies suggest that trade-off theory and pecking order theory do not 
completely explain all firm behaviour as they make financing decision.  
 
To fill this gap, this study focuses on whether the decisions of firms’ financing 
activities are influenced by ownership structure, market timing, or public media. 
Therefore, the main research questions in this study are: what are the determinants 
of firms’ financing decision? What are the influences of controlling shareholders 
and institutional shareholders on firms’ external financing activity？Do market 
conditions influence firms’ making external financing decision? Are public media 
in affecting firms’ equity issuance? This study attempts to address these research 
questions in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Chapter 2 analyzes the role of ownership structure in firm capital structure and 
external financing activities. Based on the presence of two main types of agency 
conflicts, this chapter proposes that ownership structure is a determinant of firms’ 
financing decisions. The first agency cost, between large shareholders and minority 
shareholders, indicates that a firm’s financing decisions are more likely to be 
controlled by large, undiversified shareholders, such as large shareholders on the 
board of directors. To maintain their empire-building activities or voting power in 
a firm, large shareholders are less likely to increase debt levels, which could 
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increase the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy risk (Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999). This view implies that ownership concentration negatively 
affects a firm’s debt ratio. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
diversified shareholders are more interested in undertaking risky projects with high 
expected returns at the expense of bondholder wealth. Diversified shareholders 
benefit from any excess returns if the investment is successful, whereas debt 
holders bear the cost of failure. Consequently, the cost of debt is much higher. This 
view implies ownership-diversified firms are unwilling to issue debt. 
 
The second agency cost arises from the separation of ownership and management. 
Managers desire to maximize their own wealth at the expense of shareholder 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This suggests that firms’ financing decisions 
may not be optimal from a shareholder’s perspective. Accordingly, managerial 
incentives play a significant role in a firm’s capital structure decisions. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986, 1997) find that high external ownership may mitigate this conflict of 
interest, since large external shareholders have strong incentives to monitor and 
discipline management. The monitoring hypothesis assumes that a firm will make 
financing decisions that maximize the general shareholder’s interests. This 
hypothesis predicts that monitors can influence a firm’s choices when issuing 
securities. 
 
Chapter 2 also investigates the effect of market valuation on firms’ financing 
choices between bond and equity. According to market timing theory, this Chapter 
proposes that market valuation has an impact on firms’ financing decisions. The 
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basic idea of market timing theory is that managers are market timers, so they issue 
equity when investors are overoptimistic about the value of new shares (Barker and 
Wurgler, 2002). Consequently, shares are issued at a higher price. Under this theory, 
managers consider market valuation before they make capital structure decisions. 
When the stock market is more favourable, investors are overoptimistic and stock 
prices are overvalued simultaneously. Managers may be aware that a hot stock 
market presents good opportunities to raise capital by issuing equity. Thus, initial 
public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are clustered in this 
period (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Graham and Harvey, 2001). However, 
when the stock market is unfavourable, managers will defer equity issuance or 
choose debt financing. 
 
To test these hypotheses, Chapter 2 uses three major variables to indicate firm 
ownership structure: ownership concentration, managerial share ownership, and 
institutional ownership. We use ownership concentration as a proxy for large 
shareholder incentives, measured as the sum of the percentage of shares owned by 
block holders whose ownership is over 3% of a firm’s equity. The managerial share 
ownership variable is a proxy for managerial incentives, defined as the percentage 
of a firm’s shares owned by all executive and non-executive directors. To capture 
external monitoring effects, this Chapter applies institutional ownership, measured 
as the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors whose ownership is 
over 3% of a firm’s equity.  
 
Moreover, Chapter 2 identifies the current market valuation by three-month 
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moving averages of scaled equity issue volume (Helwege and Liang, 2004). 
Scaled issue volume is the aggregate equity issue volume divided by the 
month-end value of outstanding equity for the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
This Chapter classifies the market as hot or cold, where a hot (cold) market is a 
period during which the current market’s valuation is in the top (bottom) 30% of 
the entire research period.  
 
In Chapter 2, the data on issue characteristics are obtained from Thomson One 
Banker. The data on ownership information include the equity ownership of all 
block holders, managers, and large institutional investors and was manually 
collected from Thomson One Banker. Due to the limited ownership information 
Thomson One Banker provided, the research period is restricted to 12 years, from 
1998 to 2009. This study examines the large sample of UK firms listed on the LSE 
and their security financing issuance. The final sample consists of 3,244 yearly 
firm observations and 348 bond and 378 equity issuances. 
 
Chapter 2 provides several empirical results to prove the interaction between 
firms’ financing decisions and their ownership structures. First, it is shown that 
ownership structure is an important determinant of a firm’s leverage level. The 
results report that the relation between managerial share ownership and leverage is 
non-monotonic. At lower levels of managerial share ownership, the relation with 
leverage is positive, supporting interest alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This finding can be interpreted as higher managerial ownership plays an 
important role in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, leading to a 
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lower cost of debt. In such situations, firms are likely to raise more debt, resulting 
in higher leverage levels. However, this relation turns to be negative when the 
MSO is relatively high, which is in line with the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Managers are more likely to protect their 
private interests from the risk of bankruptcy associated with a high leverage ratio. 
Moreover, it is shown that high institutional ownership can increase a firm’s 
leverage ratio. This finding indicates that concentrated institutional ownership 
effectively lowers the cost of debt through strong external monitoring (Bhojraj 
and Sengupta, 2003). 
 
Second, Chapter 2 finds that ownership structure has a significant effect on firms’ 
financing issuance choices between bond and equity, as well as on the issue size. 
The results imply that ownership-concentrated firms are more likely to choose 
equity over bonds to avoid the potential increase in financial distress risk. 
However, large shareholders have an incentive to maintain their control benefits, 
so they should press firms to decrease the issue size of equity. The results also 
suggest that firms with a higher managerial ownership prefer issuing equity over 
bonds, while firms with a lower managerial ownership prefer issuing bonds over 
equity. This finding is also consistent with the managerial entrenchment and 
interest alignment theories. Moreover, firms with higher institutional ownership 
prefer issuing equity rather than bonds, although they can make larger bond issues 
because of lower bond yields (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
 
Third, the findings in Chapter 2 also strongly support the market timing 
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hypothesis. This Chapter studies the role of current market valuation in the choice 
of financing decisions. The results suggest that favourable stock market conditions 
dramatically increase the probability of equity issue, while an unfavourable stock 
market increases the probability of bond issue. Moreover, Chapter 2 links stock 
market valuations to the relation between MSO and a firm’s external financing 
activities. It is shown that a hot market increases the probability that firms with 
high managerial ownership choose equity over bond issues. At the same time, a 
cold market decreases the probability of firms with low MSO issuing equity over 
bonds. In summary, the magnitudes of these effects suggest that firms make 
external financing decisions according to current market conditions. 
 
Subsequently, this thesis lays emphasis on UK firms’ Seasoned Equity Offering. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of ownership characteristics in a firm’s choice of SEO 
methods, offer price discount, and market reactions to SEO announcements. This 
Chapter empirically examines UK firms’ choices of seasoned equity issue methods. 
This Chapter addresses the lack of empirical research on four SEO methods, 
particularly the difference between a rights offer (RO), a placing (PL), an open 
offer (OO), and a combination of placing and open offer (PLOO). 
 
Chapter 3 examines the seasoned equity issuance of firms traded on the London 
Stock Exchange during 1998–2010. The research sample consists of 653 UK 
SEOs, categorized into four subsamples by issue type: 156 ROs, 291 PLs, 54 OOs, 
and 152 PLOOs. We note that the average proceeds amount of PLs equals half 
that raised by ROs (US$91.21 million versus US$211.79 million, respectively). 
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The mean offer discount on a rights offer is the highest among the four issue types, 
while the lowest price discount occurs in placing (18.71% versus 7.83%, 
respectively). 
 
Chapter 3 also tests the market reaction to SEO announcements by different issue 
types. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are generated for the two-day [-1, 0] 
and three-day [-1, 1] event windows, where the SEO announcement takes place on 
event day 0. The estimated period is set covering [-260, -61] prior to 
announcement day. It is shown that market reactions to announcements of PLs or 
PLOOs are significantly positive, while the average announcement return of ROs 
is significantly negative. This result is consistent with previous studies on UK 
SEOs (e.g., Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Capstaff and Fletcher, 
2011),  
 
In Chapter 3, the empirical evidence further shows that ownership structure has an 
impact on a firm’s choice of SEO methods. The results indicate that firms with 
higher OC are more likely to choose right-preserving issues over placings. This 
finding strongly supports the controlling hypothesis that large shareholders in 
firms have a strong incentive to maintain their voting rights and control. If a firm 
chooses a right-preserving issue, the ownership of large shareholders is preserved 
and large shareholders do not experience any reduction in control benefits. This 
Chapter also find that ownership-concentrated firms prefer ROs rather than OOs 
in the right-preserving issue. This is because a rights offer is more convenient for 
existing shareholders compared to an open offer. In a rights offer, existing 
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shareholders who does not wish to increase their holdings can sell their 
preemptive rights in the secondary market. However, this is not allowed in open 
offer. 
 
The results in Chapter 3 also suggest the firms with a higher managerial 
ownership are more likely to choose placing as an equity issue method. This 
supports the argument that the usage of placings can solidify managerial control 
(Barclay et al., 2007). Entrenched managers are willing to place new shares with 
friendly investors who are relatively passive. Furthermore, this finding also shows 
that institutional ownership is negatively related to the probability of a firm 
choosing placing as the SEO method. It is generally believed that high 
institutional ownership is associated with effective monitoring (e.g. Zhang, 2004, 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009, Chemmanur, 2009). A firm’s motivation in 
choosing placing is to improve monitoring. If a firm already has monitors, it is 
less likely to use placing. 
 
Chapter 3 also analyzes the impact of ownership on UK SEO price setting and 
announcement returns. The results show that firms with high ownership 
concentration are likely to set the offer price at a higher discount. This finding can 
be explained as a high ownership concentration is associated with lower market 
liquidity; thus investors should require a larger discount to compensate their 
investments in illiquid stock (Intintoli and Kahle, 2010). The results also indicate 
that managerial ownership has a significant positive effect on offer discounts. This 
Chapter also finds some support for the monitoring hypothesis. Since institutional 
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holdings verify firm quality, firms with high institutional ownership are more 
likely to price share at a lower discount, which is consistent with the prediction of 
the monitoring hypothesis. Moreover, the results indicate that SEO announcement 
returns will be decreased by higher managerial ownership because of increased 
agency problems and adverse selection cost. Investors believe that entrenched 
managers have an incentive to issue equity when their firms are overvalued. The 
positive relation between institutional ownership and SEO announcement returns 
is also consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Notably, the results of Chapter 3 also show that announcement returns are higher 
(lower) when SEOs are conducted in a hot (cold) market. This evidence suggests 
that firms are likely to issue equity when the indirect cost is relatively low. Further, 
it is shown that firms are likely to choose ROs when the stock market is 
favourable, while they prefer placing in cold conditions. Since placing is value 
certification, overvalued (undervalued) firms are less (more) likely to choose 
placing as the issue method. This result implies that SEOs in a hot market are 
likely to be motivated by firm overvaluation. 
 
In Chapter 4, this study emphasizes the role of financial media in SEO offer 
discounts and market reactions to SEO announcements. Based on investor 
recognition theory (Merton, 1987), this Chapter proposes that the public media 
can play a role in firms’ equity issue decisions. This theory suggests that investors 
tend to hold stock they are more familiar with and therefore their portfolios will 
be underdiversified. Consequently, stocks with lower investor recognition must 
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offer higher returns to compensate investors for an imperfectly diversified 
portfolio. This suggests that investor recognition can influence stock price. Recent 
research uses the public media as a proxy for investor recognition and finds that 
the media have a significant effect on equity issuance and asset prices (e.g., Cook 
et al., 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). By focusing on IPOs, Cook et al. 
(2006) argue that pre-offer media can promote IPO firms to retail investors by 
creating pre-offer publicity, resulting in upward offer price revisions. Liu et al. 
(2009) also find that more financial news is associated with a higher initial IPO 
return and better long-term performance. Given the similarity of IPO and SEO 
practice, this study expects a similar association between SEOs and the media. 
 
Chapter 4 examines a sample of 415 UK seasoned equity issuances from 1996 to 
2010. To examine the role of the media in the UK SEO market, all firm-related 
news in the pre-SEO period are collected from the LexisNexis UK database, 
which comprises the articles published in the Financial Times (London), The 
Times (London), the Guardian (London), the Daily Mirror, and the Sunday Mirror.  
 
Chapter 4 constructs two media variables: media coverage and media sentiment. 
Media coverage is obtained by simply counting the number of pre-SEO media 
news articles for each issuer. Media coverage is measured as the summative 
amount of news articles covering the SEO issuer. Second, this Chapter constructs 
media sentiment according to the linguistic content of media articles, by counting 
positive words and negative words in each news article. Media sentiment is 
measured as the ratio of positive words minus negative words to the total words 
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for each article and then finding the average ratio of all related articles in the 
pre-SEO period. Positive and negative words are identified with the word list 
proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
 
In Chapter 4, the results show a significant correlation between pre-SEO media 
coverage and the SEO offer price discount. The results suggest that high media 
coverage can decrease UK SEO offer discounts. This Chapter also finds that 
issuers covered by less negative media are likely to price offers higher. The 
findings contribute to the literature by adding new insight into the effect of media 
content in the case of SEOs. The results also imply that the media could be a 
potential determinant of SEO price setting. This Chapter further explores the 
pre-SEO media’s influence on announcement returns. The empirical evidence 
suggests that SEOs with greater pre-SEO media coverage attract less favourable 
market responses. This is consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis 
(Merton, 1987). Investors continue to pay attention to the stocks with which they 
are more familiar. When issuers with high investor attention make SEO 
announcements, they will reach more investors. However, investors already 
realize that an SEO is a signal for overvalued equities (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; 
Masulis and Korwar, 1986). In this case, most existing and potential investors 
believe that issuers are opportunistic and revise the firm’s valuation downward. As 
a consequence, the SEO announcement return will decrease. Moreover, in line 
with the studies on media content (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Garcia, 
2012), the finding supports the argument that media content can distort stock price 
by inducing behaviourally biased trading. Positive media news can induce 
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sentimental investors to be over-optimistic, resulting in higher announcement 
returns. 
This thesis extends the knowledge of what influences firms when they are making 
external financing decisions in the following ways. First, this study investigates 
whether ownership structure affects firm financing choice. This thesis investigates 
whether and to what degree ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and 
institutional ownership affect choice between bond and equity financing. 
Subsequently, this study focuses on the effect of ownership on seasoned equity 
financing. In addition to rights offers and placing, this study considers open offers 
and open offer combined with placing as an alternative issue method for UK firm. 
By using multinomial logistic regressions, this study analyzes what factors 
influence UK firm decisions among these four SEO issue methods: rights offers, 
placings, open offers, and open offers with placing. 
 
Second, this study investigates whether market valuation is a determinant of firm 
financial decisions. This study examines whether market valuations have a great 
influence on the choice between bond and equity financing, which provides new 
insights into the market timing theory. This study shows that firms are more likely 
to choose equity issue over bond, when stock market condition is favourable. By 
focusing on the equity issuance, this study further analyzes whether different 
market valuation affects the choice of SEO issue method, which provides greater 
insights into manager’s market timing behaviour. This study finds that issuers are 
most likely to perform rights offers when the market is hot, but they prefer 
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placings in a cold market. Given that placing is a proxy for value certification, this 
finding implies that managers tend to sell the overvalued equity by using rights 
offers in the hot market.  
 
Third, this study stress the importance of the role of the media in seasoned equity 
issuance, since recent studies focus on the role of the media in initial public 
offerings (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Cook et al., 2006; Liu et al. 2009). The 
evidence provides new insights and explanations for the determinants of SEO 
discounts and announcement returns. Finally, this study adds new evidence to the 
UK SEO literature by covering the extended period from January 1996 to 
December 2010. Testing a longer period can ensure the results are persistent 
across time. 
 
Chapter 2 Ownership, Capital Structure, and Stock 
Market Valuation 
 2.1 Introduction 
Capital structure is of great importance to firm performance and stakeholder 
interests. Although recent work emphasizes the primary determinants of capital 
structure (Gaud et al., 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009), the findings on the effect of 
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ownership structure on capital structure have been limited and inconsistent. 
Anderson et al. (2003) find insider ownership is positively related to a firm’s debt 
level. Using different data sources and sample periods, Moh’d et al. (1995) and 
Nam et al. (2003) draw the opposite conclusion. Brailsford et al. (2002) and 
Florackis and Ozkan (2009) report a nonlinear relation between managerial 
ownership and leverage. Such mixed findings lead us to clarify the relation between 
ownership structure and capital structure. 
 
The UK provides an interesting context to study such a relation. Most large 
shareholders of UK firms are financial institutions. They are capable of monitoring 
the corporate governance of firms and constraining the choice of strategies. 
However, Franks et al. (2001) point out that UK institutional investors do not take 
an active role in monitoring management. Thus UK managers are posited to be 
more entrenched, regardless of whether firms have an optimal leverage ratio. Under 
this scenario, the cost of debt financing should be higher than in other market places. 
As reported by the Financial Times, however, the UK economy has expanded via 
increased junk bond sales in recent years and UK firms are more likely to possess 
high leverage ratios due to the junk bond problem.
1
 
 
The literature on ownership structure is characterized by discussions of the agency 
problem, highlighting two types of agency conflict. The first arises from the 
                                                 
1
 Bondt and Ibáñez (2005) find that high-yield corporate bonds in the UK grew faster than in the 
euro area since 1998, benefitting from a more market-based financial structure.  
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separation of ownership and management. Managers desire to pursue their own 
wealth, even where their behaviour may not act in the firm’s best interests. 
Managerial ownership is an effective mechanism for resolving this agency problem 
by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).
2
 However, an increase in insider ownership can be associated with 
managerial entrenchment, where managers exert their increased managerial 
opportunism at the expense of outsider investors (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). When managers own a large proportion of firm shares, the low market 
liquidity and high undiversified holding risk will increase the cost of capital. 
According to this view, managerial incentives play a significant role in a firm’s 
capital structure. To address this issue, this study uses managerial share ownership 
as a proxy for managerial incentive (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Moh’d et al., 1998; 
Lundstrum, 2009).  
 
Moreover, this study constructs institutional ownership to capture external 
monitoring effects. Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) find that high external 
ownership can also mitigate this standard owner–manager conflict of interests, 
since large external shareholders have strong incentives to monitor and discipline 
management. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that higher outside ownership leads 
to more intense managerial monitoring. Although monitoring has a cost, large 
stakeholders can gain internal benefits from it (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The 
                                                 
2
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers may consume perquisites, expropriate 
shareholder wealth, or engage in other non–value-maximizing behaviour. 
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active monitoring mechanism effectively limits the scale of managerial 
opportunism and solves the problem of managers adjusting firm debt levels to serve 
their own interests; hence the cost of debt financing is reduced. This implies that 
firms with higher outside ownership prefer debt issue on account of its lower debt 
cost. In contrast, widely dispersed outside ownership can weaken the monitoring 
mechanism because of the free rider problem
3
 (Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
 
The presence of a secondary conflict between large undiversified shareholders and 
diversified shareholders means that the effect of ownership concentration on capital 
structure is far from conclusive (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firm capital structure 
decision making is more likely to be controlled by undiversified shareholders, such 
as large shareholders on the board of directors. To keep non-diversifiable portfolio 
risk low, large shareholders avoid increasing debt levels, which can increase the 
probability of financial distress and bankruptcy (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mishra 
and McConaughy, 1999). This suggests ownership concentration inversely affects a 
firm’s debt ratio. On the other hand, diversified shareholders are more interested in 
undertaking risky projects with high expected returns at the expense of bondholder 
wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore diversified shareholders obtain any 
excess returns if the investment is successful while debt holders bear the cost of 
failure. In this situation the cost of debt is much higher. Hence 
                                                 
3
 The literature recognizes that individual investors who own a small fraction of firm shares 
expect others to take responsibility for monitoring, because their cost of monitoring is generally 
much higher than their return (Grossman and Hart, 1982).  
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ownership-diversified firms are also cautious about issuing debt. To conduct this 
analysis, this Chapter employs ownership concentration as a proxy for large 
shareholder incentives. 
 
Through resolving the agency conflicts above, this study suggests that proper 
management of a firm’s ownership structure can have a significant effect on its 
leverage level, echoing the argument of Friend and Lang (1988), Brailsford et al. 
(2002), and Florackis and Ozkan (2009), where ownership structure in corporate 
governance is a crucial instrument in alleviating the agency problem. Therefore, the 
main research question is: what are the influence of controlling shareholders and 
institutional shareholders on firms’ capital structure? Given that a firm’s external 
financing policies using security issue methods and proceeds can directly affect its 
debt ratio, this study uses UK bond and equity issues to extend the literature by 
shedding light on the role of ownership in firms’ external financing decisions. This 
study is in line with the recent work by Lundstrum (2009), who investigates 111 
financing offerings of US firms, suggesting a positive relation between managerial 
share ownership and a decline in leverage from before issuance to afterward. 
 
In addition, the literature also suggests that market valuation plays an important 
role in determining firm capital structure. Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose that 
firms raise external funds when their cost of equity is temporarily low and that past 
market timing decisions have long-lasting impacts on leverage. Welch (2004) 
further concludes that the fluctuation of a firm’s own stock price is a primary 
determinant of capital structure changes. In a hot market, a firm’s stock price is 
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likely to increase because of the rising demand of individual investors, naturally 
leading to a lower debt level. Furthermore, Pedersen and Thomsen (2000) consider 
stock market valuation a probable determinant of firm ownership structure. In the 
case of a hot market, the demand for stocks rises and firm equity is overvalued such 
that managers prefer to issue equity and sell shares, resulting in diffuse managerial 
ownership (Pedersen and Thomsen, 2000). In contrast, if firm stock prices are 
undervalued, managers tend to repurchase shares to increase managerial ownership. 
Briefly, firms are more likely to issue equity under hot stock market conditions, 
causing a decreasing in both the leverage ratio and firm managerial ownership. 
Hence this Chapter examines whether the relation between managerial share 
ownership and a firm’s external financing decision varies under different stock 
market valuation conditions. 
 
Despite this field of research’s growing importance and interest therein, only 
limited literature directly links firm ownership with capital structure decisions. 
Therefore this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this chapter 
is similar in sprit to the studies of Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009). However, in addition to managerial share ownership, this Chapter 
considers institutional ownership and ownership concentration as additional 
ownership structure variables in the analysis, which leads to a more precise 
measurement of ownership ratio. Second, for the first time in the literature, by using 
updates to the data set, this study investigates whether and to what degree 
ownership concentration, managerial share ownership, or institutional ownership 
affects firms’ external financing decisions. Third, we take explicit account of 
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different market valuations (hot/cold) to interact with firm ownership and assess 
their impact on external financing decisions. Market conditions have a great 
influence on not only the timing of a new issuance but also its relation with 
managerial share ownership. 
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides the 
theoretical background. Section 2.3 sets forth the arguments underlying the main 
hypotheses by reviewing the literature. Section 2.4 presents the sample selection 
and summary statistics. Section 2.5 discusses the main findings from the empirical 
analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
This section focus on the most relevant theories related to capital structure and 
ownership structure.  
2.2.1 Capital structure theories 
Theories of corporate capital structure have received increasing attention from 
financial economists since the publication of Modigliani and Miller (1958). The 
literature develops three major theories of capital structure to explain how firms 
manage their capital structure: trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and market 
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timing theory. 
2.2.1.1 Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory refers to firms choosing how much equity and debt to use in their 
capital structure as determined by trade-offs between the costs and benefits of 
debt and those of equity. This theory suggests that firms are willing to carry more 
debt as long as its benefits are higher than its costs. The benefits of debt involve 
the interest tax shields and reduced free cash following agency costs (Jensen, 
1986). The major costs of debt include agency conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders, potential financial distress, and bankruptcy risk. 
 
Trade-off theory is derived from the theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
who propose that a firm’s value is irrelevant to the cost of capital or capital 
structure in a perfect market. In a second seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) consider corporate taxes in their analysis and draw a different conclusion 
about capital structure: They argue that a firm’s value increases with the use of 
debt in its capital structure due to the interest tax shield. In this scenario, firm 
value is maximized when the firm is financed entirely with debt. Furthermore, 
Miller (1977) finds that both personal and corporate taxes can determine an 
economy-wide leverage ratio. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) analyze not only the 
tax shield but also the interest payments of debt. They find that firms use a mix of 
debt and equity to achieve optimal capital structure ratios. In addition to the 
trade-off between the tax advantages of debt against its costs of financial distress, 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) focus on the agency costs that 
stem from conflicts of interest between the different stakeholders. The addition of 
agency costs to trade-off theory suggests that firms manage capital structure by 
balancing the agency costs of debt versus those of equity. 
 
Unlike a capital structure model in a static setting, Fischer et al. (1989) propose a 
model of dynamic capital structure choices in the presence of recapitalization 
costs. The authors find that a firm’s optimal leverage ratio can vary. They argue 
that a firm’s actual leverage ratio may therefore deviate from an optimal ratio. 
Firms continuously readjust their capital structure towards optimal ratios to 
balance the costs and benefits associated with various levels of leverage. However, 
responding immediately to capital structure shocks may be suboptimal because of 
adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that 
if the costs of such adjustments are higher than the benefits, a firm would wait to 
recapitalize. Their results show that most firms are relatively inactive, making 
financing decisions once a year, on average. 
 
A number of studies provide empirical evidence to support trade-off theory. For 
example, Hovakimian et al. (2001) find that firms tend to adjust their leverage 
ratios towards target ratios when making financing and repurchase decisions. 
Their study has two main stages: The first stage estimates the target leverage ratio 
by regressing the observed debt ratio on a series of accounting variables. The 
second stage uses the difference between a firm’s target leverage ratio and its 
actual ratio as a predictor of whether the firm will issue debt or equity. The results 
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also suggest that capital structure considerations play an important role when 
firms repurchase stock rather than raise capital. Moreover, Fama and French 
(2002) examine the trade-off model and find firm leverage only slowly adjusts to 
target levels as firms balance the costs of adjustment against the benefits of 
approaching the target leverage ratio. Consistent with dynamic rebalancing after 
accounting for adjustment costs, Leary and Roberts (2005) find that firms indeed 
respond to equity issues and stock price shocks by rebalancing their leverage over 
the next two to four years. 
2.2.1.2 Pecking Order Theory 
Pecking order theory proposes a hierarchy to a firm’s financing decisions. Firms 
choose internal financing in the first place, which involves the use of profits or 
retained earnings. If internal financing is insufficient for a new investment, firms 
will resort to external financing, where risk-free debt should be applied first, then 
risky debt, and then equity issue as a last choice. 
 
According to pecking order theory, Myers (1984) argues that firms’ financing 
decisions are influenced by adverse selection costs, which arise from the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Managers know 
more about a firm’s financial condition and future growth opportunities than 
outside investors do. The usage of external financing induces managers to make 
public disclosures about investing opportunities and potential retained earnings. 
Therefore, internal funds are preferable because of the lower level of asymmetric 
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information. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) add information asymmetry to a signalling model of 
investment and financing decisions. They argue that outside investors obtain 
information about firm value from the financing decisions made by managers. 
Under this assumption, managers act in the best interest of existing shareholders. 
Debt issuance implies that managers have confidence in future cash flows and 
their ability to pay the interest on the debt. However, managers issuing equity 
issue rather than riskless debt signal to outside investors that the managers believe 
the firms’ shares are overvalued. Consequently, investors rationally discount the 
firm’s equity. In this case, the equity is issued only after internal financing and 
debt capacity has been exhausted. 
 
Several studies find a strong support for pecking order theory. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) propose the pecking order models, in which the external debt 
financing is driven by the internal financial deficit. They conclude that the 
pecking order theory has greater time-series explanation power than trade-off 
theory. Frank and Goyal (2003) further find that the pecking order theory should 
perform best among small, high-growth firms because these firms are likely to 
have higher level of information asymmetry, and therefore suffer higher adverse 
selection cost when issuing securities.   
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2.2.1.3 Market timing theory 
Market timing theory suggests that firms time their equity issues, so they issue 
new equity when shares are perceived to be overvalued and repurchase the shares 
when the shares are undervalued. As a result, share prices change and security 
financing decisions have a significant effect on capital structure changes. 
 
Several studies suggest that managers time equity issues to take advantage of 
periods of high stock prices and investor overoptimism (e.g., Ritter 1991, Bayless 
and Chaplinsky, 1996; Graham and Harvey, 2001). The ‘window of opportunity’ 
hypothesis (Ritter, 1991) suggests that the best time for firms to issue equity is 
when that equity is overvalued. Managers are assumed to have information about 
firm fundamental values that investors do not have; therefore they time equity 
issues to when the market is overoptimistic about stock prices. This hypothesis 
also suggests that investors are slow to react to information contained in equity 
issue announcements, leading to underperformance in the long run. Ritter (1991) 
finds that IPO firms underperform their benchmarks in the long run and that 
underperformance is more pronounced for hot market IPOs. Similarly, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) find that firms issuing either IPOs or SEOs have significantly 
lower long-run performance than matched non-issuing firms do. 
 
Moreover, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) examine whether market timing 
influences firm SEO decisions. They use the aggregate volume of equity issues to 
identify periods when market conditions are most favourable or unfavourable for 
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issue. They define high equity volume periods as hot and low equity volume 
periods as cold. Their results suggest that the average price reaction to an SEO 
announcement in a hot market is significantly less negative than at other periods, 
while that in a cold market is significantly more negative. By focusing on IPOs, 
Alti (2006) examines whether an IPO in a hot issue market is characterized by a 
high IPO volume in terms of the number of issuers or a cold issue market. This 
author further finds that firms tend to increase the amount of their equity issues in 
hot markets and to minimize it in cold markets. 
 
Based on an extensive survey of 392 CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 
two-thirds of CFOs admit market timing is an important consideration for 
financing decisions. The respondents said that they would time equity issues when 
share price had increased dramatically and would conduct debt issues when the 
interest rates were low. Hovakimian et al. (2001) find that stock price run-ups are 
a determinant of firm financing decisions. Firms with higher current stock prices 
are more likely to issue equity than debt and to repurchase debt rather than equity. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose the external finance weighted historical 
market-to-book ratio as a market timing measure. They find that firms tend to 
raise external funds when their cost of equity is temporarily low and that past 
market timing decisions have a long-lasting impact on leverage. Moreover, Welch 
(2004) concludes that the fluctuations of a firm’s own stock prices are a primary 
determinant of the debt–equity ratio and that the effect is permanent. 
 
The above findings suggest that market timing has a persistent effect on firm 
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capital structure. Following the trade-off theory of capital structure, once a firm’s 
capital structure is out of target, the firm will slowly adjust it back to optimal 
levels (Fama and French, 2002). Leary and Roberts (2005) find that the influence 
of equity issues on firm leverage completely vanishes within four years. 
Furthermore, Alti (2006) show evidence of slow rebalancing toward target 
leverage levels, consistent with dynamic trade-off theory. 
2.2.2 Ownership structure and Agency Cost  
Most of the related literature is involved with agency theory, which is a 
fundamental theory of ownership structure. The separation of ownership and 
management (Berle and Means, 1932) is the source of agency costs, mitigating the 
incentive of managers to improve corporate efficiency. Later, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) develop this principle–agent problem further, which becomes well known 
as agency theory. They advocate that managers desire to maximize their own 
wealth despite the fact that their behaviour may damage shareholder interest. Since 
the 1980s, ownership structure has been broadly accepted as an effective approach 
to mitigate agency costs and improve firm performance. There are three typical 
agency conflicts in ownership structure, including conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers, shareholders and creditors, large shareholders and 
minority investors. 
 
According to the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, managers’ 
incentives have attracted lots of academic attention. With low levels of managerial 
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share ownership, managers are willing to consume perquisites and expropriate 
shareholder interest, even displaying inefficient management, raising agency costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) present the alignment effect in their seminal paper and 
imply that a high level of managerial ownership can help closely align the interests 
of managers and shareholders and then improve firm value. However, a high level 
of managerial ownership means managers hold a large number of stakes. They may 
have not only enough voting power to ensure their empire building in the firm, but 
also more discretion from outside monitoring. Consistent with this reasoning, 
Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) explore managerial entrenchment 
theory. They claim that high insider share ownership may result in managers 
obtaining effective control over firms and then pursuing their own interests by 
expropriating firm resources, ultimately reducing firm value. 
 
Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) find that the shareholders with high 
ownership concentration have strong incentives to monitor and discipline 
management, resulting in decreased agency costs, which is well known as the 
efficient monitoring hypothesis. Grossman and Hart (1986) support this argument 
and indicate that large stakeholders are able to gain the internal benefit from their 
monitoring. In contrast, wide ownership may weaken the monitoring mechanism 
due to the free rider problem. In a corporation with dispersed ownership, each 
shareholder hopes others will do the monitoring because if one shareholder does, all 
shareholders benefit. However, the cost of supervision is generally much higher 
than an individual shareholder’s return, so that no shareholder has an initiative to 
watch over management (Grossman et al., 1982). Moreover, shareholders who hold 
 29 
 
only a small fraction of a firm may invest in many firms to minimize their portfolio 
risk. They are more concerned with the dividend payments instead of the firms’ 
future. 
 
Ownership structure could lead to another agency conflicts between shareholders 
and creditors. In regard to firms with high ownership concentration, large 
shareholders are usually risk averse, so they may avoid undertaking investments 
with high risk premiums, resulting in an under-investment problem (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate that diversified 
shareholders have greater interest in undertaking a risky project with a high 
expected return at the expense of bondholder wealth. The reason is that diversified 
shareholders are able to obtain the excess returns if the investment is successful; 
however, creditors bear the cost of failure. Thus the creditors will ask for higher 
debt costs if they realize this adverse situation. 
 
Since the 1990s, conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders have become main stream in the literature. Due to the divergence 
between voting rights and cash flow rights, controlling shareholders desire to 
consume and take advantage of corporate resources, but minority shareholders 
cannot share with them (Morcket al., 1988; Holderness, 2003). Furthermore, larger 
shareholders potentially expropriate minority investors in firms with high 
concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1998; Denis and McConnel, 2003). 
Johnson et al. (2000) put forward the term tunnelling to describe observe how 
controlling shareholders extract private benefit from firm assets and resources. 
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Theories regarding agency problems and ownership structure follow two streams: 
ownership concentration and managerial ownership. Morck et al. (1988) suggest 
that ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm performance in the 0–5% 
board ownership range because of the efficiency monitoring hypothesis; the effect 
may exist beyond 25%, but it turns negative at the 5–25% level of ownership 
concentration, consistent with the hypothesis of minority shareholder expropriation. 
While much evidence 
4
shows that agency conflicts in ownership structure have an 
impact on firm performance, only a handful of studies look into the issue of how 
ownership structure affects firm capital structure by considering agency problems. 
2.2.3 Ownership Structure and Capital Structure 
The literature mentions the impact of ownership on leverage and obtains mixed 
results: positive, negative, and no impact. The disagreement is due to differences 
in research period, target market, estimating technique, and data selection bias. 
Moreover, some studies illustrate that the impact of ownership on capital structure 
is non-monotonic over time, changing with a firms’ growth opportunities and 
assets. 
 
                                                 
4
 Some studies find that the relation between ownership structure on firm performance is 
non-monotonic (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
find a positive relation, while Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) report that this relationship is significant 
negative.  
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The majority of the evidence indicates a positive impact (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Anderson et.al., 2003). Firms with high ownership concentration should 
exhibit greater financial leverage, since controlling shareholders maintain their 
voting control for a given level of equity investment and thus avoid hostile 
takeovers. Debt financing is a good method to restrict managerial entrenchment 
and overcome the risk of being a takeover target. Furthermore, it can relieve 
agency conflicts between large shareholders and bondholders due to the long-term 
commitment on debt. In general, family-owned firms bear lower cost of debt 
financing, so they hold greater debt in their capital structure (Anderson et al., 
2003). Managers of firms with dispersed ownership prefer equity to debt because 
they desire to avoid the pressure of paying interest on the debt. Moreover, 
leverage is a monitoring mechanism used by creditors to limit controlling 
shareholder power. However, according to agency costs and dividend-paying 
behaviour, Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend payments are part of a firm’s 
monitoring methods, in which firms tend to pay out more in dividends when 
insiders own lower proportions of shares. Moreover, shareholders in firms with 
dispersed ownership tend to diversify their risk to invest in multiple firms. This 
finding can explain why firms are concerned about risky projects, since their 
creditors’ interests can be harmed (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due to this 
situation, debt holders will demand higher interest on debt to compensate their 
potential loss. As a result, the cost of debt financing increasingly reduces debt in 
capital structure. 
 
The explanation for the negative impact of ownership on leverage is built on the 
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theory that a high leverage ratio exposes a firm to higher bankruptcy risk and, 
following this, managers should lower debt in capital structure (Friend and Lang, 
1988; Nam et al., 2003). Additionally, firms are easier to finance when their large 
shareholders are financial institutions, such as banks, but financial institutions 
have more incentives to restrain a firm’s investments because they are usually risk 
averse (Elyasiani et al. 2010). 
 
Some scholars argue that ownership structure is an exogenous variable that 
influences firm performance and leverage. Demsetz (1983) believes that 
ownership structure is not only affected by firm- and industry-specific 
characteristics, such as firm size and product uniqueness, but also closely linked 
with large shareholders’ wealth. Holderness (2003) notes the causation between 
ownership and performance and finds that performance appears to be a 
determinant of ownership structure, but not vice versa. 
 
Investor type is also relevant to leverage in the context of the agency problem. 
When controlling shareholders have professional knowledge and financial and 
business experience, the quality of monitoring may be better. Ownership identities 
are traditionally categorized into different types – such as government ownership, 
founding family ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership – in 
which family ownership and institutional ownership are studied most (e.g. 
Anderson et al.,2003; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009)). 
 
Institutional investors’ role in corporate governance is known as institutional 
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shareholder activism, which can effectively solve the agency problem of dispersed 
ownership (Black, 1992). Pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and 
banks are typical institutional shareholders and are capable of monitoring and 
affecting investment strategies to their benefit. However, certain characteristics of 
institutional shareholders make them take on an inactive role in monitoring 
management. Major institutional investors invest in various firms to diversify risk, 
so they may just be interested in short-term firm performance, even pushing firms 
to undertake risky investments with high returns (Black, 1992; Tufano, 1996). 
Additionally, due to the stock market’s liquidity, it is easy for institutional 
investors to sell and buy large shares that influence corporate efficiency. On the 
other hand, institutional shareholders are regulated to prevent them from holding 
significant percentages of shares in any one firm and consequently affect 
management passively (Black, 1992; Black and Coffee, 1994). To attract outside 
institutions, firms may issue more debt to adopt investment strategies consistent 
with their targets. 
 
In most family firms, the largest shareholder or blockholders are involved in 
management as executives and directors. Therefore family owners are in a better 
position to monitor corporate governance, overcoming the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since owners 
in a family tend to maintain voting and control power, they may make better 
investment decisions with longer horizons. However, family-owned firms are less 
transparent to the public, so stock prices are more sensitive to information 
asymmetry than non-family firms. On account of the higher cost of equity and 
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greater asymmetric information, family firms prefer issue debt over equity. These 
statements can be summarized as family firms have higher debt levels than 
non-family firms. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Due to the different incentives of various investors, this study develops the 
hypothesis regarding the effect of ownership concentration, managerial share 
ownership, and institutional ownership on a firm’s capital structure decisions,. 
 
The results obtained in the literature thus far with respect to the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm debt ratio are mixed. Grossman and Hart (1986) 
developed a model to formulate the costs and benefits of firm ownership 
structures, implying that managerial ownership is positively related to leverage. 
Subsequent the finding of Anderson et al. (2003) supports this proposition. 
Several theories from the literature underpin such a positive relation. First, to 
maintain the level of voting control and influence for a given level of equity, large 
undiversified shareholders prefer debt over equity financing. Second, a higher level 
of debt can reduce the probability of a firm becoming a takeover target (Stulz, 
1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Third, according to the signalling hypothesis, 
managers may implement higher leverage to convince investors of their ability to 
generate sufficient earnings to repay their debt (Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
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However, some authors find that the effect is negative, that is, managers prefer to 
keep a firm’s debt ratio low, alleviate the pressure that accompanies interest 
payment commitments (Jensen, 1986), and reduce bankruptcy risk and protect 
their undiversified human capital (Fama, 1980). In this context, it is implied that 
that risk-averse managers are more reluctant to raise a firm’s debt level. 
 
Moreover, Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) report a 
non-monotonic relation between managerial share ownership and a firm’s leverage 
level. The finding can be interpreted by two competing theories: interest 
alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and managerial entrenchment 
theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983). At low levels of managerial ownership, an 
increase therein promotes the alignment of management and shareholder interests. 
In this case, managers prefer a higher level of debt since the use of more debt can 
efficiently alleviate agency conflicts. However, when managerial share ownership 
surpasses a certain point, managers have more discretion to adjust debt levels for 
their own interests (Brailsford et al., 2002). To avoid the constraints from debt 
financing and bankruptcy risk, managers have more incentive to lower the debt 
level at high levels of managerial ownership. 
 
According to the active monitoring hypothesis, institutional investors can reduce 
the owner–manager agency conflict by closely monitoring firm performance 
(Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Higher debt levels bring about more 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The benefits of monitoring cash flow 
motivate external investors to bear the cost of active monitoring. Compared with 
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individual investors, institutional investors are better at monitoring due to their 
access to various sources of information and their large stakes in firms. A high 
degree of institutional ownership causes managers to follow corporate strategies in 
the interest of the shareholder. Institutional investors can share the benefits from 
proportionate cash flow dividends and the appreciation of firm shares with all 
shareholders. Furthermore, institutional investors can obtain private benefits from 
other providers of capital (small shareholders and creditors), such as the ability to 
trade firm shares below market price, access to private information, and the ability 
to influence firm policies (Grossman and Hart,1980; Barclay and Warner,1993). 
 
Ownership concentration measures the power of shareholders to influence 
managers (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). High ownership concentration 
fundamentally constrains manager discretion through the distribution of voting 
power and control among shareholders. To avoid sharing or losing control, firms 
with concentrated ownership prefer debt over equity, which leads to high levels of 
debt. However, as proposed, the risk of bankruptcy cannot be underestimated. The 
interests of large shareholders are highly linked to firm operations and force firms 
to hold a certain degree of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The relation between managerial share ownership and firm 
leverage is nonlinear. This relation is positive at lower levels of managerial share 
ownership and negative at higher levels. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Institutional ownership is positively related to firm leverage 
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Hypothesis 1c: The relation between ownership concentration and firm leverage is 
nonlinear. This relation is positive at lower levels of ownership concentration and 
negative at higher levels. 
 
A considerable body of research on the above aspects of managerial perspective 
suggests that a firm’s financing decisions are influenced by its managers’ objectives, 
desires, and preferences. In particular, the structure of equity ownership is an 
important proxy for manager’s incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Using the underlying agency theory and following the survey 
evidence to date (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; 
Anderson et al., 2003), this study expects a strong linkage between managerial 
ownership and firm securities financing decisions. 
 
According to pecking order theory, adverse selection leads managers to consider 
internal funds as a first choice, followed by debt issuance, with equity issuance as a 
last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Shareholders who hold a significant 
proportion of a firm’s share may favour debt over equity issuance since they intend 
to maintain their voting and control powers. Furthermore, debt financing is an 
efficient mechanism to assist creditors in disciplining the controlling shareholder 
and in imposing constraints via covenants (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). In 
general, family-owned firms prefer debt issuance due to their long-term 
commitment, which means that they usually enjoy lower costs of debt financing 
(Anderson et al., 2003). 
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Nevertheless, it is expected that managers are likely to issue equity based on several 
conjectures. On the one hand, the regular interest on debt reduces the probability of 
management overinvestment. On the other hand, managers are unwilling to accept 
monitoring by outside investors and creditors. Moreover, a high debt level is 
associated with a corresponding high risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
Since managers bear the non-diversifiable employment risk linked to a firm’s 
survival, bankruptcy or financial distress will result in their demotion or loss of 
employment (Friend and Lang, 1988; Brailsford et al., 2002). This risk aversion 
argument can also be applied to institutional and other shareholders. When a firm 
goes into bankruptcy and liquidation, shareholders have only a residual claim on its 
assets and cash flow, after creditors, employees, suppliers, and taxes are 
remunerated. Since large shareholders hold high equity stakes, their wealth is 
closely tied to firm survival. Naturally, they are more averse to raising a firm’s debt 
level (Friend and Lang, 1988; Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). In other words, 
when loss of control is less of a concern, firms are more likely to fund their growth 
with equity issuances. 
 
Hence, this study predicts the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: A firm with high managerial ownership is likely to choose equity 
over bond financing to secure external funds. 
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Hypothesis 2b: A firm with high institutional ownership is likely to choose equity 
over bond financing to secure external funds. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: A firm with high ownership concentration is likely to choose equity 
over bond financing to secure external funds. 
 
In practice, equity offerings are often related to the state of the market, that is, 
whether it is hot or cold (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975). Loughran et al. (1994) 
document that the issuing firm takes advantage of a window of opportunity known 
as a hot market, in which it schedules new issues to maximize issue proceeds 
simultaneously. The literature offers many explanations for this hot market 
phenomenon. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) built a signal model based on the theory 
of asymmetric information, predicting that a hot market induces a large number of 
IPO from high-quality firms. This is because the offer price is less affected by the 
costs of asymmetric information in hot markets. Subsequently, Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) developed the SEO model, which also predicts that 
better-quality firms are more likely to undertake equity issues when information 
asymmetry is low, as in a hot market. As a result, the cost of equity is reduced in a 
hot market. Furthermore, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) provide another explanation 
based on investor sentiment, that a favourable market valuation generates wild 
bullishness from some investors about the prospects of issuing firms. Investors are 
more willing to purchase new shares during hot markets (Helwege and Liang, 
2004). 
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In line with market timing theory, Frank and Goyal (2009) also claim that issuing 
firms and underwriters investigate current market valuation before issuing a new 
security. When the stock market is hot, investors are overoptimistic and 
consequently stock prices are overvalued (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). This 
increased market value directly generates lower leverage levels for firms. 
Managers may perceive a hot stock market as a good opportunity to issue new 
shares because of the lower cost of equity, further reducing firm debt ratios. If the 
stock market is cold, managers are willing to defer or withdraw the equity issue. 
Hence, this study further investigates whether the impact of managerial ownership 
on financing decisions of debt or equity vary in accordance with stock market 
valuation. 
 
Thus, this Chapter further proposes the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Hot (cold) stock market valuation strengthens (weakens) the positive 
effect of managerial share ownership on the likelihood of equity issue. 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the data sources and descriptive statistics for the firm and 
issue variables. It also shows how this study constructs the measures of ownership, 
leverage, and market valuation and provides variable definitions and a discussion 
of their evolution over the sample period. 
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2.4.1 Data Source and Sample Selection  
This study obtains the accounting and market data for the sample period 
1998–2009 from the DataStream.  The information on ownership and security 
issuances are derived from Thomson One Banker. The ownership data include the 
following terms for each firm: the equity ownership of all block holders 
(the %O/S
5
 > 3%), managers, and large institutional investors. the sample exclude 
observations where the total percentage of block holders exceeds 100%. 
 
To examine the impact of ownership on firm leverage, the sample consists of all 
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Due to the limited ownership 
information Thomson One Banker provided, the research period is restricted to 12 
years, from 1998 to 2009. The ownership dataset represents all of a firm’s 
shareholder information for each year, including investor type, investment style, 
and %O/S. the sample eliminates firms in the financial industry (Standard 
Industrial Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 
4900–4949) from the sample because the leverage ratio of financials is 
significantly different from that of non-financials and the utility industry operates 
under a regulatory regime, with limited scope for corporate control activity. This 
study thus reduces the sample to 275 firms. Additionally, this Chapter excludes 
                                                 
5
 Thomson One Banker defines % O/S as the percentage of total shares outstanding that a 
shareholder holds of a firm, calculated by dividing the investor’s share positions in the firm by the 
firm’s most recent publicly available total number of shares outstanding. 
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firm observations with incomplete data. The final overall sample consists of 3,244 
yearly firm observations from the period 1998–2009. 
 
The second motivation behind this chapter is to investigate how ownership affects 
securities financing decisions under different stock market valuations. Therefore 
we examine all UK firm bond and equity issuances reported by Thomson One 
Banker over the 12-year period. This study focuses on relatively large offerings, 
whose value exceeds US$1 million. After excluding financials and utilities,  the 
initial sample size is reduced to 1,372 bond offerings and 5,038 equity offerings. 
Since the analysis focuses on listed firms, IPO-related equity issuances are 
removed from the database. This study match ownership and accounting data with 
offering activity and then drop the missing issue observations. Thus the final 
sample comprises 348 bond and 378 equity issuances. 
2.4.2 Variable Definitions 
The empirical analysis uses ownership concentration (thereafter OC) as one of the 
proxies for firm ownership structure. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) measure OC as the 
fraction owned by the five, 10, or 20 largest shareholders. Earle et al. (2005) 
explore alternative measures to capture several important interactions between 
large shareholders and patterns of concentration that may influence the effect of OC 
on leverage. With this in mind, this study employs the sum of the percentage of 
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shares owned by block holders to measure OC,
6
 where a block holder in a UK firm 
is defined as one owning over 3% of the firm’s equity. 
 
Managerial share ownership (MSO) is defined as the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding shares owned by all executive and non-executive directors.
7
 This 
measure indicates whether the management party on the board has an incentive to 
involve firm operations. Besides the squared MSO term,  this study also uses 
piecewise linear regression to explore a nonlinear relation between MSO and 
leverage ratio. According to the studies of Morck et al. (1988) and Lundstrum 
(2009), this chapter classify MSO into three different levels: Low MSO (0–5%) 
indicates a firm whose MSO level is lower than 5%, median MSO (5–25%) 
indicates a firm whose MSO is in the range 5–25%, and high MSO (>25%) 
indicates a firm whose MSO is over 25%. 
 
In recent years, institutional investors have become the largest shareholders in UK 
firms. This chapter applies institutional OC as the proportion of corporate equity 
owned by institutional investors that own at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by all institutional investors. The role of institutional investors in 
                                                 
6
 For robustness tests, this study employs three other variables to measure OC: C1, defined as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder; C2, the sum of the holdings of the largest and 
second largest shareholders; and C3, the sum of the holdings of the three largest shareholders. The 
results based on these distinct OC variables also support this chapter’s findings. 
7
 This study does not separate non-executive ownership from managerial share ownership because 
of the limitation of data source.  
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corporate governance is known as institutional shareholder activism, which can 
effectively reduce the cost of debt financing. Typical institutional shareholders – 
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks – have the capacity 
to monitor and affect investment strategies for their own benefit. Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) find that firms with concentrated institutional ownership have 
lower yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues. Furthermore, Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach (2009) find that different large shareholders have distinct impacts 
on leverage. Klein and Zur (2009) document that hedge fund targets usually make 
continuous payouts in the form of interest payments to creditors to reduce the free 
cash flow problem. Hence their leverage level is higher.
8
 On the other hand, Black 
and Coffee (1994) argue that regulations restrict institutional shareholders from 
holding significant percentages of shares in any one firm, which passively affects 
management. 
 
In reference to the most frequently used concept of a hot market (e.g., Helwege and 
Liang, 2004), this author identifies the current market by ranking three-month 
moving averages of scaled equity issue volumes. Scaled issue volume is the 
aggregate equity issue volume divided by the month-end value of outstanding 
equity for the London Stock Exchange. Here Hot (Cold) is a dummy variable equal 
to one when the valuation of current market is in the top (bottom) 30% of the entire 
research period and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
8
 This study emphasizes the relation between institutional ownership and a firm’s capital structure, 
so it does not consider the type of institutional investor. 
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This study defines a firm’s debt level, leverage, as the book value of debt over the 
market value (Fama and French, 2002). Book debt is total assets minus book equity. 
We define book equity as total assets minus total liabilities plus investment tax 
credits minus preferred stock. We define market value as total liabilities minus 
investment credits plus preferred stock and market equity, where market equity is 
the number of common shares outstanding times the stock price. 
 
In addition to ownership structure, other factors affect the firm’s leverage ratio and 
external financing policies and can be grouped by firm-specific characteristics such 
as profitability, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, sales growth, dividend, non-debt 
tax shield, and credit rating. The impact of each factor on capital structure decisions 
is indicated in the relevant literature (Anderson et al., 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
This study calculates all of these variables, including ownership variables, as of the 
end of the preceding calendar year. 
 
This study defines firm profitability as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization over total assets. The literature has long argued about the effect of 
profitability on leverage (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Booth et al., 2001) but the findings are mixed. More profitable firms have lower 
costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Moreover, the use of debt as a 
monitoring mechanism is more likely to solve the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 
1986). Thus profitable firms use more debt financing. However, profitable firms 
probably have more internal funding to invest in new projects. Conversely, less 
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profitable firms need to resort to debt financing. This negative impact of 
profitability on a firm’s debt level can be countered by the presence of substantial 
investments (Booth et al., 2001). 
 
This study defines a firm’s market-to-book ratio as the ratio of total assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets. The 
market-to-book ratio is the most widely used indicator to predict firm growth 
opportunities. It can also capture the change of leverage brought about by equity 
mispricing. According to asymmetric information theory, overvaluation causes 
firms to issue equity but, when stock prices are undervalued, firms purchase shares 
or issue debt. Therefore firms with higher market-to-book ratios should have lower 
debt levels via equity issuance. 
 
Sales growth is measured by the change in the logarithm of total assets, which is 
considered in the literature to be an alternative measure of firm growth. Typically, 
low-growth firms can carry more debt in their capital structure because they are 
more secure and stable, incurring lower agency costs of debt. On the other hand, 
high-growth firms may face a more intense debt overhang problem, as described 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). In other words, the effect of 
sales growth on leverage is positive. This impact is more significant in small, 
family-owned firms, where there is a fear of losing control to the bank. 
 
The tangibility of firm assets is closely associated with agency costs of debt and 
the cost of financial distress (Myers, 1977; Booth et al., 2001), which is the ratio 
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of tangible assets to total assets. Firms with more tangible assets are better able to 
secure debt since these assets can be used as collateral (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In the case of liquidation, tangible assets are worth more than intangible 
assets. Hence bondholders generally demand a lower risk premium. This indicates 
that asset tangibility has a positive effect on leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
Based on agency theory and market efficiency theory, a firm’s dividend payout 
ratio is considered an important factor adversely impacting leverage (Rozeff, 1982). 
However, Chang and Rhee (1990) argue that firms with high dividend payout ratios 
are likely to issue more debt than those with low payout ratios. The authors reason 
that this is due to the effective capital gain tax rate being lower than the dividend tax 
rate. In the present study, this Chapter uses the term dividend to express a common 
dividend payout. 
Non-debt tax shield is an inverse proxy for the effect of tax on the leverage ratio 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Trade-off theory posits that firms increase the amount of 
debt to take advantage of greater interest tax shields (Haugen and Senbet, 1987). 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) demonstrate that non-debt tax deductions can be 
used to describe the tax shield benefits of debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) further 
employ the depreciation ratio, net operating loss carry-forwards, and investment tax 
credits as proxies for non-debt tax shields. The regressions define the non-debt tax 
shield as the ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
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A firm’s credit rating is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s 
Standard & Poor’s bond rating is above A- and zero if not. This variable is shown 
only in the regressions of bond issuance because it can be downloaded only to 
accompany bond issuers from Thomson One Banker. As posited in pecking order 
theory, firms with higher ratings have fewer adverse selection problems because 
credit rating involves a process of information revelation by the rating agency. 
Firms with higher reputation in the debt market may issue more corporate bonds 
(Denis and Mihov, 2003). Sufi (2009) further explores Standard & Poor’s credit 
ratings as a new measure of information asymmetry. 
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for 275 UK firms for 
the period 1998–2009, including OC, MSO, institutional ownership, leverage, 
profitability, firm size, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, tangibility, dividend 
payout ratio, and non-debt tax shield. The average level of MSO is 11.7%, which is 
very similar to the average level of 10.65% reported by Brailsford et al. (2002). The 
fact that the median value of MSO is smaller than the average value (4.7% versus 
11.7%, respectively) indicates that firms with lower managerial ownership 
dominate the UK market. Due to the definition of OC and institutional ownership, 
institutional investors hold a significant proportion of the total shares of firms in 
UK firms, 31.9% on average, whereas the average value of OC is 36.1%. It is 
notable that the mean level of leverage is 37.1% in the sample of all UK firms. This 
ratio is considerably higher than that in other countries, for example, 24.85% in US 
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firms over the period 1965–2001 (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and 30.3% in Brazil 
and 34.7% in Mexico for the period 1985–1991 (Booth et al., 2001). Profitability 
and firm size have mean values of 13.5% and 13.11, respectively. This Chapter uses 
the market-to-book ratio and sales growth as proxies for growth opportunity, with 
average values of 1.906 and 6.2%, respectively. Panel B shows that most firm 
observations have low MSO (51.78% of all firms’ observations) in the full sample. 
 
(Please insert Table 2.1 here) 
 
In Table 2.2, this study uses firm accounting data matched to security issuance and 
obtain 348 bond issues and 378 equity issues. Panel A shows issuance distribution 
by year. Bond and equity issues, as highly important financing decisions, raise 
US$99.45 billion and US$40.22 billion, respectively. It is shown  that the total 
number of equity issues is greater than the number of bond issues, while the sum of 
the proceeds of bond issues is significantly greater than that of equity issues. 
 
In panel B, this study also merges bond issues and equity issues with ownership and 
accounting variables. This table presents descriptive statistics by issue type and 
highlights the differences across bond and equity issuers. As shown in panel B, the 
average amount of bond issues is around US$285.8 million, while it is around 
US$106.3 million for equity issues. Bond issues, on average, raise more funds than 
equity issues did. On average, bond issuers have lower OC than equity issuers (22.5% 
versus 34.3%, respectively). On average, MSOs are 4.0% and 12.8% for bond and 
equity issuers, respectively, and this difference is significant at the 1% level. This 
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result is consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and means a 
higher-MSO firm perfers equity issue over bond to retain a lower level of debt. The 
average value of institutional ownership for bond issuers is 20.2%, while it is 31.5% 
for equity issuers. These findings suggest that firms that have higher OC, MSO, or 
institutional ownership values rely more on equity than bond financing. Another 
important observation is that the leverage ratio is much smaller for bond issuers 
than for equity issuers (39.5% versus 58.8%, respectively). This implies that bond 
issues are more likely to cluster for a firm with a lower debt level. 
 
Panel B also reports other firm characteristics of bond and equity issues. The 
profitability of bond issuers is greater than for equity issuers (14.6% versus 13.8%, 
respectively). On average, bond issuers have a significantly higher average firm 
size than equity issuers. The sales growth ratio for bond issuers is 4.4% while it is 
5.6% for equity issuers. This indicates that equity issuance exhibits greater 
clustering in high-growth firms, consistent with Frank and Goyal (2009). The 
average dividend is much higher for bond issuers than for equity issuers (13.8% 
versus 6.6%, respectively). The average value of the market-to-book ratio and 
tangibility do not differ between bond and equity issuers. 
 
To address the issue of whether bond and equity issues are associated with different 
market states, the evidence supports the expectations, that equity issues are more 
likely to cluster in a favourable market. 
 
(Please insert Table 2.2 here) 
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2.5 Empirical Results 
This Chapter applies several ordinary least squares models
9
to explore the 
propositions argued above. The first is a regression for examining how ownership 
impacts firm leverage. The second model is applied to examine how various levels 
of MSO affect firm bond–equity choice. Here external financing choice includes 
not only the likelihood of issuing bonds or equity but also the amount of security 
insurance proceeds. The third tests whether the effect of MSO on external financing 
policy changes under different stock market valuations. 
 
Table 2.3 presents the results of four models where the level of leverage is regressed 
against the ownership measures and other firm characteristics, using the overall 
sample of UK yearly firm observations. The analysis also includes industry and 
year dummies to control for industry- and time-specific effects. 
 
As shown in Estimation 1, the coefficient of OC for the leverage ratio is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient of OC
2 
is negative and 
significant. This result confirms a non-monotonic relation between leverage and 
ownership. Firms with concentrated ownership exhibit a negative association with 
                                                 
9
 This Chapter addresses the potential endogeneity effect of ownership concentration and 
managerial share ownership on leverage levels by using Hausman’s two-stage least squares test. 
The difference between the two estimations is insignificant. Therefore, this study favours OLS 
regressions.   
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the level of debt, while firms with dispersed ownership are positively related to the 
level of debt. By simple differentiation, the turning point of this relation is 17.8%. 
That is, the positive relation between ownership and leverage holds up to 17.8%. 
After the reaching the turning point, the higher the OC, the lower the debt level. 
This suggests that high-OC firms tend to maintain lower levels of leverage. 
Normally the voting rights that accompany the ownership of common shares enable 
shareholders to participate in management either directly or through electing the 
board of directors, who select the management team. However, a greater debt level 
is associated with a higher probability of financial distress and bankruptcy risk, 
which threatens large shareholders’ voting and control rights (Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999). 
 
Estimations 2 and 3 contain the results of the model in which leverage is regressed 
on MSO and MSO
2
, respectively. They reveal a similar pattern as OC in Estimation 
1. This result supports the hypothesis that the relation between MSO and leverage is 
nonlinear. Specially, firms tend to align the interests of managers and shareholders 
at a lower level of MSO by choosing a higher level of debt. However, when MSO is 
high, more entrenched corporate managers are likely to pursue their own 
self-interests, resulting in a lower debt ratio. This finding is consistent with the 
studies of Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009). The turning 
point is around 33%, that is, higher than OC’s turning point, because of the effect of 
institutional investors and other block shareholders. 
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Followed the findings in Estimations 2 and 3, MSO is replaced by three piecewise 
variables, as in Estimation 4 (Morck et al., 1988). Consistent with earlier findings,  
this study shows a positive and significant relation between MSO and leverage 
when MSO is lower than 25%. This association turns negative when MSO is over 
25%. 
 
This Chapter also examines the effect of institutional ownership on a firm’s debt 
level. As shown in Estimations 3 and 4, the coefficients of the institutional variable 
are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that firms with higher 
institutional ownership are prone to hold more debt in their capital structure. 
Consistent with the argument of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), concentrated 
institutional ownership effectively lowers the cost of debt capital through strong 
external monitoring. Tufano (1996) provides another potential explanation: Most 
institutional shareholders invest in a variety of firms to diversify risk. They may 
thus be interested only in the firm’s short-term performance. Hence, to attract 
outside institutions, firms may raise capital via debt financing to adopt investment 
strategies that meet institutional investors’ requirements. 
 
With regards to other important firm characteristics, the coefficient of profitability 
is significantly negative. The regression results indicate that profitable firms are 
less likely to increase their debt level, consistent with pecking order theory (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Moreover, the negative coefficient of the market-to-book ratio 
suggests that a firm’s leverage level is inversely correlated to its equity valuation. 
As an alternative proxy for firm growth opportunities, sales growth negatively 
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affects firm debt levels. A survey investigating trade-off theory finds that firm 
growth increases the cost of financial distress, weakens the free cash flow problem, 
and exacerbates the agency cost of debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Hence firms with 
more growth opportunities are less likely to raise debt. 
 
The results in Table 2.3 further demonstrate that firms with more tangible assets are 
more likely to raise debt in their capital structure. This supports such findings in the 
literature as those of Friend and Lang (1988) and Jensen et al. (1992). The dividend 
variable has a positive effect on the leverage ratio that is consistent with Chang and 
Rhee (1990). It is also shown that the coefficient of non-debt tax shield is positive 
and significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with the argument of Moh’d et 
al. (1995). These authors regard depreciation as the primary component of the 
non-debt tax shield and posit that higher depreciation charges represent a higher 
level of tangibility, which implies a higher collateral value for the firm; thus the 
capacity for debt rises. 
 
(Please insert Table 2.3 here) 
 
Thus far this Chapter has documented that a firm’s ownership structure is related to 
capital structure in a non-monotonic manner. This Chapter proceeds to examine the 
effect of ownership on a firm’s external financing activity according to two aspects: 
issue type and offer size. Plainly, issuing public debt increases a firm’s debt level, 
while equity issue decreases the leverage ratio. Furthermore, the bigger offer size of 
security issuance strengthens such effects. However, it is unclear from the extant 
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literature whether firms’ external financing decisions are somewhat subject to their 
ownership structure. Therefore this study should establish the connection between 
ownership structure and firms’ external financing decisions. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
present the results of regressing ownership on issue choice and offer size by 
examining 726 issues, a combination of 348 bond and 378 equity issues, over the 
period 1998–2009. 
 
In Table 2.4 this study uses a binary dependent variable that takes the value of one 
for equity issues and zero for bond issues. Following the theoretical literature on the 
function of ownership structure in financing choices, this Chapter uses ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership as a proxy for 
ownership structure. The models in this table also include the determinants of 
bond–equity choice that earlier empirical work (Morck et al., 1988; Frank and 
Goyal, 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009) views as important. 
 
As reported from Estimation 1 in Table 2.4, OC is positively related to the 
probability of equity issue. Issuers with concentrated ownership are more likely to 
choose equity, while bond ownership-dispersed firms are more likely to issue bonds. 
Table 2.5 reports that OC is positively related to the amount of debt issuance and 
inversely affects the amount of equity issuance. This suggests that firms with high 
OC tend to increase the proceeds of bond issue but reduce the proceeds of equity 
offerings compared with low-OC firms.  
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Combining the OC results shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, this study can explain 
matters as follows. Since large shareholders hold high equity stakes, their private 
interests are closely associated with firm survival. Hence large shareholders may 
prefer equity over debt to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. However, bigger offer sizes 
of equity financing would weaken their control and decision power. Large 
shareholders are expected to carry larger bonds. The implication is that the bigger 
the bond a firm raises, the greater the interest payment, which means the firm has 
more active monitoring mechanisms in place to reduce the agency conflict between 
owner and manager, especially in family firms (Morck et al., 1988; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). This result also explains the nonlinear relation between OC and 
leverage, that is, high-OC firms are more (less) likely to issue equity (bonds) but 
they tend to decrease (increase) the amount. 
 
Estimation 2 in Table 2.4 shows that the coefficients of MSO are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that an increase in MSO level is 
associated with a higher likelihood of issuers choosing equity over debt. In other 
words, firms with a lower MSO prefer bonds over equity and the inverse at higher 
MSO levels. This result supports the interest alignment hypothesis of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and managerial entrenchment theory (Jensen, 1986). Although 
bond issue can alleviate agency conflicts and the cash flow problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), most managers are risk averse to raising debt levels by bond issue, 
especially those who own a large proportion of firm shares. This is because they 
tend to reduce non-diversifiable employment risk (Friend and Lang, 1988). 
Additionally, the obligations associated with bond issue constrain managers’ 
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discretion on a firm’s free cash flow, who then adjust debt ratios according to their 
incentives (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986). 
 
Moreover, it is shown that the coefficients of MSO in Table 2.5 are not significant, 
suggesting that the offer size of bond or equity issue is unrelated to managerial 
share ownership. Associating these findings with those in Table 2.3, this Chapter 
can summarize them as meaning that lower levels of MSO induce firms to issue 
bonds instead of equity, leading to increased debt levels. Moreover, firms with 
higher MSO tend to choose equity financing over bonds, resulting in reduced 
leverage ratios. This finding is consistent with the results of the association between 
MSO and leverage level in Table 2.3. 
 
To better investigate the relation between MSO and the choice of financing, this 
Chapter employs, as in Table 2.3, a piecewise linear specification of MSO in 
Estimation 3. The results show that the coefficients of MSO (5–25%) are 
significantly positive; however, the coefficients of the MSO (0–5%) and MSO 
(>25%) variables are not statistically significant. This suggests that MSO has a 
significant impact on financing decisions at the 5–25% level but no influence under 
5% or over 25%. At this range of MSO, an increase in MSO makes issuers more 
likely to choose equity over debt. Firms with lower MSO prefer bonds over equity. 
 
The positive and significant coefficient of institutional ownership in Table 2.4 
suggests that firms with greater institutional ownership are less likely to issue bonds 
over equity. This finding can be explained by institutional shareholder risk aversion. 
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However, Table 2.5 reports that the institutional variable has a strongly positive 
effect on the amount of bond issuance. This finding suggests that firms with high 
institutional ownership tend to maximize their bond size. This is because greater 
institutional ownership leads to lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new 
bond issue (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Thus the proceeds of new bonds are 
greater when the issuer has concentrated institutional ownership. 
 
Another important finding is that the coefficient of current market is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that favourable market conditions increase 
the probability of equity issue, while an unfavourable market increases the 
probability of bond issue. This finding supports the previous literature (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), which states that firms decide to 
raise equity capital under favourable current market conditions. Allen and 
Faulhaber (1990) argue that a hot market is a sign of a positive shock to a firm’s 
expected profits. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) demonstrate that a hot market 
offers a window of opportunity for seasoned equity issues because the asymmetric 
information cost and adverse selection cost should be lower then. 
 
In Estimations 4 and 5 in Table 2.4, to investigate the role of current market 
valuation on the relation between ownership and firms’ external finding decisions, 
this Chapter constructs two binary variables, Hot and Cold, representing hot and 
cold stock market periods, respectively. Then this study proposes two interaction 
terms between MSO and stock market valuation in the regressions: MSO*Hot and 
MSO*Cold. As reported in Estimation 4, the results on the effect of MSO or current 
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market on financing decisions are also consistent with earlier findings. The 
coefficient of the interaction term MSO*Hot is positive and statistically significant, 
implying that a hot market increases the probability that firms with a higher level of 
managerial ownership choose equity over bond issues. The results of Estimation 5 
show that the interaction variable MSO*Cold is significantly positive at the 10% 
level, which indicates that a cold market reduces the likelihood that firms with a 
higher level of managerial ownership issue equity over bonds. 
 
Consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in panel B in Table 2.2, other 
controlling variables also have a significant impact on a firm’s external financing 
choice. The coefficient of leverage suggests that a firm with a higher debt level 
tends to issue equity instead of bonds. This finding can be explained by a firm’s 
attempt to restructure its capital. The positive probability coefficient indicates that 
firms with higher retained earnings are more likely to issue equity than bonds. At 
same time, firms with higher growth opportunity, measured by sales growth, also 
tend to issue equity over bonds. However, greater tangibility promotes the 
probability of firms choosing bonds over equity, supporting the findings of Friend 
and Lang (1988) and Jensen et al. (1992). The dividend coefficient suggests that 
firms with higher cash dividend payments have more incentive to issue bonds over 
equity, consistent with pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Finally, the 
coefficient of non-debt tax shield indicates that firms with higher depreciation 
charges tend to raise equity capital over public debt. This supports the argument of 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 
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In Table 2.5, this Chapter further examines other factors relevant to offer size. The 
level of debt is negatively related to offer size because the cost of capital rises when 
a firm carries more debt. The proceeds of bond issuance are inversely correlated 
with firm profitability, in line with the results of Myers and Majluf (1984), who 
show that profitable firms lower the proceeds of bond offerings because they can 
employ internal funds for new investments instead. The market-to-book ratio has a 
negative effect on the proceeds of bond issues, which implies that managers should 
time the stock market to issue equity instead of bonds when stock prices are 
overvalued. However, the effect of sales growth on the size of bond issues is 
significantly positive, suggesting that sales growth, as another indicator of firm 
success, is closely correlated with the availability of internal funds. 
As posited earlier, the coefficients of tangibility in Estimations 2 and 4 suggest that 
high-tangibility firms tend to increase the proceeds of bond issues relative to the 
proceeds of equity offerings. This finding implies that firms with higher levels of 
tangible assets are expected to have a lower cost of debt because they have more 
collateral to offer. Consistent with Chang and Rhee (1990), the dividend variable 
has a positive impact on bond size. A significant positive correlation is found 
between the non-debt tax shield and the amount of bond issuance, which suggests 
that firms with higher levels of depreciation are willing to increase their bond size. 
This supports the argument of Moh’d et al. (1995). Another important finding is that 
credit rating, a significant determinant of bond size, has a significantly positive 
effect, consistent with findings reported by Denis and Mihov (2003). 
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 (Please insert Tables 2.4 and 2.5 here) 
2.6. Conclusions 
This study extends the existing knowledge of capital structure in the following 
ways. First, this Chapter stresses the importance of the relation between 
ownership and leverage ratio in the UK context. The analysis uses three major 
proxies for ownership: ownership concentration, managerial share ownership, and 
institutional ownership. The empirical results show that the association between 
OC and the debt ratio is non-monotonic, as is the relation between MSO and the 
level of debt. At lower levels of managerial share ownership, its relation with 
leverage is positive, supporting interest alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This is because higher managerial ownership plays an important role in 
aligning the interests of corporate managers and outside shareholders, leading to a 
lower cost of debt. In this case, firms are likely to raise more debt, resulting in 
higher debt levels. However, this relation becomes negative, which can be 
explained by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Corporate managers are in a better position to protect their private interests from 
the risk of bankruptcy associated with a high leverage ratio.  Our finding is 
consistent with the studies of Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009). Interestingly, institutional ownership is found to be positively related with a 
firm’s leverage ratio. This implies that institutional investors have a strong 
incentive to mitigate agency costs through monitoring. As a result, public debt 
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issuance is more favourable than other external financing channels. 
 
Second, this Chapter further examines the impact of ownership structure on firms’ 
external financing decisions. Our empirical results strongly suggest that firms with 
a higher level of MSO prefer to issue equity over bonds to avoid the risk of 
bankruptcy. This study also considers the role of current market valuation in the 
choice of security issuance. Consistent with previous findings (Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), firms raise new seasoned equity when the 
market is favourable; otherwise, they are more likely to choose a bond issue instead. 
Further, this study ties stock market valuations to the relation between MSO and a 
firm’s external financing activities. This study finds that a hot market increases the 
probability of firms with higher levels of managerial ownership choosing equity 
over bond issues. At the same time, a cold market decreases the probability that 
firms with a low level of managerial ownership issue equity over bonds. In 
summary, the magnitudes of these effects suggest that firms, on average, time 
current market valuation when they plan to raise external financing. 
 
Third, this Chapter investigates whether ownership can influence the proceeds of 
issuance. The empirical results suggest that high-OC firms prefer to issue more 
bonds and less equity to maintain their corporate control and reduce agency costs. 
In contrast, firms with dispersed ownership tend to maximize the proceeds of equity 
and reduce the amount raised from bonds. 
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It is notable that this research highlights OC, managerial share ownership, and 
institutional ownership as proxies of ownership structure. Due to the difficulty of 
obtaining reliable data, this study does not take institutional shareholder type into 
account, although it plays a vital role in ownership structure. For the same reasons, 
it is unclear how institutional differences affect firm capital structure decisions. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, there is no optimal capital structure, so further 
research may determine how ownership influences firm capital structure 
adjustment speed according to dynamic trade-off theory. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample 
This table reports key descriptive statistics of the sample of 275 UK listed companies (Panel A) and 
the number of firm observations with different levels of managerial share ownership (Panel B), 
excluding financials and utilities. All firm observations are yearly, based on the period 1998–2009 
(from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2009).Panel A reveals the means, standard deviations, 
medians, and 25th and 75th quartiles of the firm characteristics of the full sample. Here OC is the 
sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% stakes; MSO represents managerial share 
ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; 
Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all 
institutional investors; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of book debt and the market 
value of equity; Profitability is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over 
total debt; M/B ratio is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity to the book value of assets; Sales growth is the change in the log of total 
assets; Tangibility is tangible assets over total assets; Dividend expresses the common dividend 
payout ratio; Non-debt tax shield denotes the ratio of depreciation to total assets;Low MSO (0–5%) 
represents firms whose level of managerial share ownership is lower than 5%;Median MSO (5–25%) 
represents firms whose MSO is in the range 5–25%; and High MSO (>25%) represents firms whose 
MSO is over 25%.  
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics of the 275 sample firms 
Variables Mean St. Dev. 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
75th 
percentile 
No. of 
Obs. 
OC 0.361 0.230 0.181 0.357 0.517 3,244 
MSO 0.117 0.17.2 0.009 0.045 0.141 3,244 
Institutional OC 0.319 0.224 0.144 0.301 0.472 3,244 
Leverage 0.371 0.187 0.238 0.359 0.495 3,668 
Profitability 0.135 0.141 0.092 0.137 0.191 3,781 
M/B ratio 1.906 1.706 1.167 1.498 2.044 3,668 
Sales growth 0.062 0.151 -0.005 0.040 0.095 3,763 
Tangibility 0.312 0.248 0.108 0.258 0.451 3,782 
Dividend 0.086 0.110 0.0015 0.0546 0.114 3,648 
Non-debt tax shield 0.037 0.029 0.017 0.030 0.047 3,706 
Panel B Number of firm observations with different levels of MSO 
Firm Observations 
Low MSO 
(0–5%) 
Median MSO (5–25%) 
High MSO 
(>25%) 
Total 
No. of obs. 1680 1036 528 3244 
% 51.79 31.94 16.28 100 
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Table 2.2 Issue Distributions and Firm Characteristics of Bond and Equity Issues 
This table presents the distributions of 348 equity issues and 378 bond issues by year (Panel A), the 
firm characteristics for the sample of bond and equity issues, respectively (Panel B), and the number 
of issues from issuers with different levels of managerial share ownership (Panel C), excluding 
financials and utilities. All issues are for the period 1998–2009 (from January 1, 1998, to December 
31, 2009),.Here Annual proceeds is the sum of proceeds in one year; Proceeds is the proceed amount 
of the issues, in millions of US dollars; OC is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% 
share stakes; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of 
executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of 
the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Leverage is the ratio of the book value of 
debt to the market value; Profitability is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization over total debt; M/B ratio is the ratio of total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity to the book value of assets; Sales growth is measured by the change in the 
log of total assets; Tangibility is tangible assets over total assets; Dividend expresses the common 
dividend payout ratio; Non-debt tax shield denotes the ratio of depreciation to total assets;Current 
market is defined as a three-month moving average of scaled equity issue volumes, where scaled 
issue volume is the aggregate equity issue volume divided by the month-end value of outstanding 
equity for the London Stock Exchange; Low MSO (0–5%) represents issuers whose level of 
managerial share ownership is lower than 5%;Median MSO (5–25%) represents issuers whose MSO 
is in the range 5–25%; and High MSO (>25%)represents issuers whose MSO is over 25%. The 
superscripts ***，**, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
for the Wilcoxon signed ranks test of the difference in means between bond and equity issues. 
Panel A. Bond and equity issue distribution 
 Bond Issues Equity Issues 
Year No. of Obs. Annual Proceeds No. of Obs. Annual Proceeds 
1998 16 2252.54 20 1658.64 
1999 8 1134.68 10 4765.32 
2000 24 7103.15 16 454.31 
2001 32 6228.17 24 1794.20 
2002 38 12399.49 55 2675.72 
2003 19 5803.68 21 1317.84 
2004 42 12508.13 37 4460.86 
2005 20 3197.81 44 3325.10 
2006 39 10527.04 37 4889.71 
2007 60 20011.32 53 5247.06 
2008 25 12237.47 41 8166.32 
2009 25 6046.05 20 1478.29 
Total 348 99449.53 378 40233.37 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Panel B. Firm characteristics for bond and equity issues 
 Bond issues Equity issues Difference in 
means Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Proceeds 285.775 258.161 106.437 143.234 179.338*** 
OC 0.225 0.174 0.343 0.197 -0.118** 
MSO 0.040 0.072 0.128 0.162 -0.088*** 
Institutional OC 0.202 0.164 0.315 0.195 -0.113*** 
Leverage 0.395 0.139 0.588 0.150 -0.193*** 
Profitability 0.146 0.084 0.138 0.040 0.008*** 
M/B ratio 1.715 1.081 1.112 0.312 0.603 
Sales growth 0.044 0.072 0.056 0.113 -0.012*** 
Tangibility 0.429 0.263 0.531 0.224 -0.102 
Dividend 0.138 0.18 0.066 0.072 0.072*** 
Non-debt tax shield 0.042 0.03 0.067 0.055 -0.025* 
Current market -0.092 1.062 0.087 0.931 -0.179** 
No. of obs. 348 378  
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Table 2.3 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Firms’ Capital Structure 
This table reports the estimates of several OLS regressions of firm leverage levels on ownership measures and a series of control variables over the period 
1998–2009 (from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2009).Here Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value; OC is the sum of shares held by 
block holders with at least 3% share stakes; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive 
directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Profitability is earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over total debt; M/B ratio is the ratio of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to 
the book value of assets; Sales growth is measured by the change in the log of total assets; Tangibility is tangible assets over total assets; Dividend expresses the 
common dividend payout ratio; and Non-debt tax shield denotes the ratio of depreciation to total assets.Estimation 3 is a piecewise linear specification in 
managerial share ownership such thatMSO (0–5%) is equal to MSO when MSO is lower than 5% and MSO (0–5%) is equal to 5% otherwise; MSO (5–25%) is 
equal to zero if MSO is lower than 5%.When MSO in the range 5–25%, MSO (5–25%) is equal to MSO minus 5%; otherwise, MSO (5–25%) is equal to 
25%;MSO (>25%) is equal to zero if MSO is lower than 25%. When MSO is over 25%, MSO (>25%) is equal to MSO minus 25%.All independent variables are 
lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in 
square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Variable Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept 0.205*** [<.0001] 0.498*** [<.0001] 0.479*** [<.0001] 0.474*** [<.0001] 
OC 0.126*** [<.0001]       
OC2 -0.321*** [0.003]       
MSO   0.564*** [<.0001] 0.486*** [<.0001]   
MSO2   -0.863*** [0.005] -0.672*** [0.004]   
MSO (0–5%)       0.082** [0.021] 
MSO (5–25%)       0.016*** [0.001] 
MSO (>25%)       -0.008*** [0.001] 
Institutional OC     0.046*** [0.000] 0.046*** [0.001] 
Profitability -0.228*** [<.0001] -0.196*** [<.0001] -0.199*** [<.0001] -0.195*** [<.0001] 
M/B ratio -0.061*** [<.0001] -0.064*** [<.0001] -0.064*** [<.0001] -0.064*** [<.0001] 
Sales growth -0.046** [0.024] 0.040 [0.846] 0.088 [0.670] 0.047 [0.820] 
Tangibility 0.029** [0.020] 0.026** [0.045] 0.032** [0.014] 0.028** [0.031] 
Dividend 0.091*** [0.000] 0.016*** [<.0001] 0.017*** [<.0001] 0.018*** [<.0001] 
Non-debt tax shield 0.258** [0.026] 0.244** [0.039] 0.208* [0.078] 0.200* [0.091] 
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.296 0.299 0.300 
No. of obs. 3244 3244 3244 3244 
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Table 2.4 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Firms’ Financing Decisions 
This table reports the estimates of logistic regressions where the dependent variables are binary variables that take the value of one if the issuer issues equity and 
zero for bond issues. The sample comprises 726 issues combined with 348 bond and 378 equity issues over the period 1998–2009 (from January 1, 1998, to 
December 31, 2009).Here OC is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% share stakes; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as 
the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by 
all institutional investors; Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value; Profitability is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization over total debt; M/B ratio is the ratio of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets; 
Sales growth is the change in the log of total assets; Tangibility is tangible assets over total assets; Dividend expresses the common dividend payout ratio; 
Non-debt tax shield denotes the ratio of depreciation to total assets; andCurrent market is a three-month moving average of scaled equity issue volumes, where 
scaled issue volume is the aggregate equity issue volume divided by the month-end value of outstanding equity for the London Stock Exchange. The variable 
Hot(Cold) is a dummy variable equal to one when the valuation of the current market is in the top (bottom) 30% of the whole research period and zero 
otherwise; MSO*Hot (MSO*Cold) is the interaction term of MSO and Hot (Cold), that is, MSO times the Hot (Cold) dummy variables. Estimation 3 is a 
piecewise linear specification in managerial share ownership such that MSO (0–5%) is equal to MSO when MSO is lower than 5% and MSO (0–5%) is equal to 
5% otherwise; MSO (5–25%) is equal to zero if MSO is lower than 5%. When MSO in the range 5–25%, MSO (5–25%) is equal to MSO minus 5%; otherwise 
MSO (5–25%) is equal to 25%; MSO (>25%) is equal to zero if MSO is lower than 25%. When MSO is over 25%, MSO (>25%) is equal to MSO minus 
25%.All independent variables are for the year-end prior to issuance. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects.The p-value for the chi-squared test 
statistic is shown in square brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 Estimation 5 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept -1.469*** [<.0001] -0.521*** [<.0001] -1.456*** [<.0001] -1.590*** [<.0001] -0.864** [0.014] 
OC 0.042*** [<.0001][         
MSO   0.052*** [<.0001]   0.021*** [0.000] 0.033** [0.011] 
MSO (0–5%)     0.119 [0.162]     
MSO (5–25%)     0.073*** [0.005]     
MSO (>25%)     0.020 [0.534]     
MSO*hot       0.218*** [0.000]   
MSO*cold         -0.165* [0.052] 
Current market 0.631*** [0.003] 0.513*** [0.000] 0.832*** [0.000]     
hot       1.283*** [<.0001]   
cold         -0.601** [0.036] 
Institutional OC   0.041*** [<.0001] 0.035*** [<.0001] 0.039*** [<.0001] 0.038*** [<.0001] 
Leverage 0.127*** [0.001] 0.197*** [0.002] 0.297*** [<.0001] 0.164** [0.012] 0.194*** [0.002] 
Profitability 0.419*** [0.007] 0.396** [0.013] 0.510*** [0.003] 0.486*** [0.003] 0.464*** [0.003] 
M/B ratio -0.141 [0.281] -1.057 [0.423] -0.237* [0.095] -0.115 [0.390] -1.290 [0.328] 
Sales growth 0.784*** [<.0001] 0.491*** [<.0001] 0.524*** [<.0001] 0.563*** [<.0001] 0.513*** [<.0001] 
Tangibility -0.201*** [<.0001] -1.837*** [<.0001] -0.207*** [<.0001] -2.040*** [<.0001] -1.942*** [<.0001] 
Dividend -0.693*** [<.0001] -0.656*** [<.0001] -0.683*** [<.0001] -0.549*** [<.0001] -0.579*** [<.0001] 
Non-debt tax shield 0.896** [0.043] 0.170 [0.722] 0.266 [0.599] -0.034 [0.947] 0.207 [0.656] 
Pseudo-R2 0.297 0.298 0.336 0.349 0.307 
No. of obs. 726 726 726 726 726 
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Table 2.5 The Impacts of Ownership on the Proceed Amount of Issuance 
This table reports the estimates of several OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proceed amount of issuance (scaled by the issuer’s market value for 
the year-end prior to issuance). Our two subsamples consist of 348 bond and 378 equity issues, respectively, over the period 1998–2009(from January 1, 1998, to 
December 31, 2009).Estimations 1 and 2 are used to examine the relation between ownership and the proceed amount of bond issues, while Estimations 3 and 4 are 
employed to test the impact of ownership on the proceed amount of equity issues. Here OC is defined as the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% 
share stakes; MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC 
comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market 
value; Profitability is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over total debt; M/B ratio is defined as the ratio of total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets; Sales growth is the change in the log of total assets; Tangibility is tangible assets over 
total assets; Dividend expresses the common dividend payout ratio; Non-debt tax shield denotes the ratio of depreciation to total assets;andCredit rating is a 
dummy variable that equals one when a firm’s S&P bond rating is above A- and zero if below A-.All independent variables are lagged with respect to the 
dependent variable. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets. The 
superscripts ***，**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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 Bond issue Equity issue 
 Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept -0.185 [0.613] 0.498*** [<.0001] 0.323*** [<.0001] 0.976*** [<.0001] 
OC 0.026*** [<.0001]   -0.006** [0.044]   
MSO   -0.065 [0.885]   -0.020 [0.262] 
Institutional OC   0.013*** [<.0001]   0.047 [0.462] 
Leverage -0.098*** [0.001] -0.096*** [0.001] -0.263*** [<.0001] -0.265*** [<.0001] 
Profitability -1.326* [0.070] -1.478** [0.022] -1.706** [0.015] -0.312** [0.027] 
M/B ratio -1.073* [0.064] -1.812*** [0.001] 0.482 [0.501] 0.765*** [<.0001] 
Sales growth 1.916*** [0.000] 1.093** [0.022] 0.22 [0.404] 0.089 [0.857] 
Tangibility 0.316** [0.029] 0.651*** [<.0001] -0.298 [0.238] -0.124** [0.011] 
Dividend 0.517** [0.011] 0.481*** [0.006] -0.576 [0.441] 1.888 [0.234] 
Non-debt tax shield 1.585*** [<.0001] 1.258*** [<.0001] 0.323 [0.123] 0.702* [0.075] 
Credit rating 0.168** [0.044] 0.141* [0.078]     
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.471 0.228 0.245 
No. of obs. 348 348 378 378 
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Chapter 3 Ownership Structure and the Choice of 
SEO Issue Method 
3.1 Introduction 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are an important external financing decision for 
publicly listed firms. The research on UK SEOs mainly focuses on the choice of 
issue type, such as rights offers versus placings, as well as the market reactions to 
announcements of SEO issuance. For example, Slovin et al. (2000) find that rights 
offer generates a significantly negative effect on firm stock price, while placing has 
a significantly positive effect. Based on a different sample period, Barnes and 
Walker (2006) obtain similar outcomes. They further develop a model to examine 
the determinants of choice between rights offers and placings. However, in addition 
to rights offers and placing, there are alternative SEO choices for UK firms, such as 
open offers or a combination of an open offer and placing.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no previous research on these alternative SEO 
choices. Therefore, the basic motivation of this chapter is to fill this gap by 
examining the choice of alternative issue methods, including rights offers, placing, 
open offers, and open offers combined with placing. This chapter mainly 
investigates the choices of financing decisions relating to firm ownership structure. 
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It further analyzes the effects of ownership structure on the price setting and 
announcement returns of SEOs. 
 
When UK firms conduct an SEO, they can choose from four flotation methods: a 
rights offer (RO), placing (PL), an open offer (OO), and a combination of placing 
and an open offer (PLOO). The RO and OO are right-preserving issue methods, in 
which existing shareholders are entitled to preemption rights for purchasing new 
shares in proportion to their holdings. This preemption right is an effective 
mechanism to protect shareholder wealth and control, which is enshrined in UK 
Company Law (Companies Act 1985). Moreover, preemption rights in ROs are 
allowed to be sold in the market, whereas those in OOs are not marketable. As an 
alternative to a right-preserving issue, UK firms may issue equity through placing, 
in which the entire amount of shares is purchased by an underwriter at a fixed price; 
the underwriter then places the shares with outside investors rather than existing 
shareholders. Additionally, UK firm usually conduct OOs combined with 
conditional PLs, that is, PLOOs. In such an offer, the proportion of the share placed 
is subject to the proportion of shares taken up by existing shareholders. 
 
The role of ownership structure in a firm’s choice of issue method is discussed in 
the context of agency costs between large undiversified and diversified 
shareholders and between managers and shareholders. According to the control 
hypothesis, block holders, who hold large fractions of a firm’s shares, are assumed 
to have a large influence on firm equity issue decisions by voting rights and control. 
Block holders of the firm are expected to press the firm to choose a right-preserving 
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issue rather than placing to avoid the reduction in private benefits of control. 
Moreover, if block holders do not exercise the preemption rights, they can also 
obtain benefits from selling these rights to other investors (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 
2003). In this case, an RO is more likely to be chosen over an OO. Based on these 
considerations, it is implied that a firm’s ownership structure may have large impact 
on its financing choices. To conduct this analysis, this chapter uses ownership 
concentration as a proxy for the incentive of block holders. 
 
Under the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, managers are assumed to choose 
the issue method that maximizes their private wealth. However, the choice in this 
case may not be optimal from a shareholder’s perspective. This setting will lead to 
two outcomes. First, placings can dilute the control power of firms; thus entrenched 
managers are less likely to choose placing. Second, placings can also be used to 
strengthen the control rights of management (Barclay et al., 2007). Managers can 
place the shares directly with affiliated investors who vote in favour of managers, 
resulting in more entrenched management. For this reason, managers prefer placing 
rather than other issue methods. To analyze this issue, we construct managerial 
ownership as a proxy for the incentive of entrenched managers. 
 
To investigate the monitoring effect on this issue, this Chapter uses institutional 
ownership as a proxy for the incentive of external monitors. The monitoring 
hypothesis suggests that the monitoring of management can constrain managerial 
opportunism in corporate policy decision making. Therefore, firms with active 
monitors tend to choose the issue method that maximizes shareholder interests. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) indicate that placing can strengthen the monitoring of 
management by creating potential monitors. However, if the firm already has 
monitors, the benefit of adding one by placing should be lower. In this case, the 
probability of firms implementing SEOs by placing will be decreased. 
 
This study examines the SEOs of firms traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
during the period 1998–2010. The data on SEO and ownership characteristics are 
obtained from Thomson One Banker’s database. The research sample comprises 
653 UK SEOs, categorized into four subsamples by issue type: 156 ROs, 291 PLs, 
54 OOs, and 152 PLOOs. The descriptive statistics analysis shows that the average 
issue size of ROs is the largest, while that of PLs is the smallest (US$211.79 versus 
US$91.21 million, respectively) among the four issue types. Moreover, the highest 
price discount occurs for ROs, while the lowest appears in PLs. These results are 
consistent with the restrictions of the LSE (also found in Barnes and Walker, 2006; 
Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). To examine the choice of SEO issue method more 
explicitly, this Chapter applies not only the basic logistic models, but also 
multinomial logistic regression. This is because the latter model allows for four 
possible conditions of the dependent variable. Subsequently, event study 
methodology and cross-sectional regressions are used to examine the determinants 
in offer price setting and market reactions to SEO announcements. Consistent with 
previous studies (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Capstaff and 
Fletcher, 2011), this study finds significantly positive market reactions to PLs and 
PLOOs, but a negative reaction to ROs. This indicates that SEOs choosing a PL or 
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PLOO provide a positive signal for firm value, which results in lower indirect costs, 
but an RO is a negative signal for firm value and entails larger indirect costs. 
 
By investigating the determinant of the choice of issue method, the empirical 
results strongly support the hypotheses. Consistent with the control hypothesis, 
high ownership concentration firms prefer ROs and OOs over PLs. Moreover, they 
choose ROs over OOs. For firms with higher managerial ownership, placing is the 
first choice for these firms’ equity issues. This evidence is in line with the prediction 
of the entrenched management hypothesis. Moreover, firms with lower institutional 
ownership are more likely to choose placing over other issue methods to improve 
monitoring.  
 
This Chapter also finds evidence that the probability of choosing placing is 
significantly related to issue size, offer discount, and previous stock performance. 
More specifically, firms with smaller offer sizes, higher discounts, and better stock 
performance are more likely to use the placing method. These results are consistent 
with Barnes and Walker (2006). Interestingly, the results also suggest that pre-issue 
market conditions have a significant effect on the choice of issue method. Placing is 
the first choice for firms who conduct SEOs in a cold market; however firms are 
less likely to choose placing in a hot market. The result supports the argument that 
firms are willing to conduct equity issues when they are overvalued. A hot market is 
highly associated with overoptimistic investors and overvalued equity (Barker and 
Wurgler, 2002). Given the argument that using placing is a proxy for value 
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certification (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), SEOs in a hot market are likely to be 
motivated by firm overvaluation. 
 
Furthermore, this Chapter provides evidence of the SEO price-setting process and 
subsequent announcement returns. In particular, our analysis focuses on the 
influence of ownership structure on such issues. The results suggest that firms with 
concentrated ownership or higher managerial share ownership are likely to offer a 
higher discount in their SEOs. Consistent with the private benefit prediction of the 
controlling hypothesis, the share’s public float and market liquidity should decrease 
with the ownership of controlling shareholders. Therefore, such firms should offer a 
higher discount to compensate for investing in illiquid stock.  
 
Moreover, this study finds that SEOs conducted by firms with higher managerial 
ownership receive less favourable market reactions. On the contrary, there is a 
significantly positive relation between pre-issue institutional ownership and SEO 
announcement returns. This result indicates that high pre-issue institutional 
ownership is a positive signal for firm value due to the monitoring by institutional 
investors. This Chapter also reports that the market condition is positively 
associated with market reactions to SEO announcements. This finding further 
supports market timing theory. It implies that managers are market timers who are 
likely to issue equity when indirect costs are lower. 
 
The results support the theoretical predictions of Wruck (1986), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Barclay 
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et al. (2007). Private placement creates a large shareholder with an incentive to 
monitor, which can mitigate the problem of managerial moral hazard and raise the 
probability of a value-increasing takeover (Wruck, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). Eckbo and Masulis (1992) argue that the use of a rights offer may fully solve 
the underinvestment problem if all existing shareholders exercise 100% of their 
rights. However, it becomes costly to issue equity by a rights offer with lower 
shareholder participation, especially for an undervalued firm, due to wealth 
transfers from existing shareholders to new shareholders.  
 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) propose that private placements may solve the 
underinvestment problem. They argue that private placement is a value certification 
from informed investors. The informed investor confirms firm value by agreeing to 
purchase a large fraction of new shares. Barclay et al. (2007) find that private 
placements can assist management solidify their control of a firm, the rationale 
being that private placements are often made to friendly investors who will not 
‘rock the boat’, leading to a more entrenched management. 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this Chapter extends 
prior studies on UK SEO. More specifically, in addition to ROs and PLs, this 
Chapter also consider OOs and PLOOs as alternative issue methods in the analysis. 
This consideration adds new insights on the choice of SEO issue methods. Second, 
for the first time in the literature, this study constructs three ownership variables – 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership – to 
examine the role of ownership structure in UK SEOs. Third, this Chapter use 
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multinomial logistic regressions to analyze what factors influence a firm’s decision 
among the four SEO types, RO, PL, OO, and PLOO. Fourth, this study also 
explicitly considers SEO price setting and assesses its effect on market reactions to 
SEO announcements. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly summarizes the different 
SEO methods in the UK. Section 3.3 discusses the underlying theory and 
hypothesis development. Section 3.4 describes the sample selections and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 discusses the main finding from the empirical 
results. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 3.6. 
3.2 SEOs and Different Issue Methods 
This section provides a brief overview of seasoned equity issues in the UK, 
including different issue types, underwriting procedures, the SEO process, and 
conflicts of interests. 
3.2.1 Regulation and Issue Method in UK SEOs 
In the last two decades, the regulation of issue methods in UK firm has changed. 
Rights offers were the only method for UK firms to issue seasoned equity until 
1986. After that, placing offers were allowed. Since 1996, the proportion of issues 
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conducted by placing has increased dramatically, while the proportion of issues by 
rights offers has declined. 
 
In practice, UK firms issuing a seasoned equity can choose from three flotation 
methods: rights offers, placings, and open offers. Both rights offers and open offers, 
give existing shareholders’ preemption rights to purchase new shares in proportion 
to their holdings, and the sale of new shares turns to other investors, only if 
shareholders do not exercise any or part of the preemption rights. Thus, rights and 
open offers are also called a preemption issue. However, placing is a 
non-preemption issue, in which the seasoned shares in the placing are sold at a fixed 
price to outside investors. Preemption rights are a principal mechanism to protect 
shareholders from dilution of their wealth and control in the firm, enshrined in UK 
Company Law and LSE listing rules. 
3.2.1.1 Rights Offer 
In a rights offer, existing shareholders are entitled to subscribe to the new shares in 
proportion to their existing shareholdings at an exercise price that is below the 
pre-announcement share price. Typically, existing shareholders are allowed to 
process this preemption right within 21 days after the initial announcement (LSE 
listing rules). To maintain their proportionate ownership and value of shareholding, 
existing shareholders have an incentive to exercise their rights and undertake their 
proportional stakes in the new shares. However, this is not compulsory. Since the 
new shares are usually offered at a discount, the rights have an intrinsic value, 
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allowing shareholders to trade them in the secondary market. Thus, existing 
shareholders can sell part or all rights to other investors who are willing to 
participate in the new equity issue. Rights that are not exercised or traded during the 
subscription period can be allotted or sold to underwriters and are likely to be taken 
up by other shareholders in the issuing firm, who desire to purchase more shares 
over their pro rata share of the issue (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995; Barnes and Walker, 
2006). This method is called the overallotment option. 
 
In a rights offer, the LSE listing rules stipulate that the value of rights must exceed 
25% of the total amount of shares offered and the exercise price must be below 
one-half of the difference between the offer price and the ex-rights price. Moreover, 
a rights offer in UK can be insured (underwritten) or uninsured. In the insured rights 
offer, the issuing firm pays an underwriter a standby fee to guarantee that all shares 
can be sold at the offer price. The underwriter is responsible for any unsubscribed 
shares. The standby fees are relatively uniform. Most UK rights offers are insured, 
as confirmed by Marsh (1979, 1980). Furthermore, Slovin et al. (2000) find that 91% 
of right issues were insured in the period of 1986–1994. 
3.2.1.2 Placing 
In a placing, the lead underwriter or broker commits to buy all of the new shares 
from the issuing firm at a given price and then places the shares directly with 
outside investors, primarily institutions. On the initial announcement date, the 
issuing firm obtains a certain amount of proceeds based on the fixed offer price. 
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Meanwhile, the underwriter takes the responsibility for issued shares. The offer 
conducted by placing cannot be withdrawn or postponed and, moreover, the offer 
characteristics as reported in the initial announcement cannot be revised. Thus, the 
underwriter cannot adjust offer proceeds or the offer price according to the market 
reaction to the announcement. As a result, the underwriter must bear not only the 
risk of offer failure and the risk of undersubscription, but also the risk from 
subsequent adverse share price changes. To reduce these risks, underwriter 
certification of the issuing firm value becomes more important in the case of UK 
placing. Thus, conducting SEOs by placing can be perceived as a signal of the 
issuing firm’s quality (Slovin et al., 2000). High-quality firms are more likely to 
choose placing as the offer method to distinguish themselves from other firms, 
which can mitigate the adverse selection problem. 
 
Slovin et al. (2000) further propose that underwriting risk for a placing in the UK is 
much greater than for a firm’s commitment offering in the US. Similar to firm 
commitment offers in the US, in the UK offer characteristics are solicited based on 
the information of investor potential demand and market conditions. Such 
information is acquired by the underwriter’s bookbuilding activities. In a US firm’s 
commitment offer, the offer terms can be adjusted on the basis of such information 
during the period from the initial announcement date to the actual offer date. The 
offer price and size are finalized by the offer date. However, the bookbuilding of 
UK placings takes place prior to the issue announcement date. The offer terms are 
set upon initial announcement and, furthermore, the placing can be postponed or 
withdrawn after the initial announcement date. 
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Since placing is an invitation to outside investors, the wealth of the existing 
shareholders is more likely to decline and dispersion in post-issue equity holdings is 
likely to be greater than in the case of rights issues. To limit such a dilution in 
ownership, the LSE listing rules stipulate that issue proceeds in placing cannot 
exceed 5% of the current share capital, unless the excess part is approved by the 
shareholders in an extraordinary general meeting (EGM, hereafter) with a majority 
of 75% of the votes. The 5% limitation is relaxed to 10% for the shares issue as part 
of vendor placing (the UK Listing Authority, hereafter UKLA). Moreover, the offer 
size of the placing is restricted to 5% of existing capital in any one year and 7.5% in 
any three years (UKLA). The offer discount in placing is limited to at most 10% of 
the middle market price at the time of the placing (UKLA). Burton et al. (2005) 
state that existing shareholders generally vote against any proposed share issues 
through their preemption rights, especially since the proposed discount is higher 
than 5% of the middle market price in reaction to the SEO announcement. 
 
Moreover, UK firms are permitted to carry out placings since 1986. Prior to 1990, 
offer sizes over £3 million could not be conducted by placing. The maximum value 
of the offer size then increased to £15 million during 1990–1995. The restriction of 
the offer size in placings was removed in January 1996. Slovin et al. (2000) define a 
post-deregulation period and a pre-deregulation period, respectively, as 1986–1994 
and 1982–1985, to examine the effect of regulation changes on the choice of issue 
method. 
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3.2.1.3 Open Offer and Open Offer Combined with Placing 
Open offer has similar characteristics to both rights offers and placings. To attract 
investors to participate in the issue, the new shares are offered at a discount. As in a 
rights offer, existing shareholders in open offers are also entitled to purchase new 
shares in proportion to their existing holdings. However, there is no renounceable 
allotment letter or negotiable document in an open offer, so that existing 
shareholders are unable to sell entitlements to other investors. Therefore, existing 
shareholder wealth is likely to decline when shareholders do not take up their pro 
rata entitlements. This suggests that an open offer is less convenient for existing 
shareholders who do not wish to increase their holdings, compared with a rights 
offer. Similar to the case with a placing, shares that are not taken up by existing 
shareholders are allocated privately to new investors, primarily institutions, prior to 
the issue announcement. This is called a placing with clawback (Barnes and Walker, 
2006). 
 
In the UK, most open offers are usually made in conjunction with conditional 
placing, which is called placing with an open offer (PLOO). Typically, in this type 
of offer, the shares are placed by an underwriter or directly with institutions or other 
investors, subject to recall for 21 days by shareholders that exercise the preemption 
right. Moreover, the offer price in such an issue must not be discounted by more 
than 10% of the middle market price at the time of issue announcement, unless 
approved by an EGM (LSE listing rule). 
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3.2.2 Underwriting and the Process of SEO 
Since the late 1980S, in the UK, SEO-issuing firms usually hire an investment bank 
or broker to underwrite the share issue. The most important role played by the 
underwriter is to ensure that the required capital from the SEO will be successfully 
raised. Armitage (2000) states that investment bankers and brokers in the  agree to 
underwrite new shares before the issue is publicly announced. However, the 
agreement may be verbal and not legally binding, unless it is written on or after the 
announcement date. 
 
In the SEO process, basic underwriting services include advising how and when to 
conduct the issue, pricing the offer, allocating the shares, writing up the prospectus, 
conducting a road show, and acting as a sponsor to the issue. In the US , 
underwriters set the offer price range on the basis of the demand information 
provided by investors, who would be compensated by more favourable allocation 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1987). Unlike in the US, there is no initial price range in 
the case of UK SEOs. By studying the SEO bookbuilding process, Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2003) find that underwriters consider entire bids in the demand curve 
and finalize the offer price accordingly. Although the pre-issue market price is 
observable in the second SEO market, pricing setting cannot fully rely on this price 
because the market reaction to SEO announcements should be considered. Thus the 
issuing firm also needs to build a book, especially since the stock has low liquidity 
or the required amount of issue is large relative to existing capital (Cornelli and 
Goldreich, 2003). 
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In UK SEOs, investment bankers or brokers that have an established relationship 
with the issuing firm are more likely to be used as underwriter (Armitage, 2000). 
The number of underwriters in the syndicate is determined by the transaction risk 
and the size of the underwriter’s balance sheet. Each underwriter in the syndicate is 
allocated a proportion of the transactions. Underwriters normally arrange the 
proportion of shares with high transaction risk to be sub-underwritten. To guarantee 
the success of the issue, the sub-underwriting is generally taken on by institutions 
who already hold pre-issue shares of the issuing firm. In this case, the risk has been 
transferred from the underwriter to institutions, which are compensated by the 
sub-underwriting fees. 
 
In a rights offer, the underwriter is required to prepare the prospectus and send it out 
to shareholders (Financial Services and Market Act, 2000). Before the 
announcement, the underwriter can communicate with existing shareholders and 
provide compelling reasons for the issue. This can increase the likelihood of 
approval of right issues at the general meeting and the take-up of new shares during 
the subscription period. The general meeting extends the process by at least two 
weeks. The amount of a rights issue has no limitation, although the directors in the 
issuing firm have no authority to raise capital beyond two-thirds of the existing 
capital. In common practice, the underwriter suggests that the issuing firm choose a 
rights offer when the required capital is over 10% of existing capital. 
 
 88 
 
Moreover, there is non-underwritten issue under the rights offer approach, which 
has become rare since 1999: The offer price of such an issue type is deeply 
discounted to enhance the take-up of shares among investors and thus issuing firm 
are more likely to gain capital successfully without underwriting costs. However, 
this issue type is perceived as a negative signal, that the issuing firm has lower 
quality, and results in a negative market reaction to the announcement (Heinkel and 
Schwartz 1986). Korteweg and Renneboog (2003) further find that 
non-underwritten rights offers are mostly conducted by financially distressed firms. 
 
Given that the opportunities to subscribe for new shares are equal for either existing 
shareholders or new investors, placing does not require a prospectus. The amount of 
issue is restricted by regulation, because placing leads to the dilution of shareholder 
ownership. Consequently, the amount of placing is likely to be smaller than for a 
rights offer of open offer. In a placing the underwriter runs the bookbuilding to 
market the new shares and negotiate the offer price with selected investors. Unlike a 
rights offer, there is no time for existing shareholders trading preemption rights in 
the event of non-exercise. The timing of placing is much quicker than in other issue 
methods, from one day to one week. In practice, firms are more likely to choose 
placing in the case of a stock-financed merger (Fama and French, 2005). 
 
Similar to the rights offer process, an open offer requires a prospectus and the 
issuing firm to hold a general meeting. However, the decision to conduct an open 
offer does not have to be approved by existing shareholders. The role of the general 
meeting is to notify the shareholder of the subscription period, typically at least 10 
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days. The time to prepare for the general meeting is shorter in an open offer than in 
a rights offer. Therefore, issues conducted by open offers or open offers with 
placing are quicker, compared with rights offers. Given an open offer combined 
with placing with clawback, new investors are encouraged to subscribe to the new 
shares. The discount in an open offer is restricted to no more than 10% of the 
current market price. 
3.2.3 Conflicts of Interest in the SEO Process  
By reviewing the SEO process and underwriting practice in SEOs, two main 
conflicts of interest should be considered. First is the conflict between the 
underwriter and the issuing firm. During the issue, the issuing firm and underwriter 
have the same target: maximizing the take-up of new shares. For the issuing firm, a 
high take-up indicates that more investors are confident of its prospects. For the 
underwriter, a high take-up reflects the underwriter’s ability and thus improves 
reputation. However, information asymmetry exists between the issuing firm and 
the underwriter in SEO price setting. The underwriter has superior information 
regarding the potential demand of the shares through bookbuilding activities. To 
guarantee that the shares are fully subscribed, the underwriter is likely to set a lower 
offer price. Additionally, since information acquisition is costly, the underwriter 
may price the share at a high discount to reduce such costs. In this case, the price is 
not optimal for the issuing firm. This conflict of interests can be weakened by the 
underwriter’s reputation (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003). 
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A second conflict of interests arises among the shareholders. The information about 
the issuing firm is asymmetric between existing shareholders and outside investors. 
To resolve this problem, an underwriter is hired to price the shares accurately, in 
line with the true value of the issuing firm. In the case of rights issues, Heinkel and 
Schwartz (1986) argue that high-quality firms are more likely to choose 
underwritten issues than non-underwritten issues. The empirical results of Slovin et 
al. (2000) and Balachandran et al. (2008) support this argument in the UK and 
Austria, respectively. Balachandran et al. (2008) further demonstrate that 
high-quality firms prefer underwritten issues over partial or non-underwritten 
issues. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) propose that underwriting may signal to the 
market that the issuing firm is not overvalued, which influences investor 
expectations of a new issue. As a result, more investors, whether existing 
shareholders or new investors, participate in the issue. However, Armitage(1999) 
finds there is no relation between the proportion of shares sold to new investors and 
the proportion underwritten. 
3.3 Theories and Hypothesis Development 
This section provides previous evidence and relevant theories about SEOs, 
including the choice of issue method, offer price discount, and announcement effect 
of SEOs. Based on the theoretical literature, this study develops several testable 
hypotheses for the empirical analysis. 
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3.3.1 The Choice of SEO Issue Method  
Previous studies provide several explanations behind a firm’s choice of a rights 
issue, placing, or open offer at the time of the SEO. Various issue methods may 
have differential effects on firm ownership structure. Unlike the rights offer, 
placing allows other investors to purchase the new shares, rather than just existing 
shareholders. Therefore, placing may induce a major ownership change, while 
ownership structure after a rights issue may be relatively unaltered (Barnes and 
Walker, 2006). By studying US SEOs, Kothare (1997) finds that ownership 
becomes more diffuse after a public offering, but more concentrated following a 
rights issue. 
 
The preemption right in a rights issue and an open offer can protect the existing 
shareholders’ wealth and control. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find that right 
issues are used to maintain family control. Consistent with this result, Wu and 
Wang (2005) argue that family-controlled firms are more likely to choose a rights 
issue because they desire to preserve the private benefits of control. By developing 
a model for the choice of equity issuing method, Rinne and Suominen (2009) claim 
two major determinants of the choice: value uncertainty and the price impact of 
selling shares. They argue that undervalued firms are likely to use rights issues, 
while overvalued firms choose public offers. Moreover, the price impact is larger 
for rights issues than for public offers, because in the latter case the offer discount 
can be lowered by the underwriter’s market effort. 
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There are several reasons for firms to use placing. First, firms with higher 
information asymmetry are more likely to choose placing over public offers, 
because placing can reduce information production cost (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1999). To ensure the success of an equity issue, the issuing firm must provide 
information to the public and attract larger amounts of investors to purchase new 
shares in the public offer. However, placing only involves target investors, typically 
one or small amounts of investors. Therefore, given a level of information 
asymmetry, placing incurs lower information cost than an open offer. Wu (2004) 
finds that private placement firms have higher information asymmetry than public 
offering firms. 
 
Second, Hertzel and Smith (1993) propose that using private placement as an issue 
method is value certification. Private placement investors, as informed investors, 
affirm a firm’s market value by agreeing to buy large percentage blocks of stock at a 
given offer price. Therefore, undervalued firms prefer private placement over 
public issues (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Barnes and 
Walker (2006), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) also find firms with a high degree 
of value uncertainty – for example, undervalued firms – are more likely to choose 
placing over a rights offer. 
 
Third, placing improves the monitoring of management, because of increased 
active block holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Wruck, 1989). The new shares in 
placing are purchased by outside block-holders, resulting in higher external 
ownership. Motivated by the shared benefits of control, such new block holders 
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have an incentive to monitor management and ensure that corporate policy decision 
making is more efficient. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) further suggest that external 
ownership is positively related to firm value. However, most placings in private 
placement are passive, which suggests placings may have no effect on monitoring 
incentives (Wu, 2004; Barclay et al., 2007). 
 
Fourth, placing may induce more entrench management. The buyers in a placing 
are usually institutions or large block holders, who may participate on the board as 
an inside investor following the placing. In some cases, managers will provide a 
higher offer discount for select investors in exchange for their votes in the managers’ 
favour, resulting in an entrenched management (Barclay et al., 2007; Armitage, 
2010). 
3.3.2 SEO Discount 
It is common for a new issue to be priced at a discount in an SEO. Given that the 
pre-issue price can be observed in the market, an SEO discount is usually measured 
as the percent change between the closing price on the day prior to the issue and the 
offer price or the percent change between the offer price and the closing price one 
day after the issue. The latter measure is also used to proxy for SEO underpricing. 
 
The pricing of SEOs has attracted much attention in the academic literature. Eckbo 
and Masulis (1992) find the average discount in US SEOs from 1963 to 1981 is 
only 0.44%. Loderer et al. (1991) report that during 1980–1984, the discount is 
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1.4%, rising to around 3% in the 1990s (Mola and Loughran, 2004). During the 
1980s and 1990s, Corwin (2003) shows that the discount of seasoned offerings 
increased substantially over time, averaging 2.2%. Meanwhile, Slovin et al. (2000) 
examine UK SEOs and find a significant discount of 17% for insured issuers over 
1986–1994. Barnes and Walker (2006) report that the average discount between 
1989 and 1998 is 15%. 
 
The SEO discount is an indirect cost for firms of issuing new shares, based on 
uncertainty about firm value, gathering information, and marketing the new shares. 
The literature provides several potential explanations for SEO discounting. In the 
value uncertainty hypothesis (Ritter, 1984), uninformed investors should require 
higher compensation for stocks with greater value uncertainty. Corwin (2003) 
argues that SEO discounting is positively related to the level of uncertainty about 
firm value. The investigation of Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also confirms the 
positive relation between discounting and value uncertainty in US SEOs. 
According to the winner’s curse problem (Rock, 1986), the issuer must price the 
shares at a discount to guarantee that uninformed investors will participate in the 
new equity issue. Otherwise, informed investors will squeeze uninformed investors 
out of the good issues and withdraw from the new issue market for bad issues. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that SEO discounting is positively related to the 
level of ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issue. 
 
Furthermore, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that underwriters attempt to 
pay for acquiring information from better-informed investors by allocating the new 
 95 
 
shares at a higher discount. In line with this argument, Aggarwal et al. (2002) 
demonstrate that in initial public offerings, underwriters are likely to allocate more 
shares to institutional investors with a higher discount. Additionally, Corwin (2003) 
finds that a bigger offer induces a larger discount, which is consistent with price 
pressure caused by a downward-sloping demand curve. In principle, the demand for 
shares decreases as the supply of shares is permanently increased in an SEO. The 
discounting of an SEO is compensation for the investor, who is willing to absorb the 
additional shares. 
3.3.3 Announcement Effect on SEOs 
Numerous studies have documented that SEOs have a negative average 
announcement effect (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; 
Clarke et al., 2002; Corwin, 2003). Asquith and Mullins (1986) explore the 
phenomenon of offering dilution in equity offerings, where the dilution is measured 
by the change in the ratio of the equity value of the firm to the proceeds of the issue. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) observe that the equity value of firms declines by 
around 13% of the issue proceeds after the equity announcement. Interestingly, 
Clarke et al. (2002) find that the negative announcement return for secondary 
offerings is less negative than for SEOs, -2% versus -3%, respectively. 
 
The explanations of the negative price impact of SEOs are often based on the 
information asymmetry model. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a 
signalling model to explain the negative announcement return. They suggest that 
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managers have an incentive to maintain their stock ownership if they are highly 
optimistic with regard to the firm’s future performance. Thus equity issuance is a 
bad signal to the market that managers have negative private information for the 
firm’s prospects, resulting in a fall in stock price. In the spirit of the signalling 
models, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the adverse selection model to predict 
the timing of firms’ issues of equity. The authors suggest that managers tend to issue 
new shares when they believe the current stock price is overvalued. Managers tend 
to act in the interests of existing shareholders, who can benefit from an SEO if the 
overvalued shares are issued only to new investors. In contrast, managers are 
unwilling to issue undervalued shares, to avoid decreasing the wealth of existing 
shareholders. Thus, rational investors perceive an SEO announcement as a signal 
that the issuer’s stocks are overvalued. According to another asymmetry 
information model, developed by Miller and Rock (1985), an unanticipated equity 
issue is used to compensate for factors that create a shortfall compared to the 
expected cash flow, such as low earnings. This shortfall can be interpreted as a 
decrease in firm value and can result in a negative announcement return. 
 
A negative market reaction can also be triggered by the intensified agency problem 
between managers and investors in an SEO. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that 
the managerial entrenchment effect is negatively related to managers’ stock 
ownership. New equity financing is likely to reduce managerial ownership and thus 
managers have more discretion to consume perquisites and exert sub-optimal 
investments, resulting in a decline in stock price. Additionally, the introduction of a 
new equity issue increases the supply of shares to the market. Kalay and Shimrat 
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(1987) state that a negative SEO announcement return can be explained by the price 
pressure due to the down-sloping demand curve. Petajisto (2009) supports this 
argument by modelling a negative demand curve with a fixed cost. 
 
However, several studies find there is a positive market reaction to placing and 
open offers (e.g., Slovin et al., 2000; Armitage, 2002; Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
This reaction can be interpreted as a positive signal of firm quality to the market. 
Moreover, placing brings new investors into the firm, which enhances external 
monitoring for corporate control (Slovin et al., 2000). 
3.3.4 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, several hypotheses are developed to test whether ownership has an 
effect on the choice of issue method, offer price discount, and announcement 
effect. To capture the different incentives of various investors, this study proposes 
three ownership variables, for ownership concentration, managerial shares 
ownership, and institutional ownership. 
 
The first discussion concerns the influence of ownership on the probability of firms 
choosing various issue methods. More specifically, this section discusses which 
method firms decide to use in the first place and which method is the last choice. 
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Ownership concentration is used to capture the incentives of large shareholders, 
measured as the sum of the percentage of shares owned by block holders.
10
 Given 
that concentrated ownership generates strong monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986), it is assumed that block holders have a strong incentive to influence the 
decision of equity issue. Placing will decrease ownership concentration and thus the 
control of block holders may be diluted. To avoid such a loss in the private benefits 
of control, block holders are more likely to press the firm to choose a 
right-preserving issue over placing. 
 
To capture the incentives of entrenched managers, this Chapter applies managerial 
share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and 
non-executive directors. The results of previous studies with respect to the impact 
of managerial ownership on the choice of issue method are mixed. According to the 
managerial self-dealing hypothesis, managers are assumed to engage in 
self-serving behaviour and are therefore concerned about maintaining control and 
wealth (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). In this setting, a right-preserving issue is 
preferred. Managerial ownership can be preserved and managers do not have to 
experience any reduction in control benefits (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
Moreover, placing may lead to enhanced monitoring to constrain the scale of 
managerial opportunism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Thus, entrenched managers 
are unwilling to accept such monitoring pressure. 
 
                                                 
10
 Here, a block holder in a UK firm is defined as one owning over 3% of the firm’s share.  
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However, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that entrenched 
managers are more likely to choose placing as the issue method. Barclay et al. 
(2007) propose that placing is often made to passive investors, thereby helping 
management solidify its control of the firm. Managers seek target investors, usually 
affiliated institutional investors, to participate in placing. Such target investors 
should vote with managers on decisions of corporate policy, leading to a more 
entrenched management (Barclay et al., 2007; Armitage, 2010). In this setting, 
placing will be used as a first choice. 
 
To explore the role of institutional investors in the choice of SEO method, this 
Chapter constructs an institutional ownership variable. It is measured as the sum of 
shares held by all institutional investors whose shareholding is over 3% of the 
firm’s share. According to the monitoring hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), 
institutional ownership, as a proxy for the monitoring of management, plays an 
important role in corporate governance. In the SEO process, institutional investors 
are the major target in bookbuilding activities. In the UK, placing is the most 
common issue method that can create a monitoring incentive by adding institutional 
investors. In this setting, placing is preferred when institutional ownership is lower. 
 
Based on the discussion above, this study proposes the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Ownership-concentrated firms are less likely to choose placing as 
the equity issue method. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to choose 
placing as the equity issue method. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms with lower institutional ownership are more likely to choose 
placing as the equity issue method. 
 
This study now discusses the role of ownership in SEO discounts and 
announcement returns. According to the argument that SEO discounts are partially 
due to price pressure resulting from a down-sloping demand curve, Intintoli and 
Kahle (2010) find that higher ownership concentration may decrease public float, 
resulting in increased price pressure and a higher offer discount. They also find that 
this effect becomes stronger in firms with low trading volume. Moreover, 
concentrated ownership will lead to low market liquidity and such high 
undiversified holding risk will increase the cost of capital. In this case, investors 
require a higher discount as compensation for investing in low-liquidity stock. 
 
In the context of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, managers 
are assumed to have an informational advantage about firm value over outside 
shareholders. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that a firm’s equity issuance is 
perceived as the manager’s belief that the firm is overvalued. Moreover, managerial 
entrenchment is likely to be more severe for firms with higher managerial 
ownership. Entrenched managers will pursue their own wealth or empire building 
in management at the expense of outside shareholders (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). In this case, investors believe that SEOs are motivated by 
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overvaluation and thus require deeper discounts in offer price. In addition, since 
managers hold large proportions of firm shares, low market liquidity and high 
undiversified holding risk will increase the cost of equity. In this setting, the offer 
price discount should be larger in such firms. 
 
These arguments make us propose the following hypotheses. 
  
Hypothesis 2a: Ownership-concentrated firms will price the offer at a higher 
discount and receive a lower announcement return. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with high managerial ownership will price the offer at a 
higher discount and receive a lower announcement return. 
 
Given the fact that institutional investors are one of the major investor groups in the 
UK, the role of institutional investors in SEOs has become an important question in 
academic research. According to the manipulative trading hypothesis (Kyle, 1985; 
Gerard and Nanda, 1993), institutional investors attempt to trade the stock 
strategically as they receive private information prior to a public announcement. 
Institutional investors may sell the stock when they receive positive private 
information and thus pre-SEO stock prices will fall, resulting in a higher offer 
discount. Although there is a loss due to such short-term price manipulation before 
the SEO, institutional investors can benefit from the large allocation of new shares 
at the declined offer price and then sell these allocations after the SEO. In this case, 
the SEO discount is intended to compensate uninformed investors, consistent with 
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the winner’s curse hypothesis in the IPO allocation process (Rock, 1986). This 
hypothesis implies that institutional investor trading behaviour acts in the opposite 
direction of private information. 
 
However, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find the opposite results, that institutional 
investors are likely to buy the issuing firm’s stock before the SEO if they possess 
positive private information. By investigating the institutional investor’s trading 
behaviour before and after the SEO, they find that the pre-SEO net buying of 
institutional investors is associated with greater SEO allocation and more 
institutional investors’ post-offer net buying, where net buying is measured as total 
institutional buying minus the sale of the SEO firm’s shares. This result can be 
interpreted through the information production hypothesis. When Institutional 
investors identify a good offer from private information, they have an incentive to 
participate in this offer and request more allocations. To lower the risk of SEO 
failure, institutional investors will provide the issuing firm or underwriter with the 
information regarding the market demand. Such information production effectively 
decreases the information asymmetry between the issuing firm and shareholders. 
This makes SEO price setting easier and the offer discount can be set lower. 
 
According to the monitoring hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), institutional 
ownership, as a proxy for the monitoring of management, plays an important role in 
corporate governance. Higher institutional ownership can improve shareholder 
value by constraining managerial discretion to waste corporate resources through 
inefficient investment. Moreover, higher institutional ownership can partially 
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resolve the free rider problem. All shareholders in the firm can benefit from active 
monitoring carried out by institutional shareholders, whereas the institutional 
shareholders have to bear the monitoring cost. Pre-issue institutional ownership 
suggests that potential monitors are already in place. Thus, new investors are more 
likely to subscribe for new shares from issuers that already have potential monitors 
in place. 
 
Zhang (2004) demonstrates that new shares are easier to place when issuing firms 
have higher pre-issue institutional ownership. Huang and Zhang (2011) further find 
a negative relation between pre-issue institutional ownership and the SEO offer 
price discount. Pre-issue institutional holding also suggests existing institutional 
investors are already familiar with the stock. Gibson et al. (2004) propose that 
institutional investors have better stock picking ability. They find that institutional 
holdings can separate above-average SEO firms from underperforming firms. Since 
institutional investors have better information than individuals, higher institutional 
ownership implies more informed institutional investors have put their stamp of 
approval on the firm value. Thus higher institutional ownership signals the better 
quality of the issuing firm, making it easier for underwriters to market the new offer 
at a lower discount. 
 
Therefore, this study proposes the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: A firm with higher institutional ownership will price the offer at a 
lower discount and receive a higher announcement return. 
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3.4 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Data Selection 
This study examines the seasoned equity issues of firms traded on the LSE from 
January 1998 through December 2010. The reason why this study uses this research 
period is that ownership data about UK firms only started in 1997 in Thomson One 
Banker’s database. Moreover, since regulation removed the restriction on the issue 
size of placings since January 1996, UK firms in the research sample have more 
discretion to choose the SEO issue method. 
 
The sample excludes firms in the financial industry (Standard Industrial 
Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–4949), 
since these firms differ dramatically from firms in other industries in their financial 
reporting, structure, and management. Pure secondary and joint issues are also 
excluded, following Slovin et al. (2000). This Chapter focuses on issues with 
proceeds over US$1 million. The data on issue characteristics and ownership 
information were initially obtained from Thomson One Banker’s database. The 
items of the issue include the announcement date, the offer date, the closing price 
one day before the announcement date, the offer price, the offer amount, and the 
issue method. Ownership data include each firm’s investor types, investment style, 
and shareholder equity holdings. Finally, the daily stock price data and financial 
statement data are from the Datastream databases. 
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After excluding issues with incomplete data, the final sample consists of 653 
seasoned equity issues, distributed over years, and issue methods, as shown in 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1. The whole sample of SEOs is categorized into four 
subsamples by issue type: ROs, PLs, OOs, and PLOOs. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 report the trends in SEO issue methods over the sample 
period. As shown in Table 3.1, listed UK firms conducted 653 SEOs over 
1998–2010, 156 of which were ROs, 291 were PLs, 54 were OOs, and 152 were 
PLOOs. There is a general surge in SEOs during 1998–2001. However, the number 
of SEOs dramatically falls to 36 in 2002, followed by a resurgence during 
2002–2005. The number of SEOs reaches its highest level of 142 issues in 2009. A 
potential interpretation for this pattern is the financial crisis. Financially distressed 
firms prefer equity to debt to raise additional capital. It is clear that placings are the 
dominant issue type in the sample, approximately 44.56% of all issues. This finding 
is consistent with the evidence of Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), who find the 
proportion of placings is the largest in UK SEOs during 1996–2007. During 
2008–2010, almost all UK SEOs were conducted as placings, with 81.25%, 69.01%, 
and 76.79% of total issues in each of the years, respectively. 
 
(Please insert Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 here) 
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Table 3.2 presents the mean and median value of the key issue and firm 
characteristics for the whole sample, as well as for the four subsamples of SEOs by 
issue type. As shown in panel A, proceeds average US$211.79 million for ROs and 
US$91.21 million for PLs. This finding suggests that placings raise considerably 
less capital than rights offers do, consistent with the findings of Barnes and Walker 
(2006). The average rights offer discount is 18.71%, which is close to the findings 
of Armitage (2002) and Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), 21% and 21.56%, 
respectively. Moreover, the mean offer discount on a rights offer is the highest 
among the four issue types. This indicates that issuers choosing rights offers set the 
offers at lower prices to guarantee the success of the issuance; in contrast, the 
lowest price discount occurs for placings, with an average of around 7.83% (median 
around 7.24%). These results are consistent with the restrictions of the LSE, as 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics for the firm variables of the SEOs. 
The average ownership concentration is highest for OO issuers and lowest for 
PLOO issuers (63.98% and 49.04%, respectively). It is notable that placing issuers 
have the highest average managerial ownership, at 15.38%, while the lowest 
managerial ownership, 6.34%, is found for the right issuer groups. Another 
important finding is that the mean ownership and median institutional ownership in 
right issuers are significantly larger than for other issue types. This means that 
rights offers cluster more in firms with higher institutional ownership. 
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This Chapter now focuses on the other firm variables. The average firm size that is 
measured as the market value of equity is higher for right issuers than for placing 
issuers (US$286.24 million versus US$256.12 million). It is interesting to note that 
the largest average firm size is that of PLOO issuers, around US$353.8 million. 
This finding suggests that PLOO issuers cluster more in the large firm size class. 
We also find that right issuers have higher returns on equity, a higher 
market-to-book ratio, and higher leverage levels in comparison to other issuers. 
 
（Please insert Table 3.2 here） 
3.4.3 Announcement Returns on SEOs 
Table 3.3 reports the results of the announcement returns of UK SEOs. The 
announcement returns are calculated by referring to the event study method 
introduced by Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Kang and Stulz (1996). This 
Chapter applies the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) to examine 
market responses to SEO announcements. The abnormal return (AR) is the 
unexpected stock return, constructed as the actual return minus the expected return. 
The average AR (AAR) is the mean of N issuers’ ARs for each event window, 
described as 
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The CAAR is the sum of the AARs over T days in the event window: 
 
 
 
To generate the expected stock return, the literature introduces several models 
developed from the traditional capital asset pricing model, such as the 
Fama–French (1993) three-factor model11 or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model., 
this Chapter chooses the Carhart four-factor model to estimate the time-series 
monthly portfolio return, 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + βi (Rmt - Rft) + siSMBT + hi HMLt +miMOMt+ εit 
 
In the formula above, Rit is the average monthly return on the portfolio of issuers 
during the estimated period, Rft is the monthly Treasury bill rate, Rmt represents the 
actual monthly market returns, and Rmt - Rft is the excess market return, which is the 
proxy for the market factor. The terms SMB and HMLt are obtained from Fama and 
French (1993), where SMBt is the size factor, measured as the difference between 
the returns on the portfolio of small stocks (bottom 30%) and big stocks (top 30%); 
HML is the value factor, measured as the difference between the returns on the 
                                                 
11
 Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model can be written formally as Rit – Rft = αi + βi (Rmt - 
Rft) + siSMBt + hi HMLt +εit. The authors propose three stock market factors – excess market return 
(Rmt -Rft), size (SMBt), and book to market (HML) – that have strong explanatory power for the 
differences in the average returns across stocks.  
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portfolio of high (top 30%) and low (bottom 30%) book-to-market stocks; MOMt is 
the momentum factor, measured as the difference between the returns on the 
portfolio of high- and low-return stocks; and αi is the average monthly AR on the 
portfolio of issuers over the estimated period. 
 
The estimated period is chosen as the period of [-260, -60], where day 0 is the 
announcement date. This Chapter uses t-test statistics to report the significant 
levels of market reaction to the announcement (e.g., Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; 
Balachandran et al., 2008). By focusing on the two-day and three-day event 
windows [0, 1] and [-1, 1], this study finds the means of the CAAR are negative and 
significant in the group of all SEOs, at -0.03 and -0.06 respectively. This finding is 
consistent with previous evidence; for example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and 
Kange and Stulz (1996) document that the SEO announcement return is negative 
and statistically significant at around -3%. This Chapter now examines the market 
reaction to SEOs according to the various issue types. For rights offers, it is notable 
that both the two- and three-day average excess returns are negative and significant, 
at -1.25 and -0.81, respectively. 
 
However, for placings, the announcement returns are positive and significant, at 
0.18 and 0.08, respectively. These results are consistent with other studies on UK 
SEOs. For instance, Slovin et al. (2000) report that during 1986–1994 the 
announcement return is significantly negative in a sample of 220 UK rights offers, 
while it is significantly positive for a small group of 76 placings. By using a larger 
sample comprising 268 placings and 600 rights offers during 1989–1998, Barnes 
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and Walker (2006) also make the same conclusion for SEO announcement returns. 
Both studies cover the pre-deregulation period and a post-deregulation period.
12
 A 
recent study of Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) calculates the CAARs in the 
announcement month and finds similar results for market reactions to rights issues 
and placings over the period 1996–2007. Combined with the previous finding, it 
can be concluded that market reactions to rights issues are less favourable 
compared to placings. This indicates that rights issues signal to the market that the 
issuer’s equity is overvalued or its corporate cash flows are lower than expected 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Miller and Rock, 1985). In contrast, placings convey 
favourable information to the market because they can be viewed as a verification 
of firm value. It is notable that the two-day average excess returns are highest for 
open offers, at 1.66. This indicates that open offer announcement appear to send a 
better-quality signal regarding the issuer compared to other issue types. This 
finding is inconsistent with Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), who find that issuers 
choosing PLOOs have the best stock performance in the announcement month 
compared to other issue types. 
 
Additionally, this Chapter examines the past stock performance of the issuer, 
measured as the cumulative excess return of SEO stock during the period [-260,-2] 
prior to the announcement date. The mean past stock performance of all issuers is 
                                                 
12
 Since 1986 UK firms have been permitted placings. Therefore, the pre-deregulation period is 
defined as before 1986 and the post-deregulation period means the period since or any time after 
1986 (Slovin et al., 2000).  
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positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with 
previous literature that documents a stock price run-up period prior to a seasoned 
equity issue (e.g., Marsh, 1982, Loughran and Ritter, 1996, Wu et al., 2005). 
Comparing the four subsamples, it is also notable that PLOO issuers are the best 
past stock performers. 
 
(Please insert Table 3.3 here) 
3.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, several models are applied to explore the propositions above. This 
Chapter uses basic logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression to test 
which factors determine the choice of issue method in SEOs. Then several ordinary 
least squares models are employed to examine how ownership variables affect the 
offer price discounts and announcement returns of SEOs. 
 
To analyze the probability of a firm choosing various SEO issue methods, this study 
conducts the logistic regressions as shown in Table 3.4. this study models the 
decision to issue an RO, PL, OO, or PLOO respectively, and the results are reported 
in panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The dependent variable is defined as a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm chooses one of the methods over the 
others. 
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In panel A, the value of the dependent variable equals one if the issue is conducted 
by an RO and zero if the issue is conducted by another issue method. Estimations 1 
and 2 present that the coefficients of Proceed/MV and Discount to be positive and 
significant. This result suggests that the larger the issue and the higher the offer 
price discount, the more likely the firm conducting an SEO is to choose a rights 
offer.   Then ownership concentration (OC) is found to be positively associated 
with the probability of a firm choosing a rights offer, where OC is used to capture 
the incentives of large shareholders. Large shareholders are more concerned about 
their private benefits of control and therefore choose rights offers over 
control-diluting issues. This results support the hypothesis that rights offers can 
help a large shareholder maintain control of a firm. For this reason, rights offers are 
more likely to be chosen in family-controlled firms (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
Additionally, the significant coefficient for Pasts and Market condition suggests 
that the probability of a firm conducting a rights offer is negatively related to past 
stock market performance but positively related to market performance. 
 
Panel B reports the results for the probability of a firm choosing a placing. Here, 
this study focuses on the variables with a significant coefficient, that is, Proceed/ 
MV, Discount, MSO, institutional OC, Leverage, Pasts and Market condition. Both 
Proceed/MV and Discount take on a negative role, that is, a smaller issue and a 
lower discount indicate a higher probability of a UK firm choosing a placing. With 
respect to the role of MSO, the results suggest higher managerial share ownership 
increases the probability of a firm choosing placing. This supports the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis, where entrenched managers can use placing to solidify 
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their control of the firm (Barclay et al. 2007). The coefficient of Institutional OC 
suggests that the lower pre-issue institutional ownership, the higher the probability 
of a firm choosing placing. This finding is consistent with the argument that firms 
use placing to improve the monitoring of management (Wruck, 1989). The large 
shareholders created by placing have an incentive to monitor and benefit from their 
monitoring efforts. Furthermore, the benefit of adding such large shareholders 
should be lower if there are more potential monitors in place (Cronqvist and 
Nilsson, 2003). 
 
Leverage takes on a negative role, where firms with higher debt levels are less 
likely to issue equity by placing. A higher leverage level indicates active 
monitoring from debt holders and therefore firms do not have to choose placing for 
monitoring. In addition, investors are unwilling to buy shares from a highly 
leveraged firm because it has a higher risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
These result in a higher risk of SEO failure. The results also indicate that firms with 
better past stock performance tend to select placings and this issue method becomes 
more popular in a cold market. 
 
Panel C displays the logistic modelling results for a standalone open offer. The 
coefficients of Proceed/MV and MSO are positive and significant. This finding 
suggests that firms with larger issues or with higher managerial ownership are more 
likely to make open offers. It is noteworthy that Size takes on a negative role. Firm 
size is a proxy of uncertainty and asymmetric information. This result implies that 
an open offer is more likely to be chosen in firms with a higher level of uncertainty 
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and asymmetric information. The result in panel D suggest that the larger the issue, 
the higher the offer discount and the more favourable market conditions can 
increase the probability of a firm making a combined open offer with placing. The 
leverage variable has negative coefficients, indicating that financially distressed 
firms are less likely to select PLOOs. 
 
By combining the results of different models, several variables have a significant 
effect on issue method choice. First are issue characteristics. Firms with larger 
issues are less likely to choose PLs. A larger offer discount increases the probability 
of choosing an RO or PLOO but decreases the likelihood of using a PL. Second is 
ownership. Ownership-concentrated firms prefer right-preserving issue methods, 
such as the RO and OO, but dislike the PLOO. This evidence strongly supports the 
controlling theory. Firms with higher managerial ownership are more likely to use 
PLs and OOs, which is consistent with the incentive of entrenched managers. 
Lower institutional ownership can raise the probability of a firm using placing due 
to enhanced monitoring. Third are the firm variables. Firm size is negatively related 
to the probability of a firm choosing an OO. Firms with higher leverage are less 
likely to issue PLOOs. However, the results suggest a firm’s ROE and MV/BV have 
no effect on the choice of SEO. Fourth are firm-specific and market conditions. 
Better stock performance, as a potential proxy for firm quality, is associated with a 
higher probability of choosing placings and a lower probability of choosing rights 
offers. In a hot market, firms are more likely to choose rights offers but less likely to 
conduct equity issues by placing. 
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(Please insert Table 3.4 here) 
 
To examine the choice of SEO issue method more explicitly, this Chapter applies 
multinomial logistic regression. The models allow for four possible outcomes: a 
firm can choose to issue a rights offer, issue a placing, issue an open offer, or 
conduct combined open offer/placing. The dependent variable is the four issue 
choices and takes a value of zero for an RO, one for a PL, two for an OO, and three 
for a PLOO. 
 
The results are consistent with the easier finding on the probability of firm choosing 
various SEO issue methods in Table 3.4 and provide new insights. First, higher 
offer discount firms prefer to conduct ROs rather than PLOOs. Second, the 
coefficient of OC indicates that for the choice between an RO and an OO, 
ownership-concentrated firms are more likely to conduct SEOs by ROs. Third, for 
the choice between a PL and an OO, firms with higher managerial ownership are 
more likely to conduct SEOs by PL. This evidence confirms the managerial 
entrenched hypothesis. Another important finding is that favourable market 
conditions significantly decrease the probability of a firm choosing a PL or a PLOO. 
Given that placing is a proxy for value certification, the result implies that firm 
equity is overvalued in a hot market. 
 
(Please insert Table 3.5 here) 
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Table 3.6 presents the results of cross-sectional tests on SEO offer price discounts. 
It is notable that the coefficient for proceeds/MV is significantly positive, 
indicating that the larger the issue size, the higher the discount. This result strongly 
supports the downward-sloping demand and price pressure hypotheses Corwin 
(2003). 
 
 This Chapter now observe the roles of ownership variables in SEO price setting. 
The coefficients of the three ownership variables OC, MSO, and institutional OC 
are significant. Here OC plays a positive role, suggesting that firms with higher 
ownership concentration tend to set offers at a lower price, that is, a higher discount. 
Concentrated ownership is more likely to result in a less public float and lower 
market liquidity, so investors require a larger discount to compensate for their 
investment in illiquid stock (Intintoli and Kahle, 2010).  
 
The positive relation between managerial ownership and offer discounts can be 
explained by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Managers have an incentive 
to place shares with those buyers who may be passive investors or managerial 
investors. Thus, a higher discount needs to be used in compensation for monitoring 
(Barclay et al., 2007). However, firms with higher institutional ownership tend to 
offer a lower discount. Under the monitoring hypothesis, the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders is reduced by the presence of 
institutional monitors. Moreover, investors are more likely to participate in the 
placing that the issuer already has active monitors (usually institutional investors), 
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because they can directly benefit from existing monitoring and do not have to be 
concerned about the free rider problem. Additionally, large institutional holdings 
imply the stock’s value has been approved by institutional investors. Therefore, it is 
easier for issue new shares with marketing and the offer discount will be lower. 
 
The evidence shows that smaller firms are more likely to set the discount at a high 
level. This result implies firms have to offer a deeper discount to compensate for the 
high level of information asymmetry (e.g., Corwin, 2003). Leverage has a 
significantly negative effect, which is inconsistent with the theory that high 
leverage reduces information asymmetry due to monitoring by creditors. This 
evidence can be explained as follows: To guarantee the success of an SEO, a 
financially distressed firm must price its offer with a high discount. 
 
Furthermore, the results suggest that a pre-issue stock run-up decreases the offer 
discount. Better stock performance reveals positive information to the market, 
which can increase investor willingness to participate in the SEO. Another 
important finding is that the offer price discount is higher when the market is hot. 
This may be explained as equity issues clustering in a hot market, such that the 
competition among issuers becomes intense. Therefore, a firm has to use a higher 
discount to gain the attention of investors. 
 
(Please insert Table 3.6 here) 
 
 118 
 
Table 3.7 reports the cross-sectional analysis of SEO announcement returns. The 
dependent variable is defined as the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative abnormal return 
with respect to the announcement date. First, it is shown that the offer price 
discount is negatively related to the announcement return in all estimations. The 
offer discount can appear to be a signal of firm quality to the market (e.g., Slovin et 
al. 2000; Balachandran et al. 2008). A lower price discount signals that the firm has 
high quality and thus the market response to its SEO will be more favourable, 
resulting in a higher announcement return. 
 
The coefficient of MSO is negative and significant, suggesting higher managerial 
share ownership and a less favourable market reaction. This result can be explained 
by the underinvestment problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. The underinvestment problem becomes severe in high 
managerial ownership firms. Because entrenched managers have more discretion to 
pursue their wealth, they may even act against firm interests. The SEO of such firm 
is more likely to convey managers’ belief that the firm is overvalued, resulting in a 
lower announcement return. As expected,  the results suggest that larger pre-issue 
institutional ownership leads to better SEO outcome. This is because the strong 
monitoring carried out by institutional investors may press managers into making 
optimal financing and investment decisions. Moreover, the rest of the shareholders 
can benefit from this effort. 
 
The evidence also suggests that a higher announcement return can be driven by 
better pre-issue stock performance. The results on market condition suggest that 
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market reactions to announcements are more favourable in a hot market, leading to 
a lower indirect cost of equity issue. This finding strongly supports the market 
timing hypothesis. Firms are market timers. They are more likely to issue seasoned 
equity at a time when the cost of equity is temporarily low. 
 
To examine whether the issue method can influence market reactions to SEO 
announcements, we further include four dummy variables (RO, PL, OO, PLOO) in 
the regressions of panel B. Consistent with the earlier finding, right offers incur a 
negative market reaction, while market reactions to placings are more favourable. A 
potential explanation for the latter result is that a placing is a proxy for firm value 
certification Shares in a placing are usually purchased by institutional investors, 
who are expected to have superior information about firm value. As a result, the 
market believes that placing is less likely to be conducted by an overvalued firm 
(Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003). 
 
(Please insert Table 3.7 here) 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter extends the existing knowledge of UK SEO methods along the 
following three aspects: the probability of the choices of alternative SEO methods, 
SEO price setting, and market reactions to SEO announcements. In this chapter, we 
focus on examining the influence of firm ownership structure on these three issues 
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by constructing three measures: ownership concentration, managerial share 
ownership, and institutional ownership. 
 
First, this chapter examines how and why UK firms choose one issue method over 
another in SEO issuances among four major SEO methods: ROs, PLs, OOs, and 
PLOOs. The results provide reliable evidence to strongly support the controlling 
hypothesis that block holders press a firm into choosing a right-preserving issue to 
maintain their voting rights and control. Moreover, the evidence suggests that firm 
with firms with high ownership concentration prefer ROs over OOs as issue method, 
when they conduct SEO. By contrast, the PL is the last choice for these firms. 
Consistent with the findings of Barnes and Walker (2006), the results also suggest 
that firms with higher managerial ownership are most likely to choose placing, 
supporting the argument that the use of placing can strengthen managerial control 
(Barclay et al. 2007). Institutional ownership, as a proxy for monitoring effects, is 
negatively associated with the probability of conducting an SEO by placing. Given 
that placing can improve the monitoring of management, firms that already have 
monitors are less likely to implement placing. 
 
This chapter also analyzes the role of ownership in the SEO price-setting process. 
The  results indicate that for issuing firms with concentrated ownership and a high 
level of managerial ownership, investors may require large offer price discounts 
since the stocks of these firms present lower market liquidity. this study also finds 
empirical evidence to support the monitoring hypothesis. Since institutional 
holdings relate to the verification of firm quality, firms with higher institutional 
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ownership are likely to set the offer at a higher price, that is, a lower discount, 
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter examines market reactions to SEOs by different issue 
type. Consistent with the findings of previous UK SEO studies, this study find s 
that PLs and PLOOs generate significantly positive announcement returns, while 
market reactions to announcements of an RO is significantly negative. This result 
indicates that a PL or a PLOO is a positive signal of firm value and leads to lower 
indirect costs, but the use of an RO conveys a negative signal and entails larger 
indirect costs. 
 
 This Chapter further investigates the role of ownership in such an issue. The 
finding shows that SEO announcement returns decrease with managerial ownership 
because of increased agency problems and adverse selection costs. Investors 
believe that entrenched managers have a strong incentive to issue equity when firms 
are overvalued. Moreover, institutional ownership has a positive effect on SEO 
announcement returns, which is also consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Notably, the results also strongly support market timing theory. Announcement 
returns are higher (lower) when SEOs are conducted in a hot (cold) market. Firms 
are likely to issue equity when the indirect cost is relatively low. Further, firms are 
likely to choose ROs when the stock market is favourable, while they prefer 
placings in a cold market. Since placing is value certification, overvalued 
(undervalued) firms are less (more) likely to choose placing as the issue method. 
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This result implies that SEOs in a hot market are likely to be motivated by firm 
overvaluation. 
 
 123 
 
Appendix: Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Issuer characteristics 
Discount 
1- Offer price/price (-1), where price (-1) is the close 
market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceed 
Gross proceeds. For missing data, the value is 
constructed as the number of new shares times the offer 
price. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceeds/MV 
The ratio of proceeds divided by the issuer’s market 
value. 
Thomson One 
Banker and 
DataStream 
RO 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for a rights offer and 
zero for the others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
PL 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for placing and zero for 
the others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
OO 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for an open offer and 
zero for the others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
PLOO 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for the combined offer 
of placing–open offer and zero for the others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Ownership characteristics 
OC 
Ownership concentration is the sum of shares held by 
block holders with at least 3% share stakes. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
MSO 
MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as 
the sum of the ownership of executive and 
non-executive directors. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Institutional OC 
Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 
3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional 
investors. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
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Variable Definition Source 
Firm characteristics 
MV The issuer’s market value. Datastream 
Size the natural logarithm of market value Datastream 
ROE The ratio of net income over the book value of equity. Datastream 
MV/BV 
The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity. 
Datastream 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. Datastream 
Pasts 
Past stock performance is defined as the CAAR for SEO 
firms during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to the 
announcement day. 
Datastream 
Market condition 
Past market condition is defined as the cumulative 
equal-weighted market returns during the estimated 
period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. 
Datastream 
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Table 3.1 Trend in SEO Issue Method by UK Firms from 1998 to 2010 
This table presents the annual number of SEOs listed on LSE from January 1996 to December 
2010. The whole sample of SEOs is categorized into four subsamples by issue type: rights offers 
(RO), placings (PL), open offers (OO) and issues that combined a placing with an open offer 
(PLOO). 
 
Year RO PL OO PLOO Total RO% PL% OO% PLOO% Total% 
1998 7 5 1 5 18 38.89 27.78 5.56 27.78 100 
1999 8 9 1 4 22 36.36 40.91 4.55 18.18 100 
2000 14 15 2 10 41 34.15 36.59 4.88 24.39 100 
2001 18 43 7 10 78 23.08 55.13 8.97 12.82 100 
2002 9 7 9 11 36 25.00 19.44 25.00 30.56 100 
2003 10 9 3 20 42 23.81 21.43 7.14 47.62 100 
2004 10 9 7 25 51 19.61 17.65 13.73 49.02 100 
2005 17 5 1 32 55 30.91 9.09 1.82 58.18 100 
2006 14 12 2 19 47 29.79 25.53 4.26 40.43 100 
2007 12 10 7 4 33 36.36 30.30 21.21 12.12 100 
2008 3 26 2 1 32 9.38 81.25 6.25 3.13 100 
2009 31 98 7 6 142 21.83 69.01 4.93 4.23 100 
2010 3 43 5 5 56 5.36 76.79 8.93 8.93 100 
Total 156 291 54 152 653 23.89 44.56 8.27 23.28 100 
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Figure 3.1 Trend in SEO Issue Method by UK Firms from 1998 to 2010 
This figure presents the trend in SEO issue method by UK firms listed on LSE from January 1996 
to December 2010. The whole sample of SEOs is categorized into four subsamples by issue type: 
rights offers (ROs), placings (PLs), open offers (OOs) and issues that combined a placing with an 
open offer (PLOOs). 
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Table 3.2 Issue and Firm Characteristics of SEOs 
The table presents the mean, median and standard deviation of issue (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) for UK SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) 
from 1998 to 2010. All SEOs are divided into four subsamples by issue type: rights offers (RO), placings(PL), open offers(OO) and issues that combined a 
placing with an open offer(PLOO). Issue characteristics are obtained from Thomson One Banker. Financial factors are obtained from DATASTREAM. Proceed 
is the SEO offer amount in millions of US dollars. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to 
the announcement day. OC is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% share stakes. MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the 
sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all 
institutional investors. MV is the market value of firm’s equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity. MV/BV is the ratio of the market 
value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. 
 
 RO PL OO PLOO Total 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std 
Panel A Issue characteristics 
Proceed 
($ mil) 
211.79 119.70 219.68 91.21 18.85 243.12 158.83 88.08 212.11 182.91 87.55 206.39 146.90 55.30 221.48 
Discount 
(%) 
18.71 12.94 23.14 7.83 7.24 25.42 13.27 12.37 31.13 15.80 13.71 33.14 12.74 10.31 26.61 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
 RO PL OO PLOO Total 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std 
Panel B SEO firm characteristics 
OC (%) 52.85 45.12 37.24 50.86 49.92 27.4 63.98 68.46 32.94 49.04 44.96 28.77 51.20 49.23 38.97 
MSO (%) 5.66 1.76 11.06 13.76 0.97 28.03 12.84 3.61 21.63 6.17 2.33 2.33 9.98 1.77 21.59 
Institution 
OC (%) 
35.25 32.09 26.69 34.68 31.90 26.02 28.98 21.14 22.72 31.79 28.33 25.78 33.67 31.82 25.89 
MV ($mil) 286.24 95.02 481.10 256.12 52.04 432.26 162.05 60.54 327.64 353.80 94.61 688.51 278.27 406.25 468.46 
ROE (%) 13.28 7.00 16.02 2.01 0.91 6.01 11.05 3.57 16.74 2.99 3.21 78.59 5.68 4.81 39.44 
MV/BV 3.95 1.59 13.27 3.44 1.83 11.72 1.78 1.15 11.60 3.22 2.43 13.52 3.37 1.57 13.04 
Leverage 
(%) 
26.39 24.17 23.11 25.98 26.39 24.17 22.18 18.14 20.17 20.41 15.81 20.01 24.47 22.13. 21.27 
No. of Obs 156 291 54 152 653 
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Table 3.3 Announcement Return on SEOs 
This table reports past stock performance of SEO issuers and SEO announcement returns in percentage for UK SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) from 
1998 to 2010, using the Carhart four-factor model (1997). The whole sample of SEOs is categorized into four subsamples by issue type: rights offers (RO), 
placings (PL), open offers (OO) and issues that combined a placing with an open offer (PLOO). Past stock performance is defined as the cumulative average 
abnormal return for SEO issuers during the period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day, where announcement day is set as zero. This study highlights the 2-day 
[-1, 0] and 3-day [-1, 1] announcement windows. The t-test is used under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 RO PL OO PLOO Total 
Event windows Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value Mean P-value 
Past stock 
performance (%) 
0.042*** [<.0001] 0.097 [0.162 ] 0.024 [0.772 ] 0.143*** [<.0001] 0.089*** [<.0001] 
CAAR [0, 1] (%) -1.251*** [<.0001] 0.183 [0.716 ] 1.663 [0.203 ] 0.024 [0.123] -0.074* [0.077 ] 
CAAR [-1,1] (%) -0.818** [0.032 ] 0.083* [0.095 ] 0.784 [0.261 ] 0.133* [0.063] -0.063* [0.065] 
No. of Obs 156 291 54 152 653 
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Table 3.4 Logistic Regression of SEO Issue Method Choice 
This table reports the results of modelling the probability of choosing four alternative SEO 
methods, using multivariate logistic regression analysis. The sample comprises 653 UK SEOs 
during 1998-2010. Proceed/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. 
Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 
prior to the announcement day. OC is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% 
share stakes.MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of 
executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% 
of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Discount is defined as 1- offer price 
/price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. 
MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive 
and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors. Size is the log of the market value of equity. 
ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market 
value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. Pasts is 
past stock performance, which is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return for SEO firms 
during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Market condition is defined as 
cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. All regressions include 
year and industry fixed effects.The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square 
brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Panel A Dependent variable is one for firms choosing RO and zero for firm choosing other issue 
method 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -2.032*** [0.000] -2.034*** [0.000] 
Proceed/MV 0.392*** [<.0001] 0.362*** [<.0001] 
Discount 0.106* [0.082] 0.139* [0.084] 
OC 0.206* [0.052]   
MSO   0.057 [0.137] 
Institutional OC   0.052 [0.182] 
Size -0.082 [0.334] -0.077 [0.383] 
ROE (%) 0.083 [0.433] 0.084 [0.107] 
MV/BV 0.032 [0.135] 0.037 [0.134] 
Leverage 0.358 [0.522] 0.344 [0.521] 
Pasts -1.176*** [0.000] -1.152*** [0.000] 
Market condition 2.096* [0.071] 2.132* [0.077] 
Pseudo-R2 0.427 0.432 
Panel B Dependent variable is one for firms choosing PL and zero for firm choosing other issue method 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.682 [0.220] 0.306 [0.577] 
Proceed/MV -0.573*** [<.0001] -0.577*** [<.0001] 
Discount -0.934* [0.057] -0.082* [0.091] 
OC -0.094 [0.791]   
MSO   0.015** [0.024] 
Institutional OC   -0.048** [0.017] 
Size 0.123 [0.147] 0.125 [0.157] 
ROE (%) -0.204 [0.106] -0.172 [0.158] 
MV/BV -0.033 [0.194] -0.038 [0.344] 
Leverage -1.378** [0.020] -1.294** [0.023] 
Pasts 0.824** [0.025] 0.832** [0.021] 
Market condition -3.214*** [0.000] -4.021*** [0.000] 
Pseudo-R2 0.59  0.43  
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Panel C Dependent variable is one for firms choosing OO and zero for firm choosing other issue 
method 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -1.853** [0.041] -0.964 [0.228] 
Proceed/MV 0.245** [0.012] 0.283** [0.013] 
Discount -0.163 [0.835] 0.017 [0.854] 
OC 0.013** [0.023]   
MSO   0.014* [0.091] 
Institutional OC   -0.011 [0.328] 
Size -0.367** [0.013] -0.429*** [0.001] 
ROE (%) 0.088 [0.487] 0.088 [0. 426] 
MV/BV 0.035 [0.147] 0.032 [0.112] 
Leverage -0.093 [0.928] -0.268 [0.763] 
Pasts 0.304 [0.557] 0.282 [0.557] 
Market condition -2.683 [0.124] -2.716 [0.116] 
Pseudo-R2 0.394  0.399  
Panel D Dependent variable is one for firms choosing PLOO and zero for firm choosing other issue 
method 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -2.042*** [0.000] -2.158*** [0.000] 
Proceed/MV 0.283*** [<.0001] 0.258*** [<.0001] 
Discount 0.852* [0.083] 0.822* [0.092] 
OC -0.074** [0.041]   
MSO   -0.011 [0.111] 
Institutional OC   -0.057 [0.219] 
Size 0.078 [0.452] 0.081 [0.345] 
ROE (%) -0.025 [0.994] -0.050 [0.958] 
MV/BV -0.014 [0.487] -0.018 [0.318] 
Leverage -1.903*** [0.008] -1.848*** [0.002] 
Pasts 0.211 [0.545] 2.450 [0.477] 
Market condition 3.103** [0.018] 3.135*** [0.008] 
Pseudo-R2 0.427  0.433  
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Table 3.5 Multinomial Logistic Regression of SEO Issue Method Choice 
This table reports the results of modelling the probability of choosing four alternative SEO methods, using multinomial Logistic regression. The sample 
comprises 653 UK SEOs during 1998-2010. Proceed/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price 
(-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. OC is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% share 
stakes.MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises 
aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is 
the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive 
and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors. Size is the 
log of the market value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of 
equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. Pasts is past stock performance, which is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return for SEO 
firms during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Market condition is defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same 
estimated period. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects.The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Test results for OC 
Variables  RO versus PL RO versus OO RO versus PLOO PL versus OO PL versus PLOO OO VS PLOO 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -1.733** [0.010] -1.511 [0.110] -1.499** [0.023] 0.222 [0.821] 0.234 [0.731] 0.012 [0.990] 
Proceed/MV 0.652*** [<.0001] 0.503*** [<.0001] 0.557*** [<.0001] -0.148** [0.032] -0.948 [0.234] 0.536 [0.655] 
Discount 0.649** [0.019] 0.595 [0.290] 0.828* [0.084] -0.520 [0.910] -0.379 [0.358] 0.233 [0.609] 
OC 0.022* [0.056] 0.077* [0.095] 0.06 [0.115] -0.099** [0.028] 0.379 [0.114] -0.014*** [0.008] 
Size 0.121 [0.238] 0.361** [0.016] -0.196 [0.848] 0.129 [0.114] -0.101 [0.303] 0.341** [0.025] 
ROE (%) 0.204 [0.146] 0.264 [0.160] 0.129 [0.334] -0.424 [0.749] -0.75 [0.578] -0.117 [0.491] 
MV/BV 0.417 [0.176] -0.51 [0.247] 0.089 [0.788] 0.892 [0.668] 0.148 [0.876] -0.417 [0.132] 
Leverage 0.757** [0.047] 0.906 [0.342] 0.218 [0.232] -0.148 [0.877] -0.143** [0.028] -1.278 [0.194] 
Pasts -1.435*** [0.001] 2.605 [0.623] 5.105 [0.229] 1.174** [0.048] -9.242** [0.031] -2.499 [0.671] 
Market condition 4.363*** [0.001] -1.437*** [0.001][ 5.453*** [<.0001] -4.507** [0.019] 1.090 [0.438] 5.597*** [0.004] 
Pseudo-R2 0.355 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
 
Panel B: Test results for MSO and Institutional OC 
Variables RO versus PL RO versus OO RO versus PLOO PL versus OO PL versus PLOO OO VS PLOO 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -0.157** [0.019] -0.608 [0.482] -1.479** [0.024] 0.914 [0.297] 0.069 [0.918] -0.871 [0.334] 
Proceed/MV 0.628*** [<.0001] 0.537*** [<.0001] 0.539*** [<.0001] -0.904* [0.092] -0.891 [0.333] 0.132 [0.992] 
Discount 0.627*** [0.006] 0.588 [0.300] 0.806* [0.094] -0.04 [0.390] 0.173 [0.536] 0.218 [0.651] 
MSO -0.013** [0.046] -0.010 [0.212] -0.011 [0.134] 0.012** [0.033] 0.014 [0.889] -0.022** [0.035] 
Institutional OC 0.031** [0.029] 0.076 [0.294] 0.630 [0.214] 0.044* [0.063] 0.031 [0.554] 0.013 [0.866] 
Size 0.425*** [0.004] 0.372*** [0.004] -0.119 [0.906] 0.306** [0.039] -0.107 [0.286] 0.423*** [0.006] 
ROE (%) 0.526 [0.129] 0.251 [0.153] 0.124 [0.367] 0.489 [0.714] -0.78 [0.576] -0.127 [0.459] 
MV/BV 0.389 [0.212] -0.526 [0.129] 0.526 [0.874] 0.137 [0.526] 0.336 [0.141] -0.047 [0.084] 
Leverage 0.716** [0.029] 1.057 [0.295] 2.187 [0.322] -0.270 [0.777] -1.401** [0.030] -1.13 [0.250] 
Pasts -1.419*** [0.002] 2.97 [0.609] 4.619 [0.276] 1.122* [0.058] -9.571** [0.026] -1.649 [0.776] 
Market condition 4.474*** [0.001] -3.87 [0.984] 5.517*** [<.0001] -4.435** [0.023] 1.044 [0.460] 5.479*** [0.006] 
Pseudo-R2 0.385 
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Table 3.6 The Cross Sectional Regression Analysis of SEO Offer Price Discount 
This table presents the regression results of the SEO discount on issuer financial variables, 
ownership variables and market condition for UK SEOs from 1998 to 2010. Proceed/MV is the 
SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price 
(-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. 
Ownership concentration is the sum of shares held by block holders with at least 3% share 
stakes.MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of 
executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% 
of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Discount is defined as 1- offer price 
/price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. 
MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive 
and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors. Size is the log of the market value of equity. 
ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market 
value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. Pasts is 
past stock performance, which is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return for SEO firms 
during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Market condition is defined as 
cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. All regressions include 
year and industry fixed effects.The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square 
brackets. The superscripts ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.306*** [<.0001] 0.298*** [<.0001] 
Proceed/MV 0.113** [0.010] 0.010*** [0.004] 
OC 0.012*** [<.0001]   
MSO   0.013*** [0.002] 
Institutional OC   -0.018*** [<.0001] 
Size -0.165** [0.025] -0.018** [0.012] 
ROE (%) -0.058 [0.102] -0.051 [0.492] 
MV/BV -0.519 [0.503] -0.025 [0.142] 
Leverage 0.983* [0.055] 0.979* [0.054] 
Pasts -6.874** [0.032] -7.351** [0.022] 
Market condition 3.628*** [0.001] 3.586*** [0.003] 
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.123 
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Table 3.7 The Cross Sectional Regression Analysis of SEO Announcement Returns 
This table presents the regression results of the three-day average excess returns return (CAAR[-1,1]) on issuer financial variables, ownership variables and market 
condition for UK SEOs from 1998 to 2010. Proceed/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where 
price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. MSO represents managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of 
executive and nonexecutive directors; Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional investors; Discount is 
defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. MSO represents managerial share ownership, 
defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors. Institutional OC comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by 
all institutional investors. Size is the log of the market value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market value 
of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. Pasts is past stock performance, which is defined as the cumulative average abnormal 
return for SEO firms during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Market condition is defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the 
same estimated period. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects.The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets. The superscripts 
***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A The cross sectional regression analysis of SEO announcement returns 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.108 [0.431] 0.745 [0.581] 
Proceed/MV 0.715 [0.558] 0.075 [0.498] 
Discount  -0.281** [0.017] -0.289** [0.015] 
OC -0.009 [0.225]   
MSO   -0.028** [0.024] 
Institutional OC   0.022** [0.031] 
Size 0.725 [0.723] 0.129 [0.523] 
ROE (%) -0.552 [0.826] -0.059 [0.800] 
MV/BV -0.536 [0.249] -0.552 [0.237] 
Leverage 0.116 [0.934] 0.151 [0.914] 
Pasts 3.457*** [0.000] 3.416*** [0.000] 
Market condition 5.737** [0.035] 6.008** [0.028] 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.050 
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Table 3.7 Continued 
 
Panel B: The extended cross sectional regression analysis of SEO announcement returns 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept 0.670 [0.620] 0.119 [0.394] 0.442 [0.746] 0.788 [0.560] 
Proceed/MV 0.110 [0.452] 0.156 [0.420] 0.099 [0.489] 0.054 [0.411] 
Discount -0.287** [0.014] -0.300** [0.011] -0.289** [0.014] -0.279** [0.018] 
MSO -0.028** [0.025] -0.027** [0.026] -0.029** [0.018] -0.029** [0.021] 
Institutional OC 0.020** [0.048] 0.031* [0.064] 0.032 [0.065] 0.018* [0.068] 
Size 0.132 [0.511] 0.143 [0.477] 0.173 [0.395] 0.137 [0.497] 
ROE (%) -0.070 [0.766] -0.077 [0.744] -0.073 [0.395] -0.060 [0.799] 
MV/BV -0.058 [0.210] -0.058 [0.211] -0.060 [0.198] -0.573 [0.220] 
Leverage 0.937 [0.946] 0.341 [0.809] 0.155 [0.912] -0.237 [0.987] 
Pasts 3.267*** [0.000] 3.312*** [0.000] 3.445*** [0.000] 3.386*** [0.000] 
Market condition 5.804** [0.033] 5.567** [0.043] 6.315** [0.021] 6.272** [0.022] 
RO -0.068* [0.052]       
PL   0.074** [0.011]     
OO     0.015 [0.119]   
PLOO       -0.052 [0.383] 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.053 0.054  0.051  
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Chapter 4 Financial Media and UK Seasoned 
Equity Offerings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the role of the financial media in UK firm seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). Also known as a follow-on offering, an SEO is an 
important external financing decision for publicly listed firms to raise capital. The 
most important considerations for the issuing firms are creating demand for the 
offering stocks and setting the offer price. Recent research investigates the effect 
of news media on equity issuance
13
 and asset prices.
14
 Several studies show that 
the media can raise short-term demand for a stock (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2008; 
Da et al., 2010). Moreover, Cook et al. (2006) posit that the news media can 
influence the demand for new shares and thereby affect the offer price. 
Contributing to this strand of research, this chapter provides a framework to show 
whether and how media influence in an SEO can help the issuer raise the offer 
price. 
 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, Cook et al. (2006), Bhattacharya et al. (2009), and Liu et al. (2009).  
14
 See, for example, Tetlock (2007), Tetlock et al. (2008), and Fang and Peress (2009). 
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Public media, such as newspapers, provides investors with a channel to obtain 
information on individual firms. With the continuous dissemination of new 
information about firms, investors should adjust their investment decisions 
accordingly. Media can influence investors’ trading behaviour in two ways: first is 
that the attention-grabbing media coverage should increase the investor 
recognition of stock, which is an important determinant of investment decisions 
(e.g. Merton, 1987; Barber and Odean, 2009, Fang and Peress 2009). Merton 
(1987) argues that investors purchase only the stock of which they are aware, i.e. 
the stock with high investor recognition. Second is that the content of news can 
influence the investors’ expectation of stocks, resulting in stock prices dynamics 
(e.g. Tetlock, 2007; Garcia, 2012). Therefore, firms have an incentive to use the 
media to promote their public reputation and broaden investor recognition, 
thereby affecting stock prices. This fact has not escaped the attention of 
researchers and there is a growing literature on the role of the media in corporate 
finance.  
 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that awareness of the media pushes firms to 
adjust their corporate policy to make it more acceptable to the public. Focusing on 
mergers and acquisitions, Ahern and Sosyura (2012) provide evidence that 
acquirers actively manage the media to boost their stock prices during the 
negotiation period. Buehlmaier (2012) finds that media coverage can predict 
takeover outcome. However, while this body of literature indicates that the media 
have a significant effect on the outcome of important corporate events, it contains 
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no evidence on the role of the media in SEOs. This chapter’s major motivation is 
therefore to fill this gap. 
 
Two recent papers investigate media influence in equity issuances, both focusing 
on initial public offerings (IPOs). Cook et al. (2006) argue that pre-offer, the 
media can promote IPO firms to retail investors by creating pre-offer publicity, 
resulting in upward offer price revisions. Liu et al. (2009) also find that media 
coverage is positively related to both the initial returns of the IPO and long-term 
performance. Given the similarity of IPO and SEO practice, it is implied a similar 
association between SEOs and the media. However, SEOs offer a different context 
in which to study the role of the media.  
 
First, investors face less uncertainty and a lower level of asymmetric information 
when valuing SEO issuers than they face in the case of IPOs. The reason is that 
the stock prices of SEO issuers are easily observable in the secondary market. 
Furthermore, the corporate information is more transparent, since public firms 
have a track record of financial and operation performance. Second, the existing 
information about SEO issuers should lead to lower media bias, so that media 
coverage contains more ‘genuine news’ in the sense of new and factual 
information. Thus, SEOs allow us to test more clearly whether media coverage 
influences investor impressions by increasing their exposure to firm news and, 
further, by framing this news positively or negatively. 
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For SEO issuers, price setting is highly important. Usually SEOs are priced at a 
discount and, to raise more capital, issuers want to raise prices, that is, provide a 
lower discount. The offer price is adjusted by investor demand and there are two 
potential ways in which media coverage can affect the shift in demand. First, as a 
proxy for investor attention, media news could attract more investors to 
participate in the SEO market, resulting in higher demand for offerings and hence 
a higher offer price (e.g., Cook et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2009). Second, media 
coverage can temporarily direct sentiment on the part of some investors, such as 
noise and liquidity investors, raising current stock prices (e.g., Huberman and 
Regev, 2001; Tetlock, 2007).  
 
Based on these arguments, issuers will consider the effect of the media when price 
setting. The media shape public image, affect investor opinion, and create the 
environment in which SEOs are conducted. Consequently, it is implied that more 
pre-SEO media coverage could reduce the discounting of SEO pricing. Similarly, 
issuers with positive news are more likely to price SEOs higher. 
 
This study focuses on the media coverage of UK firms during the pre-SEO period. 
The UK provides a particularly interesting context. Unlike the US market, in the 
UK the offering characteristics of SEOs, such as the method of flotation, price, 
and size of SEO offers are fixed at the initial announcement. Issuers can gather 
information to assess investor demand and determine the offer price only in the 
pre-announcement period. In this context, issuers have an incentive to promote 
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their stocks to investors and influence stock prices by producing and 
disseminating more good news before the SEO announcement. 
 
This paper examines a sample of 415 UK seasoned equity issuances from 1996 to 
2010. The starting point of 1996 is chosen because the deal value limitation of 
private placement was effectively removed in January 1996. All the offering 
factors are obtained from Thomson One Banker. The issuers’ characteristics are 
obtained from Datastream. To examine the role of the media in the UK SEO 
market, this chapter collects all firm-related news in the pre-SEO period from the 
LexisNexis UK database. This database comprises the articles published in the 
Financial Times (London), The Times (London), the Guardian (London), the 
Daily Mirror, and the Sunday Mirror.  
 
This Chapter constructs two media variables based on recent literature. First, 
media coverage is measured as the summative amount of media news covering the 
SEO issuer during pre-SEO period. Second, this study constructs the proxy for 
media sentiment by counting the number of positive words and negative words for 
each article. Media sentiment is measured as the ratio of positive words minus 
negative words to total words for each article and then finding the average ratio of 
all related articles in the pre-SEO period. Positive and negative words are 
identified by referring to the word list proposed by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011). 
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 It is shown that there is a significant correlation between pre-SEO media 
coverage and the discounting of SEO offer price. As predicted, higher media 
coverage can decrease the discounting of UK SEOs, that is, raise the offer price. 
Alternatively, issuers covered by less negative media are likely to price offers 
higher. The findings contribute to the literature by adding new insight into the 
effect of media content in the case of SEOs. The results also imply that the media 
may be a determinant in SEO price setting.  
 
This Chapter further explores pre-SEO media influence on announcement returns. 
The empirical evidence suggests that SEOs with greater pre-SEO media coverage 
attract less favourable market responses. According to the investor recognition 
hypothesis (Merton, 1987), a potential explanation is that investors continue to 
pay attention to the stocks with which they are more familiar. When issuers with 
high investor attention make SEO announcements, they reach more investors. 
However, investors already realize that an SEO is a signal for overvalued equities 
(Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986). In this scenario, most 
existing and potential investors believe that the issuer is opportunistic and revise 
the firm’s valuation downward. As a result, the announcement return will 
decrease.  
 
Moreover, the finding is consistent with papers studying media content (e.g., 
Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Garcia, 2012). It supports the argument that 
media sentiment may distort stock prices by inducing behaviourally biased trading. 
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Positive media news can induce sentimental investors to be over-optimistic, 
resulting in higher announcement returns. 
 
This study extends the existing knowledge of the relation between the media and 
the financial market in the following ways. First, it stresses the importance of 
considering the role of the media in a seasoned equity issuance, while recent 
studies focus on the role of the media in IPOs (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; 
Cook et al., 2006; Liu et al. 2009). Second, in addition to the common measure of 
total media coverage, the analysis takes into account the linguistic content of 
media articles, a better measure for capturing the latest information and direction 
of public opinion. Third, this is the one of the first study to investigate whether 
and to what degree media coverage or media content affects the SEO price-setting 
process. This adds new insight into the determinants of discounting for equity 
issuance. Fourth, the analysis is also the first to explicitly consider the media’s 
influence on market reactions to SEO announcements. Finally, the study adds new 
evidence to the previous UK SEO literature by covering the extended 12-year 
period since January 1996. 
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the 
arguments underlying the main hypotheses by reviewing the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the sample selection, the construction of the variables, and 
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main findings from the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Background and Related Literature 
4.2.1 Background of UK SEOs 
One of the most important financing sources for publicly listed firms to raise 
capital is the SEO. Many firms conduct multiple SEOs followed by investment 
policies such as stock-financed mergers (Fama and French, 2005; Rau and 
Stouraitis, 2011). Thus, an SEO is cited as a major corporate event. In contrast to 
SEOs in the United States, the empirical research on SEOs in UK firms is still 
very limited. 
 
In the last two decades, there has been a major change in the choice of offering 
method for UK firms conducting SEOs. Before 1986, the rights issue was the only 
method. Subsequently, placing and open offers have appeared. However, before 
1990, the issue size of placing was restricted to a maximum monetary value of £3 
million. During the period 1990–1995, the maximum size of placing was 
increased to £15 million. In January 1996, the size limitation was removed 
(Barnes and Walker, 2006). It is therefore important to consider the timing of 
SEOs in the UK. Slovin et al. (2000) study the announcement effect of SEOs 
during the period 1986–1994. Barnes and Walker (2006) examine market 
reactions and the choice offer method in SEOs during 1989–1998. Ho (2005) 
investigates the long-term performance of SEOs during 1989–1997. Armitage 
(2007) focuses on the period 1987–2001 and examines only pre-renounced rights 
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offers. Iqbal et al. (2009) cover the period 1991–1995 for UK open offers. Our 
research period covers 1996–2010, when UK firms were unconstrained in the 
choice of issuing method. 
 
Our SEO sample includes three major issuance methods: rights issues, placings, 
and open offers. In a rights issue, new shares are offered in proportion to existing 
shareholders’ share holdings when the offer is announced. Under ‘pre-emption 
rights’, existing shareholders are entitled to subscribe new shares or can sell the 
rights to other investors during the prescribed offer period. In the UK, this period 
usually lasts three weeks, starting on the announcement day (Armitage, 2002). 
Placing is usually underwritten by investment banks or brokers who market the 
new shares. 
 
 Unlike in the US, the bookbuildings in UK firms start before the SEO 
announcement date. During this process, issuers make presentations to potential 
investors. Underwriters purchase new shares from the issuers at a discounted price 
and in turn sell shares to institutions by private negotiation, benefitting from a 
placing fee (Barnes and Walker, 2006). Underwriters suffer the risk of failure or 
undersubscription, which is reflected in higher underwriter fees. Slovin et al. 
(2000) find that placing is a signal of firm quality and incurs more active external 
monitoring from new institutional investors. In the UK, open offers include both 
rights issues and private placing. However, in this type of offer rights cannot be 
traded during the offer period, which means shareholders only benefit from 
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purchasing the new shares. Armitage (2002) states that open offers appear to be 
unique to the UK. 
4.2.2 SEO Discount 
Since the work of Smith (1977), it has been well documented that firms incur a 
price discount in SEOs. The SEO discount is typically measured as the offer price 
relative to the closing price of the pre-offer day, divided by the closing price of the 
pre-offer day. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find the average discount in US SEOs 
from 1963 to 1981 to be only 0.44%. Loderer et al. (1991) report that over 
1980–1984, the discount is 1.4%. It rises to around 3% in the 1990s (Mola and 
Loughran, 2004). During the 1980s and 1990s, Corwin (2003) shows that the 
discount of seasoned offerings increases substantially, averaging 2.2%. 
Meanwhile, Slovin et al. (2000) examine UK SEOs and find a significant discount 
of 17% for insured issuers during 1986–1994. Barnes and Walker (2006) report 
the average discount between 1989 and 1998 is 15%. 
 
The discounting of SEOs is an indirect cost of issuing new shares, based on the 
uncertainty about firm value, gathered information, and marketing the new shares. 
The literature provides several potential explanations for discounting in SEOs. In 
the value uncertainty hypothesis (Ritter, 1984), uninformed investors should 
require higher compensation for stocks with greater value uncertainty. Corwin 
(2003) finds that SEO discounting is positively related to the level of uncertainty 
about firm value. According to the winner’s curse problem (Rock, 1986), the 
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issuer must price the shares at a discount to guarantee that uninformed investors 
will participate in the new equity issue. Otherwise, informed investors will 
squeeze uninformed investors out of the good issues and withdraw from the new 
issue market for the bad issues. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the 
discounting of SEOs is positively related to the level of ex ante uncertainty about 
the issue’s value. 
 
Furthermore, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that underwriters attempt to 
pay for acquiring information from better-informed investors by allocating the 
new shares at a higher discount. In line with this argument, Aggarwal et al. (2002) 
demonstrate that in an IPO, underwriters are likely to allocate more shares to 
institutional investors with a higher discount. Additionally, Corwin (2003) finds 
that a bigger offer size induces a larger discount, which is consistent with price 
pressure caused by a downward-sloping demand curve. 
4.2.3 Announcement Effects on SEOs 
Numerous studies have documented that SEOs have a negative average 
announcement effect (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; 
Clarke et al., 2002; Corwin, 2003). Asquith and Mullins (1986) explore the 
phenomenon of offering dilution in equity offerings, where dilution is measured 
by the change in the ratio of the firm’s equity value to the proceeds of the issue. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) observe that the equity value of firms declines by 
around 13% of the issue proceeds after the equity announcement. Interestingly, 
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Clarke et al. (2002) find that the negative announcement return for secondary 
offerings is less negative than for SEOs, with -2% versus -3%. 
 
The explanations of the negative price impact of SEOs are often based on the 
information asymmetry model. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a 
signalling model to explain the negative announcement return. They suggest that 
managers have an incentive to maintain their stock ownership if they are highly 
optimistic with regard to the firm’s future performance. Thus equity issuance is a 
bad signal to the market that managers have negative private information on the 
firm’s prospects, resulting in a fall in stock price. In the spirit of the signalling 
models, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose an adverse selection model to predict 
the timing of firms issuing equity. The authors suggest that managers tend to issue 
new shares when they believe the current stock price is overvalued. Managers 
tend to act in the interest of existing shareholders, who can benefit from an SEO if 
the overvalued shares are only issued to new investors. In contrast, managers are 
unwilling to issue undervalued shares, to avoid decreasing the wealth of existing 
shareholders. Thus, rational investors perceive an SEO announcement as a signal 
that the issuer’s stocks are overvalued. According to another asymmetry 
information model, developed by Miller and Rock (1985), an unanticipated equity 
issue is used to compensate for factors that create a shortfall compared to expected 
cash flow, such as low earnings. This shortfall can be interpreted as a decrease in 
the value of the firm and can result in a negative announcement return. 
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Negative market reactions can also be triggered by the intensified agency problem 
between managers and investors in an SEO. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit 
that the managerial entrenchment effect is negatively related to managerial stock 
ownership. New equity financing is likely to reduce managerial ownership and 
thus managers have more discretion to consume perquisites and implement 
suboptimal investments, resulting in a decline in stock price. 
 
Additionally, the introduction of a new equity issue increases the supply of shares 
to the market. Kalay and Shimrat (1987) state that negative SEO announcement 
returns can be explained by the price pressure caused by the down-sloping 
demand curve. Petajisto (2009) supports this argument by modelling the negative 
demand curve with a fixed cost. 
4. 2.4 Media  
A growing literature investigates the role of the media in finance and economics. 
Earlier research finds that media dissemination influences the outcomes of politics 
and economics through introducing potential bias in the audience’s attitude, 
beliefs, and thereby decision making. Media outlets have a strong liberal bias 
(Larcinese et al., 2011). Niven (2002) documents that news can not only distort or 
falsify the facts (distortion bias), but can also favour one side of the issue (content 
bias). Sometimes journalists are motivated to produce biased content, in which 
they may spin news to match the audience’s preferences (decision-making bias). 
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These media biases tend to be slanted towards the audience (Entman, 2007; 
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Gerber et al., 2009). 
 
 Entman (2007) observes that media bias has an effect on political power and 
democracy in American society. Larcinese et al. (2007) find that the endorsement 
policy of US newspapers is associated with their coverage of economic issues as a 
function of the underlying economic conditions and the political affiliation of the 
incumbent president. By focusing on the event of the election of the governor of 
Virginia, Gerber et al. (2009) examine the effect of daily newspapers on political 
behaviour and opinion. They find that media coverage affects reader behaviour 
and opinion in a direction consistent with the political bias of the media outlet. A 
study by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) provides supporting evidence that voting 
patterns can be predicted by the entry of Fox News into cable markets. They argue 
that media could drive a temporary leaning effect for rational voters or a 
permanent effect for non-rational voters subject to persuasion. 
 
Interestingly, some studies find that the media plays an important role in corporate 
governance by affecting firm reputation or public image. The relation between 
media and firm reputation can be interpreted in several ways. First, traditional 
economic models (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) suggest that 
managers’ interests, such as compensation or career, are dependent on shareholder 
and employer beliefs about whether managers consider their interests in all 
situations, even where they are not monitored. In this case, managers might use 
the media to create a belief among investors that they are performing well. Second, 
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the media effect extends beyond shareholders and employers to the wider society. 
Third, to protect their further political career, politicians respond to media 
pressure by introducing corporate law reforms or enforcing existing corporate 
laws (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). Based on these arguments, Dyck and Zingales 
(2002) examine the media’s role in the private sector’s responsiveness to 
environmental issues. Their evidence reveals better environmental responsiveness 
in countries with a larger newspaper circulation. They also posit that the media 
can help pressure managers and directors to act not only in the interests of 
shareholders, but also in ‘socially acceptable’ ways. In their paper, public opinion 
pressure is captured by the diffusion of the media, measured as the circulation of 
daily newspapers normalized by population. 
 
Using the same media measure, Dyck and Zingales (2004) demonstrate that the 
media diffusion has an effect on the amount of value that controlling shareholders 
tend to extract from firms, the so-called private benefits of control. Moreover, 
Dyck et al. (2008) show that corporate governance abuses can be redressed by 
media pressure. Additionally, Core et al. (2008) report that the press plays a 
crucial role in monitoring and affecting CEO compensation practice. The authors 
find the press is more likely to cover CEOs with high total annual pay. Moreover, 
their results suggest that negative coverage is more strongly related to measures of 
excess total annual pay than to raw total annual pay. This finding implies that 
press articles discuss CEO compensation by using relatively sophisticated access. 
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More recent papers pay attention to the media’s influence on the stock market. 
Huberman and Regev (2001) study the case of the cancer drug firm EntreMed, 
whose stock price increased dramatically due to a favourable front-page article in 
The Sunday New York Times, even though this news had been revealed five 
months earlier in several press reports. The authors’ findings suggest that 
enthusiastic public attention can induce a permanent increase in stock price, even 
when no genuinely new information has been presented. Chan (2003) examines 
investor reactions to public news, which is identified as headline news in The Wall 
Street Journal and the Dow Jones Newswire. This author documents that stocks 
with news show momentum and firms with more news experience greater stock 
drift. In particular, stocks with bad news exhibit a significant negative price drift 
for up to 12 months, while stocks with good news display less price drift. This 
finding indicates that investors are slow to react to bad public news. Chan (2003) 
further find that stocks without public news show significant post-event reversals 
the subsequent month, which is consistent with investor overreaction to spurious 
price moves.  
 
Vega (2006) explores the effect of media coverage on the post-earnings 
announcement drift. The phenomenon of post-earning announcement drift, 
whereby stock price tends to move in the same direction as the initial surprise 
rather than adjusting immediately to new information surprise, has been well 
documented (e.g., Fama,1998; Kothari, 2001). Vega considers the media a proxy 
for the arrival rate of noise investors and measures it as the number of days an 
individual firm is covered in the news before the announcement. The authors finds 
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that stocks with high (low) media coverage have a large (low or insignificant) 
price drift, which suggests that the stock price drift is positively related to the 
arrival rate of noise investors. Solomon (2012) examines the role of media 
coverage in investors’ capital allocation to mutual funds. The findings show that 
investors are likely to allocate more (less) capital to funds holding media-covered 
stock with high (low) past returns. 
 
Some papers consider media coverage a proxy for investor attention. According to 
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition theory, in an information-incomplete market, 
investors have limited attention and are not familiar with all stocks. Therefore, 
investors prefer to buy and hold stocks about which they are more aware. This 
indicates that stocks with lower investor recognition need to offer higher returns 
to compensate their investors. Using advertising as a similar measure of media 
coverage, Grullon et al. (2004) show that a firm’s greater advertising expenditure 
is associated with a larger number of individual and institutional investors and 
with a significant improvement in market liquidity. The authors further find that 
advertising has a stronger effect on individuals than on institutions. They argue 
that investors buy or hold stocks with greater visibility. This visibility among 
investors may lead to a larger breadth of ownership of the firm’s stock. Their 
paper assesses firm visibility by its product market advertising expenditure. 
 
However, Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that while individual investors 
prefer to hold stocks with strong brand visibility, institutional holdings are 
negatively associated with stock brand recognition. Moreover, Barber and Odean 
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(2008) posit that individual investors are the net buyers of stocks reported in the 
news and they further find that individual investors are likely to buy rather than 
sell those stocks that grab their attention. Consistent with Merton (1987), the 
authors argue that individual investors have a significant search problem at the 
time of trading. Because individual investors find it difficult to choose which 
stocks to invest in, attention-grabbing stocks are more likely to enter their choice 
set. When it comes to selling, individual investors own relatively few stocks in 
their portfolio and only sell stock they already hold. Frieder and Subrahmanyam’s 
(2005) study suggests that news is a proxy for individual investor attention, which 
is a major factor determining which stocks individual investors buy but do not sell. 
This can result in temporary positive price pressure. Unlike for Grullon et al. 
(2004), these arguments cannot be applied to institutional investor trading 
behaviour. 
 
Fang and Peress (2009) find that stocks not covered by the media earn 
significantly higher returns than those heavily covered by the media. An 
explanation for this ‘no media’ premium is based on Merton’s investor recognition 
hypothesis. Stocks with limited investor recognition face the imperfect 
diversification problem, so that they are required to offer higher returns to 
compensate their investors. Media coverage plays an important role in attracting 
investor attention and broadening investor recognition. Thus, stocks with higher 
media coverage are likely to earn lower returns than stocks with no media 
coverage. The authors’ results on the role of the media indicate that the breadth of 
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information dissemination can create investor awareness and hence generate 
investor buying behaviour, resulting in a lower cost of capital.  
 
By focusing on the response to earning announcements, DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) investigate whether limited investor attention affects stock returns. The 
authors compare the response to announcements that occur on a Friday, when 
investor inattention is more likely, to the response to announcements on other 
weekdays. They report that individuals are more likely to underreact to Friday 
announcements and there is greater drift reversal due to limited attention. The 
results show that investor inattention is negatively related to stock prices and 
trading volume and can increase the delayed reaction of stock prices to new 
information. Using a geographic instrument, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) further 
investigate whether stock trading to an earnings announcement is related to local 
media coverage. They find that local press coverage significantly increases the 
trading value of local retail investors. Their results show that media coverage can 
causally affect stock trading. 
 
Da et al. (2010) propose a new and direct measure of investor attention using 
aggregate search frequencies in Google. They use this measure because Google is 
a favourite search engine to collect information and, more critically, the search 
data reveal interest in particular stocks. The empirical results show that search 
volume captures the attention of individual investors, leading to greater individual 
trading, which strongly supports the hypotheses of Barber and Odean (2008). Da 
et al. find that increased individual attention, as measured by search volume in 
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Google, leads to higher stock prices in the next two weeks and a subsequent return 
reversal within a year. Additionally, Engelberg et al. (2011) measure investor 
attention by TV viewership and examine market reactions to first-time stock 
buying recommendations from the popular US CNBC TV show Mad Money. The 
authors find that the temporary overnight abnormal returns are positively related 
to recommendations made on the show. The results show a positive relation 
between total viewership and overnight returns. 
 
Some papers shed light on the influence of quantitative measures of media content 
on asset prices and trading volume. In the first of these studies, Tetlock (2007) 
investigates the news in The Wall Street Journal using textual analysis and 
explores the interaction between media content and stock market activity. Tetlock 
refers to the Harvard Psychosocial Dictionary to classify pessimistic words in 
each media article and obtains each article’s news attitude, labelled media 
pessimism. This research shows that high media pessimism predicts short-term 
downward pressure on stock prices, followed by a reversion to fundamentals. 
Tetlock also finds that both high and low media pessimism lead to high market 
trading volume. 
 
The explanation for these findings is based on investor sentiment hypothesis. 
Tetlock considers that media pessimism can predict further investor sentiment, 
especially for noise and liquidity investors. If such investors have negative 
prospects for a stock, they will sell it to arbitrageurs, resulting in increased trading 
volume and depressed stock prices. Alternatively, the author reports that the media 
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reflect past stock performance; for example, negative media suggests low past 
market returns.  
 
Using the same classification dictionary, Tetlock et al. (2008) find that the 
proportion of negative words in firm-specific news has predictive power for firm 
earnings and stock returns. They also find that stock price incorporates the 
information contained in negative words with a slight delay. Their findings 
suggest that the negative words embedded in the news can convey otherwise hard 
to quantify aspects of firm fundamentals. Subsequently, Loughran and McDonald 
(2010) develop an alternative word list to capture fundamental information from 
firms’ 10-K filing reports. Garcia (2012) uses media content as a proxy of 
sentiment, constructed by the number of positive and negative words from two 
financial news columns from The New York Times. This paper shows that news 
content has predictive power for daily stock returns, particularly in times of 
recession. 
 
On the other hand, some papers argue that the words used in media articles can 
create incentives for manipulation. Solomon (2012) studies the effect of investor 
relations firms, and finds that they tend to promote their client firms by releasing 
more positive news, thereby influencing investor expectations about these firms’ 
prospects, resulting in a temporary increase in stock price. Furthermore, Gurun 
and Butler (2012) argue that the local media use more positive words when 
reporting on local firms compared to the same news covered by non-local firms. 
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The authors provide strong evidence that such abnormal positive local media bias 
is strongly associated with firm stock market valuation. It is worth noting that, in 
the studies of Solomon (2012) and Gurun and Butler (2012), media tone is 
measured as the fraction of negative words in the media article, with the list of 
negative words taken from Loughran and McDonald (2010). 
 
An alternative line of research has looked at the role of media in corporate finance. 
Some papers investigate the interaction between the media and IPOs. Focusing on 
the period of the Internet IPO bubble, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) examine whether 
media coverage of internet IPOs differs from that of non-internet IPOs and 
whether media coverage affects the difference in returns between Internet and 
non-Internet stocks. They find that media coverage for Internet firms is greater 
than that for non-Internet firms and that the media is more positive for Internet 
IPOs but more negative in the post-bubble period. Using a human classification of 
media articles, the authors also find that higher abnormal returns lead to more 
positive media coverage the following day. However, their results show that 
media coverage is not a significant factor in the dramatic rise and fall of Internet 
shares in the late 1990s. 
 
Firms care about the market perception of their shares when they plan to raise a 
new offering and this concern is associated with media news received by investors. 
Cook et al. (2006) posit that pre-IPO media coverage can promote IPOs to 
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individual investors by creating pre-offer publicity, resulting in upward offer price 
revisions. Their results indicate that pre-IPO media coverage induces more 
individual investors to enter the market for an IPO and creates short-term 
sentiment demand, which benefits the issuers, investment banks, and institutional 
investors. In their paper, media coverage is considered a proxy for pre-equity 
issuance marketing. However, Liu et al. (2009) find that media coverage does not 
stimulate investor sentiment and has no effect on underwriter fees to market the 
IPOs. Based on these two papers, it is unclear whether pre-offer media play an 
active role in raising the temporary demand of individual investors. 
 
Using a different media measure, Da et al. (2010) also examine the individual 
investor attention hypothesis in IPOs and find that the search volume is positively 
related to an IPO’s first-day return and long-run return reversal. However, this 
finding is inconsistent with Liu et al. (2009), who find that pre-IPO investor 
attention, as measured by media coverage, has no impact on price reversal or 
underperformance in the long run.  
 
The different findings in these two papers are due to different measures of 
investor attention: One is media based, while the other is search based. 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009) attempt to analyze the interaction between a firm’s 
product market advertising and underpricing in the context of either IPOs or SEOs. 
They consider that a firm usually faces asymmetric information in the financial 
markets. Product market advertising plays a significant role in mitigating the 
information problem, since it can signal the firm’s intrinsic value to the financial 
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market and hence the investor would price the equity correctly. Therefore, when 
the firm needs to fund a new project by equity financing, managers tend to convey 
the true value of the project by using advertising. Chemmanur and Yan report that 
firms choose a higher level of product market advertising in their IPO or SEO 
year compared with their advertising levels in non-IPO and non-SEO years. 
Furthermore, they confirm that product market advertising and underpricing are 
substitutes for each other. 
 
Two further papers shed light on the role of media in Merger and Acquisitions 
Using test-based media content, Buehlmaier (2012) examines how the media 
predict takeover outcomes. The author claims that the acquirer will use a costly 
media campaign to make target shareholders believe the takeover is beneficial and 
hence give their approval. The authors conclude that positive media news about 
the acquirers leads to takeover success. Furthermore, Ahern and Sosyura (2012) 
consider that firms have an incentive to manage their media coverage to influence 
the outcome of important corporate events through potentially biasing investor 
expectations. They find that acquirers are likely to generate less negative news 
from the first day of merger negotiations to the public announcement. Such media 
management induces a temporary run-up in the bidders’ stock during the period 
when the stock exchange ratio is determined. 
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4.3 Hypothesis Development 
This chapter’s research questions concern whether pre-SEO media can influence 
firm equity financing decisions and how the financial market responds to 
firm-specific news in the context of SEOs. This chapter explores these two 
questions using media coverage and media content. 
 
To address the first question, this study examines whether pre-SEO media 
coverage is a possible determinant of offer price setting. To receive more equity 
capital, issuers tend to price seasoned offers higher with lower discounts. The 
price setting of SEOs is associated with several determinants, such as asymmetric 
information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989, Ritter and Welch, 2002), investor 
attention (Merton, 1987; Liu et al., 2009; Duffie, 2010), and different opinions 
among investors (Miller, 1977; Hong and Stein, 2007). In this scenario, there are 
three ways in which the media can influence the pricing of SEOs.  
 
First, this study assumes that media may help resolve value uncertainty, creating 
more transparency and thus reducing the information friction between firm and 
outside investors. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) argue that media firm has an 
incentive to build and maintain a reputation as a provider of accurate information. 
They also find that competing media outlets can sufficiently prevent media bias. 
According to this view, mass media can reveal genuine or latest information about 
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the underlying value of the firm, making it easier to value. With regard to the 
theory of value uncertainty (Rock, 1986), firms with high value uncertainty 
should compensate their investors by discounting share prices. In this setting, 
issuers with high media coverage should have low level of value uncertainty, and 
thus reduce the SEO discount.  
 
Moreover, assuming that issuers have superior information about the firm’s 
fundamental value compared to the information held by investors, rational 
investors would fear a lemon problem, whereby only issuers with below-average 
quality tend to sell new shares at a higher discount (Ritter and Welch, 2002). To 
distinguish themselves from low-quality issuers, better-quality issuers attempt to 
signal their quality using public media. Based on this consideration, when firms 
need to raise external funds for new investment projects, they may actively 
manage the media to signal their true value to investors, thus allowing them to 
correctly price the new SEO offers. Due to such incentives, issuers covered by 
more media news are willing to price SEOs at a lower discount. 
 
Alternatively, assuming that investors are more informed than the issuer about the 
information of demand, issuers would have a placement problem, whereby they 
do not know the price the market can accept (Ritter and Welch, 2002). If the offer 
is priced too high, investors may reject it since they are averse to the winner’s 
 166 
 
curse
15
 (Rock, 1986). To solve this problem, the issuer would adopt a higher 
discount to attract more investors. Media coverage sometimes implies demand 
information about stocks, because journalists may predict the stock price drift or 
the firm’s prospects based on their own information sources and professional 
judgment (Liu et al., 2009). In this case, issuers may consider the media as a 
demand information source. This suggests that pre-SEO media may have a large 
impact on offer setting. 
 
Second, increased media coverage will attract additional investor attention, 
leading to a stock price run-up (Tetlock, 2010). Given that high media coverage 
efficiently improves the dissemination of firm-specific information to the financial 
market, issuers may become more credible and more familiar to investors. Thus 
issuer stocks become more valuable to investors (Merton, 1987), and investors are 
more likely to buy or hold stocks garnering more attention from the financial 
market. Barber and Odean (2008) confirm that individual investors are the net 
                                                 
15
 In the winner’s curse theory, the tendency of the winning bid in an auction is to exceed the 
intrinsic value of the item purchased. Investors fear that they will only receive full allocations if 
they happen to be among the most optimistic investors. Successful and highly oversubscribed 
offerings involve rationing. Hence, an investor would receive a full allocation of overpriced issues 
but only partial or no allocation of underpriced IPOs. On average, the return of an uninformed IPO 
investor would be negative. To solve this problem, equity issues have to be underpriced, on 
average (Rock, 1986; Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
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buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, such as stocks covered by the news, stocks 
with high trading volume, and stocks experiencing abnormal one-day returns.  
 
Using advertising as a similar measure of media coverage, Grullon et al. (2004) 
find that the number of individual and institutional investors is positively related 
to a firm’s advertising expenditure. Therefore, this study assumes that media 
coverage plays an important role in generating positive demand for new shares by 
increasing issuers’ investor attention. As a result, the SEO offer price will be set 
higher, at a lower discount. 
 
Third, the content of a particular news article can also have a significant effect on 
stock prices, since investors revise their expectations (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Demers 
and Vega, 2010; Solomon, 2012). The content of media articles may influence the 
sentiment of investors, especially liquidity or noise investors (Tetlock, 2007). 
Such investors’ trading activities would be affected by their expectations based on 
what they obtain from the media, resulting in stock price drift. If a media article 
contains positive (negative) news, then this would be interpreted as signifying 
better (worse) future prospects for the firm and thus its price would increase 
(decrease). In other words, media content contributes to investor expectations: 
The more positive the information in the media, the more optimistic the investors 
become. In this setting, issuers price SEO shares higher (lower), at a lower (higher) 
discount, when pre-SEO media coverage reports positive (negative) news. 
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To explore these media roles in SEO price setting, this study proposes the 
following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Pre-SEO media coverage is negatively related to SEO 
discounting. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The content of pre-offer media news is related to SEO discounting. 
Positive (negative) media news leads to lower (higher) SEO discounting. 
 
The second objective of our research is to investigate whether pre-SEO media has 
an effect on market reactions to SEO announcements. Based on the argument 
above, this study expects that pre-SEO media can focus investor attention on the 
issuer before the SEO announcement. Once the SEO has been announced, the 
market reaction should be associated with increased attention to the 
announcement. This study examines the announcement effects of issuers, whether 
they are covered by news media during the pre-SEO period. Since high media 
coverage may attract more investors and increase the quality of decision making, 
market reactions to announcements where issuers are covered by the news should 
be more pronounced. 
 
Previous studies find that the announcement returns of SEOs are normally 
negative. According to the interpretation of the signalling and adverse selection 
models (Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992), this is because 
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the SEO is a negative signal for the market: Investors believe that issuers act 
opportunistically and take advantage of the overvalued share price. The more 
media reporting on the issuer before the SEO public announcement, the more 
investors continue to pay attention to this firm and thus more investors receive a 
negative signal from the SEO announcement. Therefore, the announcement effect 
of the SEO has been magnified through media news. This can result in more 
shareholders selling stocks in the secondary market, causing the stock price to 
drop further. Overall, the market reaction to the SEO announcement will be more 
negative. 
 
Moreover, it is assumed that the relation between media content and investor 
sentiment will induce stock price drift. In this case, this study further expects that 
the announcement return will increase with the positive information in issuer 
pre-SEO news articles. Sentimental investors may be optimistic about a firm’s 
value and long-term performance; for example, they may believe it is issuing new 
shares due to reasons other than the stock price is overvalued. Similarly, negative 
news is likely to induce a decrease in SEO announcement returns. 
 
Based on the arguments above, this study proposes the following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Pre-offer media coverage is negatively related to SEO 
announcement returns. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The content of pre-offer media is related to SEO announcement 
returns. Positive (negative) media news leads to higher (lower) SEO 
announcement returns. 
4.4 Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 The Sample  
This study starts with all UK common stock SEOs between 1 January 1996 and 31 
December 2010, as reported in the Thomson One Banker database. This study 
selects this sample period because of the regulatory change that took place in 
1996, when the London Stock Exchange (LSE) relaxed the rules on the maximum 
size of a placing issue.
16
 Since then, there has been the proportion of placing 
issues in UK SEOs has significantly grown (Barnes and Walker, 2006). Thus offer 
size is not necessarily constrained by issue type in our sample. 
 
Our analysis considers only non-financial (Standard Industrial Classification, or 
SIC, codes 6000–6999) and non-utility (SIC codes 4900–4949) issuer stocks 
listed on the LSE. Following Slovin et al. (2000), the sample excludes pure 
                                                 
16
 Prior to 1990, a maximum monetary value of £3 million was imposed by the LSE on the total 
value of shares being placed. A higher ceiling of £15 million applied to the period 1990–1995. In 
January 1996, all size limitations were effectively removed, paving the way for an unconstrained 
choice of issue methods by publicly listed firms (Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
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secondary and joint issues because large shareholders and insiders can sell a 
portion of their stock holdings in secondary offerings. To identify issuing 
characteristics, we download the following terms of each offer: the announcement 
date, the offer price, the offer amount, and the issue type. The daily stock price 
data are obtained from Datastream, including the closing market price prior to the 
announcement day, on the offer day, and on the first trading day after the issue. 
The accounting data with regards to issuers are also downloaded from Datastream. 
The final sample comprises 415 SEOs. 
 
Table 4.1 presents the number of SEOs, the total offering amount, and the average 
offering amount in each year, categorized by pre-offer media coverage. The 
number of SEOs and annual average offering proceeds fluctuate over the 15-year 
sample period. In 2009, the number of SEOs is 103: 52 with news and 51 without 
news. All these numbers are the highest in each group. Moreover, the SEOs in 
2009 account for 36.09% of the total proceeds raised in our sample. The potential 
explanation is the UK debt crisis, when firms found it easier to raise capital by 
equity issuance than via debt due to the high leverage ratios involved. The total 
number of SEOs with news is greater than the number without news (228 versus 
187, respectively), indicating that issuers are likely to be reported by media news 
before their SEO is announced to the public. Table 4.1 also reports that the SEOs 
in our sample raised around US$77,409 million of capital: SEOs with news 
account for US$47,050 million, while SEOs without news account for 
US$30,359 million. The average offer proceeds for SEOs with news are 
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significantly higher than for SEOs without news (US$2901.56 million versus 
US$2023.51 million, respectively). 
 
(Please insert Table 4.1 here) 
4.4.2 Construction of Media Variables 
In this chapter, media coverage and media sentiment are applied as proxies for a 
firm’s overall media exposure. To obtain the media data for each firm, this study 
searches media articles related to SEO issuers from the LexisNexis UK database. 
All media news are published in the Financial Times (London), The Times 
(London), the Guardian (London), the Mirror, and the Sunday Mirror
17
. The 
search window runs from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2010.  
 
These media sources are selected for three reasons. First, all of these five 
influential newspapers have extremely large circulations, over 6.6 million readers 
in total. In particular, the Financial Times is a finance-oriented newspaper, with an 
average daily readership of 2.1 million. The other newspapers also have dedicated 
sections for international business and financial news. Second, all of these 
newspapers have a long history; for example, the Financial Times was founded in 
                                                 
17
 This study also downloads the media articles published in The Economist. However, the amount 
of news article related to SEO issuers in this newspaper is only 72 during the research period, 
which is quite smaller than these published on other newspapers. Thus, the media sample excludes 
the news sourced from The Economist.  
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1888, The Times was established in 1785, the Guardian in 1821, and the Mirror 
and the Sunday Mirror in 1930 and 1915, respectively. Thus they have strong 
reputations and credibility for all types of investors. Third, the competition among 
these five newspapers can lead to lower media bias (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). 
Additionally, due to the long history and strong influence of these newspapers, the 
electronic text of media news for our sample period is accessible from the 
LexisNexis UK database. 
 
To construct the media coverage variable, this Chapter simply counts the number 
of all pre-SEO media news for each issuer. In our analysis, the pre-SEO media 
window is estimated separately over [-30,-2], [-60,-2], and [-90, -2], where zero is 
defined as the announcement day. This measure refers to the research of Cook et 
al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2009). However, they study the role of media news in the 
case of IPOs and their media searching period is from the filing date to the issue 
date. To better examine the effect of media, all SEOs are separated into two 
samples by media coverage: SEOs with news and SEOs without news. The group 
of SEOs with news (SEOs without news) is defined as SEO issuers that are (not) 
reported by the media from 90 days before the announcement date to 2 days 
before the announcement date. 
 
In addition to media coverage, our research also includes the media sentiment 
variable. This study constructs the media sentiment variable to examine whether 
the content of media news has an effect on price setting in SEOs, as well as 
market reactions to SEO announcements. Tetlock (2007) confirms that media 
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content can predict firm stock price movements and market trading volumes. The 
author employs a media pessimism factor as a proxy of media content, using the 
Harvard Psychosocial Dictionary to categorize the negative or weak words in 
each media article. Tetlock et al. (2008) also use the number of negative words to 
quantify the language in media news and find that media content can predict a 
firm’s accounting earnings and stock returns. However, some papers classify each 
media news item as good, bad, or neutral using human judgment (e.g., 
Bhattacharya et al., 2009). 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2010) propose an advanced word list to identify the 
positive and negative words in financial articles based on textual analysis in a 
large sample of 10-Ks. They posit that their word list reflects the tone of financial 
news more accurately than those categorized by the Harvard Dictionary in 
previous research (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). Using this new word list, 
this Chapter constructs the proxy for media sentiment by counting the number of 
business-specific positive and negative words for each media article. The media 
sentiment for each article is determined as the ratio of the number of positive 
words minus the number of negative words to the total number of words in the 
article: 
 
Media sentiment per article = (positive words - negative words)/total words per 
article 
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This measurement of media sentiment is similar to that of Tetlock et al. (2008) but 
is contrary to the definition of Garcia (2012), where the pessimism factor is 
calculated by the number of negative words minus positive words. In our study, 
the value of sentiment per article is higher when the content of the media article is 
more positive. For each SEO, media sentiment is calculated as the mean of the 
sentiment per article during the pre-announcement period. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of pre-SEO media coverage and media 
sentiment. The media variables relating to issuers are matched to each SEO by the 
issuer’s code. Coverage and sentiment are listed separately, by using different 
pre-announcement media windows. From 1996 to 2010, there were 6870 media 
articles during the pre-announcement period [-90, -2], covering 228 SEOs. 
Average media coverage is significantly higher than the median value (30.13 
versus 8, respectively), suggesting that most media news are clustered around a 
small number of SEOs. This finding indicates that media news is likely to report 
on issuers based on journalists’ preference rather than covering all issuers equally. 
 
 It is notable that the average sentiment is negative in all cases. This finding is 
consistent with the evidence of Tetlock et al. (2008). The potential reason is that 
the word list of Loughran and McDonald (2010) contains a larger number of 
negative words than positive words. Moreover, the psychology literature argues 
that negative information has a greater influence on audience psychology than 
positive information (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Tetlock (2007) also finds that 
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negative words are more likely to be related with stock returns compared with 
other types of words. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.2 here) 
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 reports the issue and firm characteristics of UK SEOs. It also presents 
the descriptive statistics of two subgroups – SEOs with news and SEOs without 
news – and highlights the differences between them. As reported in panel A of 
Table 4.3, the average issuing amount for SEOs with news is US$206.36 million, 
while that for SEOs without news is US$162.35 million. This finding suggests 
that, on average, SEOs with news raise more funds than SEOs without news. This 
finding is consistent with the result from Liu et al. (2009) that the offer size of 
IPO is positively related to the level of media coverage. Since SEOs are often 
carried out at a discount, this study calculates the offer discount as the percentage 
difference between the closing price on the day before the announcement day and 
the offer price. The average discount for SEOs in our sample is 11.9%, which is 
similar with the 12% in the United Kingdom from 1989 to 1998 (Barnes and 
Walker, 2006). The difference between the two subgroups, SEOs with and without 
news, with respective discounts of 9.48 and 14.85, is not statistically significant. 
Thus SEO discounting, on average, does not differ according to whether the issuer 
has gained media attention. 
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Panel B shows that average firm size measured by market valuation is much 
higher for SEOs with news than for SEOs without news (US$5,737millions versus 
US$1,558 millions, respectively). This result indicates that the media are likely to 
pay attention to larger firms.  It is shown that the average value of leverage for 
SEOs with news is 28.15%, while it is 23.99% for SEOs without news. This 
difference is statistically significant, suggesting that issuers with higher levels of 
debt receive more media attention than issuers with less debt. Another important 
finding is that the average turnover of SEOs with news is significantly higher than 
that of SEOs without news. This suggests that media coverage is related to market 
performance, with issuers that experience greater market performance tending to 
attract more media attention. In addition, SEOs with news tend to have higher 
growth opportunity in terms of return on equity and market to book ratio 
compared with SEOs without news. However, these differences are not 
significant. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.3 here) 
4.4.4 Announcement Effect on SEOs  
To capture the market reactions to SEOs, This Chapter follows the event study 
method introduced by Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Kang and Stulz (1996). 
Daily stock returns are computed in logarithmic form, adjusted for dividends. This 
study applies the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, with the FTSE All Share 
equally weighted portfolio as a proxy for the market. The cumulative abnormal 
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returns are generated for the two-day [-1, 0] and three-day [-1, 1] event windows 
referring to the SEO announcement date. The estimated period is set to cover 
[-260, -61] prior to the announcement day (this study also uses [-90, -30] as a 
robust test and obtain similar results). This Chapter uses t-test statistics to report 
significant levels of market reactions to announcements (e.g., Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992; Balachandran et al., 2008). 
 
Table 4.4 shows our results on the market reactions to SEO announcements, 
controlling for several determinant variables as well as the issuer’s past stock 
performance. We find that the average announcement returns of SEOs are 
negative and significant, -0.75 and -1.14%, for two- and three-day windows, 
respectively. These returns are higher than those of the US SEOs reported by Gao 
and Ritter (2010), -1.72%, over the period 1996–2007. These results can be 
explained by several theories discussed earlier, such as downward-sloping demand 
curves, signalling effects (Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986), and asymmetric 
information (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). However, several studies investigate 
market reactions to UK SEO announcements by issue type and find a positive 
market reaction to placement issues but a negative market reaction to rights issues 
(Slovin et al. 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006).  
 
Table 4.4 also presents the three-day announcement returns for the two SEO 
groups, with and without news, -1.24 and -0.85%, respectively. The difference 
between the announcement returns for these two groups is significant, suggesting 
that the announcement returns are more negative for SEOs with news than for 
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SEOs without news. That is, following the SEO announcement day, the stock 
price tends to decrease more for the issuer with pre-offer media coverage than for 
the issuer with no pre-offer media coverage. 
 
This Chapter also examines the past cumulative excess returns of SEO stock, 
described as past market performance, during the period [-260,-2] prior to the 
announcement date. As can be seen from Table 4.4, the past market performance 
for the SEO is 0.09, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result is 
consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Marsh, 1982, Loughran and Ritter, 1996, 
Wu et al., 2005). Marsh (1982) finds that stock price run-ups take place before 
rights issues in the UK. The authors also finds that excess returns over the year 
before the SEO are positively related to the probability of issuing equity as an 
external financing choice. Loughran and Ritter (1996) and Wu et al. (2005) 
confirm Marsh’s finding using different data sources. Our result is similar to the 
recent study of Barnes and Walker (2006), who examine the pre-issue market 
performance of SEO stock in the United Kingdom over the period 1989–1998. In 
that work, the stock run-up period is determined as [-170,-21] relative to the SEO 
announcement date. 
 
Comparing the two subsamples,  it is notable that the cumulative excess return 
averages 0.08 for SEOs with news and 0.01 for SEOs without news, but the 
difference is not significant. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.4 here) 
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4.5 Regression Results 
This Chapter applies three ordinary least squares regression models to explore the 
role of the media in SEOs. The first model tests whether and to what degree media 
coverage and sentiment can influence the SEO discount. The second model is 
applied to examine how media coverage and sentiment impact market reactions to 
SEO announcements. The third is a robust regression to examine how media news 
affects SEO offer size. All the regressions include industry and year dummies to 
control for industry- and time-specific effects. 
4.5.1 The Impact of Media on the SEO Discount 
Table 4.5 presents the OLS results where the discounting of SEOs is regressed not 
only on the media variables but also on a list of issues, firm characteristics, and 
market conditions used in previous studies. 
 
As shown in Estimations 1 to 3, the coefficients of the media coverage variable 
are all negative and statistically significant. This suggests that issuers with higher 
media coverage prior to the SEO announcement are likely to decrease their SEO 
discount and boost the offer price. This result is consistent with the prediction of 
our hypothesis. In practice, the reputation of journalists is closely related to the 
authenticity of the news they report, especially for those working in influential 
newspapers. In this context, the information contained in the news partially 
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reveals the true quality of the issues. The uncertainty about firm value is reduced 
and thus the information asymmetry between issuer and investors is diminished. 
At the same time, journalists give their professional prediction about the demand 
for new shares and firm value in the long term. In this case, the underwriter has an 
incentive to decrease the compensation for information acquisition from investors. 
As a result, the SEO discount is reduced and the offer price is raised. 
 
Estimations 1 to 3 also contain the results of models where discounting is 
regressed on media sentiment. The results are consistent with the earlier finding. It 
is shown that the coefficient of media sentiment is negative and significant, 
suggesting that issuers with positive pre-offer media sentiment have lower 
discounts on the offer price. This result is also consistent with the finding of 
Tetlock et al. (2008). The potential explanation is that more positive information 
in media news signals to the market that the issuer has higher quality. Individual 
investors should become optimistic about the issuer’s further market performance. 
Investors are likely to believe the SEO is motivated by other reasons, rather than 
by overvaluation of the issuer’s stocks (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus more 
investors will participate in the SEO primary market, resulting in a higher offer 
price and lower price pressure after the issue. Similarly, when media sentiment is 
more negative, the issuer needs to bear the higher risk of SEO failure. Thus the 
offer price has to be fixed at a higher discount. 
 
This study also investigates whether other SEO characteristics have an effect on 
the discounting of SEOs. A large number of studies (e.g., Slovin et al. 2000; 
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Barnes and Walker, 2006) analyze UK SEOs by issue type. Therefore, this study 
construct two dummy variables, Private and Right, to capture the effect of issue 
type. The results of Private and Right shown in Table 4.4 suggest that issue type 
has no significant impact on discounting in SEOs. It is notable that the coefficient 
of Proceed/MV is positive and significant in all the estimations, suggesting that 
larger offers have higher discounting. The magnitude of the discount will be 
increased as issuers raise larger amounts of capital in the SEO. These results 
strongly support the price pressure hypothesis. Corwin (2003) suggests that 
discounting should be most pronounced for the largest offers, reflecting the 
market’s ability to absorb the new shares. 
 
This study now focuses on the other determinants of discounting in SEOs. Similar 
to previous findings (e.g., Corwin, 2003; Wu and Wang, 2005), this study find that 
the coefficient of firm size is significantly negative. This is consistent with both 
the uncertainty and asymmetric information hypotheses. Discounts in offer price 
are generally smaller for larger issuers with lower uncertainty and asymmetric 
information. Furthermore, this study constructs three proxies for growth 
opportunities: ROE (Denis, 1994), MV/BV (Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988), and 
Leverage (Smith and Watts, 1992). It is notable that MV/BV is negatively related 
to SEO discounts, which implies that issuers with greater opportunities are likely 
to exercise lower discounts. 
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However, the positive coefficient of Dividend variable indicates that issuers 
paying higher dividends are more likely to set offer prices at higher discounts. 
According to the dividend signalling hypothesis (Miller and Rock, 1985), 
Dividend variable conveys positive information regarding future cash flow and 
firm quality. Some papers further find that the impact of dividends on stock price 
is positive (e.g., Ambarish et al., 1987; Fuller and Goldstein, 2011). Following this 
argument, when a firm with higher dividends decides to issue an SEO, investors 
are likely to believe the current stock price is overvalued and thus require more 
compensation in the form of a discount. In addition, this study uses the monthly 
average turnover ratio ([-260,-2] prior to the announcing date) to proxy for a 
standard liquidity effect, as referred to by Datar et al. (1998) and Eckbo et al. 
(2000). Estimation 2 shows that the magnitude of the discount is significantly 
positively related to the turnover ratio, consistent with Eckbo et al. (2000). 
 
To examine the effect of firm-specific stock performance and general market 
conditions before the announcement date, this study incorporates the firm’s 
CAAR and cumulative market return of [-260, -2] prior to the announcement date 
into our regressions. The result reported in Estimation 3 suggests that the issuer’s 
market performance prior to the announcement has a negative impact on the 
discount. This finding is not consistent with that of Corwin (2003), but it is 
consistent with the manipulative trading theory described by Gerard and Nanda 
(1993). This theory suggests that informed investors strategically sell shares prior 
to an SEO, leading to a temporary decrease in stock price. Then informed 
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investors may obtain additional profits from the lower price in the SEO offering. 
The sign of the coefficient of the variable Pastm suggests that more favourable 
market conditions should result in lower discounts. 
 
Overall, none of the industry and year dummy variables effects on discounting are 
statistically significant and therefore they are not reported. These results are not 
consistent with the findings of Lowry and Schwert (2004) or Bradley and Jordan 
(2002), that higher tech firms usually have larger discounts in unseasoned offers. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.5 here) 
4.5.2 The Impact of the Media on SEO Announcements Returns 
This section aims to investigate whether market reactions to SEO announcements 
are affected by media news. Table 4.6 reports the outcome of estimating various 
cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the issuer’s 
three-day announcement return. Panel A reveals the regression results of 
announcement returns on media coverage, while panel B focuses on the effect of 
media sentiment. 
 
Interestingly, this study finds that in panel A the coefficients of media coverage 
are negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that firms with 
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higher media attention experience larger value declines upon the SEO 
announcement. This can be interpreted according to the signalling hypothesis, 
whereby the SEO signals to the market that the firm’s current stock price is 
overvalued. The investors may sell their shares after the offering, resulting in price 
declines. Merton (1987) suggests that firms with more media news will attract 
more investor attention. Combining these arguments suggests that the more 
existing shareholders selling the attention-grabbing stock during the offering 
period, the greater the decrease in stock price. Moreover, Fang and Peress (2009) 
argue that stocks with no media attention are often impediments to trade. This 
implies that the investors may engage in less or no trading activity at the time of 
the SEO, lowering the announcement effect. 
 
In panel B of Table 4.5, the estimates for media sentiment suggest that more 
positive information disseminated by the media will increase announcement 
returns. Consistent with the findings of Tetlock et al. (2008), individual investor 
psychology is influenced by the content of news, which is reflected in their 
trading activities. The more positive information obtained by investors, the more 
positive their expectations about the future stock returns will be. In this context, 
existing investors are likely to hold or sell fewer shares in the secondary market, 
resulting in less negative announcement returns. 
 
It is notable that the coefficients of the dummy variable Private are positive and 
significant, supporting the findings of Slovin et al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker 
(2006), that market reactions to private placements are significantly positive in 
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UK SEOs. However, the regression results show that the effect of discounting on 
announcement returns is not statistically significant. This finding contradicts those 
of Slovin et al. (2000) and Balachandran et al. (2008), who suggest that offer price 
discounts provides a strong signal to the market. High-quality firms usually use 
lower discounts to signal their true value, resulting in higher announcement 
returns. 
 
The results of Proceed/MV suggest that larger issues are related to more negative 
announcement returns, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986; Corwin, 2003). A potential explanation is that higher offering 
amounts reflect higher information costs. For other control variables, consistent 
with the previous literature (Kang and Stulz, 1996; Wu and Wang, 2005), firm size 
has a positive effect on announcement returns. It is also shown that the financial 
leverage is positively associated with announcement returns. Dierkens (1991) 
finds that firms with higher leverage levels have lower information asymmetry 
because they are monitored by both shareholders and creditors. It is worth 
mentioning that the proxy variable for stock’s liquidity, Turnover, is significantly 
negatively related to the issuer’s announcement returns. This evidence is 
consistent with the standard liquidity theory in the literature. That is, new equity 
issues improve a stock’s liquidity, especially lower-turnover stocks. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.6 here) 
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4.5.3 The Effect of the Media on SEO Offer Size 
Table 4.7 presents the results of three regression estimations, where the relative 
size of an SEO is regressed against the media variables and other firm 
characteristics for different samples of SEOs. As shown in all the estimations, the 
estimates for media coverage are positive and significant at the 1% confidence 
level. These results suggest that pre-SEO media are positively related to offer size. 
Issuers with higher media coverage before the SEO announcement date tend to 
have larger SEOs. This finding can be interpreted as a result of the media’s 
marketing effect. Greater media coverage increases awareness of a stock among 
more investors, generating more potential buyers for new shares. Our finding is 
consistent with Cook et al. (2006), who find that pre-offering media can shift up 
the demand curve for the stock. 
 
(Please insert Table 4.7 here) 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter documents that both media coverage and media sentiment before an 
SEO announcement are significantly related to the discount and to the SEO 
announcement return. The measure of media coverage is the total amount of 
media news related to the issuer during the pre-announcement period. Media 
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sentiment is computed as the ratio of positive words minus negative words to the 
total number of words in a news article. 
 
The chapter yields two main findings. First, issuers covered by more media tend 
to lower their SEO discounts, leading to higher offer prices. This result supports 
the argument that media coverage drives the temporary demand of investors 
(Cook et al., 2006). However, the SEO announcement effect is more negative 
following more media coverage, which is consistent with Merton (1987). With 
more media news, the issuance of new equity as a bad signal reaches more 
investors, resulting in larger stock price declines. Second, the media content can 
influence investor trading activities. Our evidence reveals that when there is more 
positive information in the pre-announcement media, issuers are likely to raise the 
offer price and the market reaction to the SEO announcement is also less negative. 
 
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the function of the media in 
market response and asset pricing. Our results are consistent with Tetlock et al. 
(2008) and Liu et al. (2009). The paper also provides strong evidence to support 
Merton’s investor recognition model. In addition, this study contributes to the 
literature on UK SEOs.  However, this research focuses on the temporary effect 
of the media, while the relation between pre-announcement media and firm 
long-run performance is not explored. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Issuer characteristics 
Discounting 
1- Offer price/price (-1), where price (-1) is the close 
market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceed 
Gross proceeds. For missing data, the data are constructed 
as the number of new shares times the offer price. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceeds/MV The ratio of proceeds to the issuer’s market value. 
Thomson One 
Banker and 
Datastream 
Private 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for a private placement 
and zero for others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Right 
Dummy. Takes the value of one for a rights offer and zero 
for others. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Firm characteristics 
MV The market value of the issuer. Datastream 
Size The natural logarithm of MV. Datastream 
Roe The ratio of net income to the book value of equity. Datastream 
MV/BV 
The ratio of market value of equity to the book value of 
equity. 
Datastream 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. Datastream 
Turnover 
The ratio is defined as the monthly moving average 
turnover ratio for the estimated period [-261,-2] prior to 
the announcement date. 
Datastream 
Pasts 
Past stock performance is defined as the cumulative 
average abnormal return for SEO firms during the 
estimated period [-260, -2] prior to the announcement day. 
Datastream 
Pastm 
Past market condition is defined as cumulative 
equal-weighted market returns during the estimated period 
[-260, -2] prior to the announcement day. 
Datastream 
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Media characteristics 
Coverage 
The total number of media articles related to the issuer 
during the pre-announcement period. 
LexisNexis 
UK 
Log (1+coverage) The natural logarithm of one plus coverage. 
LexisNexis 
UK 
Sentiment per 
article 
The ratio of the number of positive words minus negative 
words to total words. 
LexisNexis 
UK 
Sentiment 
The mean value of sentiment per article during the 
pre-announcement period. 
LexisNexis 
UK 
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Table 4.1 Number of SEOs and Proceeds Amounts 
The table presents the annual number, the annual total proceed and the annual average proceed of 
SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) listed on the LSE from 1996 to 2010. The proceed is in 
millions of US dollars. All SEOs are separated into two groups: SEO with news and SEO without 
news. The group of SEO with news (SEO without news) is defined as the SEO firms that are (not) 
covered by media news from 90 days before the announcement day to 2 days before the 
announcement day. All media articles are collected from the LexisNexis UK and comprise all news 
articles from the Financial Times (London), The Times (London), Guardian(London), Mirror and 
Sunday Mirror.  
 
 All SEOs SEOs with news SEOs without news 
 
No. of 
SEO 
Total 
proceed 
Average 
proceed 
No. of 
SEO 
Total 
proceed 
Average 
proceed 
No. of 
SEO 
Total 
proceed 
Average 
proceed 
1996 11 1094.19 99.47 8 775.90 96.99 3 318.29 106.10 
1997 7 771.17 110.17 4 417.04 104.26 3 354.13 118.04 
1998 13 2747.72 211.36 10 2591.59 259.16 3 156.13 52.04 
1999 11 3128.05 284.37 9 2846.92 316.32 2 281.13 140.57 
2000 38 7568.65 199.18 23 5784.30 251.49 15 1784.35 118.96 
2001 39 4138.73 106.12 26 2316.68 89.10 13 1822.05 140.16 
2002 24 3771.94 157.16 10 2799.05 279.91 14 972.89 69.49 
2003 29 3970.33 136.91 13 1615.94 124.30 16 2354.39 147.15 
2004 39 3861.04 99.00 16 2254.51 140.91 23 1606.53 69.85 
2005 31 4607.11 148.62 16 2304.04 144.00 15 2303.07 153.54 
2006 28 4696.63 167.74 16 3273.83 204.61 12 1422.8 118.57 
2007 19 5538.47 291.5 12 3381.71 281.81 7 2156.76 308.11 
2008 15 2902.72 193.51 8 2015.31 251.91 7 887.41 126.77 
2009 103 27942.00 271.28 52 14260.88 274.25 51 13681.12 268.26 
2010 8 670.38 83.80 5 412.66 82.53 3 257.72 85.91 
Total 415 77409.13 2560.19 228 47050.36 2901.56 187 30358.77 2023.51 
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Figure 4.1The Annual Number of SEOs  
This figure presents the annual number of SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) listed on the 
LSE from 1996 to 2010. All SEOs are separated into two groups: SEO with news and SEO without 
news. The group of SEO with news (SEO without news) is defined as the SEO firms that are (not) 
covered by media news from 90 days before the announcement day to 2 days before the 
announcement day. All media articles are collected from the LexisNexis UK and comprise all news 
articles from the Financial Times (London), The Times (London), Guardian(London), Mirror and 
Sunday Mirror.  
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Figure 4.2 The Annual Average Proceed Amount of SEO 
This figure presents the annual average proceeds of SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) listed 
on the LSE from 1996 to 2010. The proceed is in millions of US dollars. All SEOs are separated 
into two groups: SEO with news and SEO without news. The group of SEO with news (SEO 
without news) is defined as the SEO firms that are (not) covered by media news from 90 days 
before the announcement day to 2 days before the announcement day. All media articles are 
collected from the LexisNexis UK and comprise all news articles from the Financial Times 
(London), The Times (London), Guardian(London), Mirror and Sunday Mirror.  
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Table4.2 Summary Statistics of Media Data 
This table presents summary statistics of the media variable for the UK SEO issuers from 1996 to 
2010. All news articles are collected from the LexisNexis UK, comprising all news articles from 
the Financial Times (London), The Times (London), Guardian (London), Mirror and Sunday 
Mirror. Coverage is defined as the total number of media articles related to the issuer during the 
pre-announcement period. Sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per article during 
the pre-announcement period, where sentiment per article is defined as the ratio of (Positive 
words-Negative words) to Total words. Positive words and negative words are identified referring 
to the work of Loughran and McDonald (2010). The pre-announcement media window is 
estimated over [-30,-2] [-60,-2] [-90, -2]. 
 
Variable Sum Mean Median Std 10th 90th 
 No. of SEO 
with news 
coverage [-30,-2] 2915 16.10 5 27.89 1 48 181 
coverage [-60,-2] 4841 22.62 6 41.87 1 54 214 
coverage [-90,-2] 6870 30.13 8 59.85 1 79 228 
Sentiment [-30,-2] (%) -98.55 -0.54 -0.54 1.22 -1.96 0.65 181 
Sentiment [-60,-2] (%) -116.49 -0.54 -0.54 1.29 -1.96 0.65 214 
Sentiment [-90,-2] (%) -143.17 -0.63 -0.58 1.23 -2.08 0.40 228 
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Table 4.3 Issue and Firm Characteristics of SEOs 
The table presents the mean, median and standard deviation of issue (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) for UK SEOs (excluding utilities and financials) 
from 1996 to 2010. All SEOs are separated into two groups: SEO with news and SEO without news. The group of SEO with news (SEO without news) is 
defined as the SEO firms that are (not) covered by media news from 90 days before the announcement day to 2 days before the announcement day. Issue 
characteristics are obtained from Thomson One Banker. Financial factors are obtained from DATASTREAM. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), 
where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement day. Proceed is the SEO offer amount in millions of US dollars. All the financial 
factors refer to the previous year. MV is the market value of firm’s equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of 
the market value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. Dividend is the cash dividend on stock price. Turnover is 
calculated as monthly moving average turnover ratio for the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day, where turnover ratio is daily trading volume 
divided by the share outstanding. Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the difference in means between two groups, SEO with news and SEO without news. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 All SEOs SEOs with news SEOs without news Difference 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std in Mean 
in Mean 
p-value 
Panel A Issue characteristics 
Proceed 
($ mil) 
186.53 110.58 211.74 206.36 127.56 218.55 162.35 87.55 201.08 44.01*** 0.00 
Discount (%) 11.90 10.47 23.12 9.48 9.15 24.41 14.85 12.01 21.16 -5.37 0.11 
Panel B Firm characteristics 
MV ($ mil) 3854.50 555.85 15628.34 5737.59 816.51 20740.14 1558.55 418.84 3003.95 4179.04*** 0.00 
ROE (%) 7.36 5.16 97.96 11.17 5.85 122.25 2.70 4.54 55.52 8.47 0.61 
MV/BV 3.15 1.96 4.07 3.49 1.96 4.88 2.74 1.99 2.73 0.75 0.17 
Leverage 
(%) 
26.28 24.96 18.15 28.15 26.26 18.52 23.99 24.54 17.48 4.17* 0.05 
Dividend 
(%) 
7.09 3.70 9.89 7.66 3.63 11.06 6.40 3.80 8.22 1.26 0.49 
Turnover 
(%) 
5.94 3.90 8.14 6.69 3.95 9.76 5.02 3.88 5.45 1.67* 0.09 
No. of Obs  415   228   187    
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Table 4.4 Announcement Return on SEOs 
This table reports past stock performance and announcement returns in percentage for UK SEOs 
(excluding utilities and financials) from 1996 to 2010,using the Carhart four-factor model (1997). 
All SEOs are separated into two groups: SEO with news and SEO without news. The group of 
SEO with news (SEO without news) is defined as the SEO firms that are (not) covered by media 
news from 90 days before the announcement day to 2 days before the announcement day. Past 
stock performance is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return for SEO firms during the 
period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Our study highlights the 2-day [-1, 0] and 3-day [-1, 1] 
announcement windows. The t-test is used under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the difference in means between the two groups, SEO 
with news and SEO without news. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 All SEOs SEOs with news SEO without news Difference 
Event 
window 
CAAR P-value CAAR P-value CAAR P-value in mean 
in mean 
P-value 
Past stock 
performance 
0.09*** [<.0001] 0.08*** [<.0001] 0.01*** [<.0001] 0.07 [0.43] 
2-day [-1, 0] 
(%) 
-0.75** [0.01] -1.35 [0.24] -0.43** [0.01] -0.92** [0.03] 
3-day [-1, 1] 
(%) 
-1.14*** [<.0001] -1.24*** [0.00] -0.85** [0.02] -0.39* [0.09] 
No. of Obs 415 228 187   
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Table 4.5 The Impact of Media on SEO Discount 
This table presents the regression results of SEO discount on media features, issuer financial 
variables and market conditions for UK SEOs from 1996 to 2010. The dependent variable is 
discount, which is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on 
day -1 prior to the announcement day. Log (1+ Coverage) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus 
coverage; coverage is defined as the total number of media articles related to issuers during the 
pre-announcement period. Sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per article during 
the pre-announcement period, where sentiment per article is defined as the ratio of (Positive 
words-Negative words) to Total words. Positive words and negative words are identified referring 
to the work of Loughran and McDonald (2010). The pre-announcement media windows are 
estimated over [-30, -2] [-60, -2] and [-90, -2]. Private is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for private placements and zero for others. Right takes the value of one when the issue is a 
rights offer. Proceed/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. Size is the 
log of the market value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of 
equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to total asset. Dividend is the cash dividend on stock price. Turnover is 
calculated as monthly moving average turnover ratio for the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to 
announcement day, where turnover ratio is daily trading volume divided by the share outstanding. 
Pasts is past stock performance, which is defined as the cumulative average abnormal return for 
SEO firms during the period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Pastm is the past market 
conditions, which is defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same period. All 
firm variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effect. The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept 0.413*** [<.0001] 0.392*** [<.0001] 0.414*** [<.0001] 
Log (1+Coverage)[-30,-2] -0.511** [0.013]     
Log (1+Coverage) [-60,-2]   -0.365** [0.031]   
Log (1+Coverage) [-90,-2]     -0.196 [0.224] 
Sentiment [-30,-2] -0.493** [0.012]     
Sentiment [-60,-2]   -0.286** [0.032]   
Sentiment [-90,-2]     -0.255* [0.056] 
Private -0.455 [0.466] -0.603 [0.913] 0.314 [0.953] 
Right 0.276 [0.957] -0.728 [0.862] -0.247 [0.567] 
Proceed/MV 0.406*** [0.000] 0.323** [0.017] 0.313** [0.023] 
Size -0.317** [0.015] -0.245* [0.063] -0.317** [0.027] 
ROE 0.276** [0.033] 0.247** [0.047] 0.254* [0.053] 
MV/BV -0.842** [0.014] -1.003*** [0.002] -1.025*** [0.000] 
Leverage -0.174 [0.118] -0.185* [0.054] -0.135 [0.154] 
Dividend 0.638** [0.013] 0.554*** [0.003] 0.543*** [0.001] 
Turnover 0.264 [0.117] 0.292* [0.073] 0.233 [0.164] 
Pasts -0.545** [0.043] -0.814* [0.094] -0.707** [0.023] 
Pastm 1.807 [0.327] 2.943 [0.113] 3.203* [0.074] 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.214 0.188 
No. of Obs 181 214 228 
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Table 4.6 The Impact of Media on SEO Announcement Return  
This table presents regression results of the announcement effect on media features, issuer’s financial variables and market conditions for UK SEOs from 1996 
to 2010. The dependent variable is the three-day announcement window, CAAR [-1, 1]. Panel A shows the cross-sectional effect of media coverage on SEO 
announcement returns. Panel B presents the role of media attitude in SEO announcement effect. Log (1+ Coverage) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus coverage; 
coverage is defined as the total media articles related to issuers during the pre-announcement period. Sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per 
article during the pre-announcement period, where sentiment per article is defined as the ratio of (Positive words-Negative words) to Total words. Positive 
words and negative words are identified referring to the work of Loughran and McDonald (2010).The pre-announcement media windows are estimated over 
[-30, -2] [-60, -2] and [-90, -2]. Private is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for private placements and zero for others. Right takes the value of one 
when the issue is a rights offer. Discount is defined as 1- offer price /price (-1), where price (-1) is the close market price on day -1 prior to the announcement 
day. Proceed/MV is the SEO offer amount divided by market value of equity. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net 
income over the book value of equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total asset. 
Dividend is the cash dividend on stock price. Turnover is calculated as monthly moving average turnover ratio for the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to 
announcement day, where turnover ratio is daily trading volume divided by the share outstanding. Pasts is past stock performance, which is defined as the 
cumulative average abnormal return for SEO firms during the estimated period [-260, -2] prior to announcement day. Pastm is the past market conditions, 
defined as cumulative equal-weighted market returns for the same estimated period. All firm variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effect. The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets.***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Test results for media coverage effect 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 Estimation 5 Estimation 6 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept -0.672 [0.422] -0.624 [0.467] -0.584 [0.497] -0.872 [0.333] -0.804 [0.373] -0.771 [0.393] 
Log (1+Coverage) 
[-30,-2] 
-0.613*** [0.000]     -0.479** [0.036]     
Log (1+Coverage) 
[-60,-2] 
  -0.468** [0.033]     -0.345* [0.073]   
Log (1+Coverage) 
[-90,-2] 
    -0.452** [0.018]     -0.344* [0.053] 
Private 0.371*** [0.000] 0.372** [0.024] 0.381*** [0.005] 0.295*** [0.003] 0.294*** [0.007] 0.303*** [0.004] 
Right 0.254 [0.720] 0.173 [0.817] 0.178 [0.814] -0.113 [0.874] -0.193 [0.793] -0.191 [0.793] 
Discount -0.547 [0.625] -0.401 [0.724] -0.442 [0.692] -0.487 [0.683] -0.384 [0.748] -0.413 [0.724] 
Proceed/MV 0.130* [0.074] 0.114* [0.054] 0.124** [0.027] 0.285** [0.043] 0.275* [0.067] 0.279* [0.051] 
Size       0.594* [0.087] 0.504* [0.064] 0.874* [0.077] 
ROE       0.274 [0.393] 0.263 [0.423] 0.292 [0.194] 
MV/BV       -0.964 [0.898] -0.174 [0.804] -0.154 [0.823] 
Leverage       0.671** [0.047] 0.593* [0.097] 0.622* [0.074] 
Dividend       0.391 [0.887] 0.434 [0.874] 0.384 [0.883] 
Turnover       -1.311*** [<.001] -1.331*** [<.001] -1.328*** [<.001] 
Pasts       -0.607 [0.473] -0.637 [0.451] -0.636 [0.443] 
Pastm       2.363 [0.364] 2.471 [0.341] 2.524 [0.337] 
Adjusted R
2
 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.074 0.075 0.075 
No. of Obs 415 415 415 415 415 415 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
 
Panel B Test results for media sentiment effect 
Variables  Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4 Estimation 5 Estimation 6 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept -0.121 [0.415] -0.184 [0.896] 0.123 [0.926] -0.878 [0.660] -0.473 [0.794] -0.774 [0.793] 
Log (1+Coverage) [-30,-2] -0.581* [0.074]     -0.384** [0.023]     
Log (1+Coverage) [-60,-2]   -0.813** [0.024]     -0.614** [0.045]   
Log (1+Coverage) [-90,-2]     -0.957*** [0.004]     -0.871** [0.044] 
Sentiment [-30,-2] 0.364** [0.033]     0.53** [0.014]     
Sentiment [-60,-2]   0.544* [0.095]     0.213* [0.064]   
Sentiment [-90,-2]     0.196* [0.054]     0.353* [0.056] 
Private 0.583*** [0.000] 0.523*** [0.000] 0.548*** [<.0001] 0.554*** [0.000] 0.484*** [0.000] 0.518*** [0.000] 
Right 0.134 [0.203] 0.744 [0.455] 1.001 [0.921] 0.681 [0.545] 0.308 [0.773] -0.844 [0.774] 
Discount -0.241 [0.174] -0.171 [0.297] -0.168 [0.286] -0.032 [0.161] -0.183 [0.298] -0.156 [0.296] 
Proceed/MV 0.368** [0.033] 0.314* [0.054] 0.419** [0.027] 0.753** [0.044] 0.577* [0.087] 0.569* [0.087] 
Size       -0.473* [0.082] 0.626** [0.049] 0.214** [0.045] 
ROE       -0.175 [0.488] -0.187 [0.367] -0.216 [0.269] 
MV/BV       -0.693 [0.427] -0.668 [0.421] -0.574 [0.428] 
Leverage       -0.317** [0.039] -0.216* [0.067] -0.973* [0.067] 
Dividend       0.404 [0.326] 0.289 [0.443] 0.221 [0.442] 
Turnover       -1.327*** [0.000] -1.347*** [0.000] -1.348*** [0.000] 
Pasts       -0.643 [0.654] -1.334 [0.314] -1.375 [0.316] 
Pastm       -1.991 [0.673] 0.417 [0.974] -0.275 [0.896] 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.078 0.090 0.134 0.119 0.133 
No. of Obs 181 214 228 181 214 228 
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Table 4.7 The Impact of Media on Offer Size of SEOs 
This table presents regression results of relative offer size on media features, issue characteristics 
and firm financial factors for UK SEOs during the period from 1996 to 2010. The dependent 
variable is relative offer size of the SEOs, which is the SEO proceed amount scaled by the market 
value of equity. Log (1+ Coverage) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus coverage; coverage is defined 
as the total number of media articles related to issuers during the pre-announcement period. 
Sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per article during the pre-announcement 
period, where sentiment per article is defined as the ratio of (Positive words-Negative words) to 
Total words. Positive words and negative words are identified referring to the work of Loughran 
and McDonald (2010). The pre-announcement media windows are estimated over [-30,-2] [-60,-2] 
[-90, -2]. Private is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for private placements and zero 
for others. Right takes the value of one when the issue is a rights offer. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity. ROE is the ratio of net income over the book value of 
equity.MV/BV is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to total asset. Dividend is the cash dividend on stock price. All firm variables are 
lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions include year and industry fixed 
effect. The p-value for the chi-squared test statistic is shown in square brackets. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 
 Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value 
Intercept 3.414*** [<.0001] 2.998*** [<.0001] 2.947*** [<.0001] 
Log (1+Coverage) [-30,-2] 0.380*** [<.0001]     
Log (1+Coverage) [-60,-2]   0.444*** [<.0001]   
Log (1+Coverage) [-90,-2]     0.436*** [<.0001] 
Sentiment [-30,-2] -3.362 [0.615]     
Sentiment [-60,-2]   -6.094 [0.217]   
Sentiment [-90,-2]     -9.807 [0.465] 
Private 0.870** [0.015] 0.917*** [0.007] 1.027*** [0.004] 
Right  0.347* [0.098] 0.563** [0.012] 0.635*** [0.006] 
Size 0.330*** [<.0001] 0.337*** [<.0001] 0.344*** [<.0001] 
ROE -0.214 [0.255] -0.213 [0.277] -0.211 [0.247] 
MV/BV 0.108 [0.164] 0.108 [0.165] 0.073 [0.276] 
Leverage 2.295*** [<.0001] 2.527*** [<.0001] 2.328*** [<.0001] 
Dividend -0.877*** [<.0001] -0.901*** [<.0001] -0.957*** [<.0001] 
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.48 0.58 
No. of Obs 181 214 228 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, Implications, and Future 
Research 
5.1 Conclusions 
This study focuses on what factors influence firms when they are making 
financing decisions. In Chapter 2 and 3, this study examines whether the decision 
of a firm’s external financing activities is influenced by ownership structure and 
market timing. In Chapter4, this study investigates the role of public media in 
seasoned equity issue.  
 
This study provides strong evidence to support the proposition that ownership 
structure has a significant effect on firm capital structure and financing decisions. 
Three ownership measures are used as proxies for the incentives of various 
shareholders: ownership concentration, managerial share ownership, and 
institutional ownership. 
 
First, Chapter 2 finds that ownership structure can influence a firm’s financial 
leverage ratio. The results show that the relation between ownership concentration 
and leverage level is non-monotonic, as the relation between managerial 
ownership and debt ratio. The results indicate that ownership-concentrated firms 
are willing to have lower leverage levels, whereas firms with dispersed ownership 
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tend to choose higher levels of debt. Similarly, at lower levels of managerial 
ownership, firm prefer a higher level of debt, which is consistent with managerial 
entrenchment theory (Jensen, 1986). However, firms with higher levels of 
managerial ownership are more likely to lower the debt ratio, which is in a line 
with interest alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). 
 
Second, Chapter 2 also examines the effect of ownership on firm external 
financing decisions from two aspects: the choice between bond and equity issues 
and issue size. The results imply that ownership-concentrated firms prefer equity 
over debt to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. However, large shareholders have an 
incentive to maintain their voting rights and control powers, so they should 
encourage firms to make smaller equity issuances. The findings also suggest that 
firms with lower managerial ownership are willing to issue bonds over equity and 
vice versa at higher managerial ownership levels. This finding is also consistent 
with managerial entrenchment theory and interest alignment theory. Moreover, 
firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to issue equity over 
bonds, although they can carry out a larger bond issue due to lower bond yields 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
 
Third, Chapter 3 investigates the impact of ownership on a firm’s choice of 
seasoned equity issue methods. When UK firms make SEO decisions, four issue 
methods can be chosen: a rights offer, placing, an open offer, and an open offer 
with placing. By using a multinomial logistic regression, Chapter 3 finds that 
ownership-concentrated firms prefer rights offers or open offers over placing. This 
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finding supports the controlling hypothesis that large shareholders are willing to 
preserve their ownership of shares and maintain the benefits from control, so they 
pressure firms into SEOs using a right-preserving offering method. 
 
Moreover, the results indicate that firms with high managerial ownership are more 
likely to choose placing as the SEO method. This finding can be explained by the 
argument of Barclay et al. (2007), that is, placings are often made with friendly 
investors who will probability vote in the manager’s favour, resulting in more 
entrenched management. In addition, Chapter 3 reports that firms with lower 
institutional ownership are more likely to issue equity by placing. A lower level of 
institutional ownership indicates that firms may lack monitoring, so that they can 
create new monitors through placing, leading to increased management 
monitoring. 
 
Fourth, Chapter 3 also analyzes whether firm ownership structure can influence 
SEO price setting and market reactions to SEO announcements. The results 
indicate that ownership-concentrated firms are likely to price SEOs with higher 
offer discounts, which can be interpreted as compensation for investors who 
invest in illiquid stocks. The result suggests that firms with higher institutional 
ownership are likely to price shares higher, that is, at a lower discount. This 
finding supports the monitoring hypothesis, in which institutional holding is a 
proxy for firm quality verification. 
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Moreover, the results of this dissertation strongly support our prediction that firm 
financing decisions are determined by market timing. First, Chapter 2 finds that 
favourable market conditions increase the probability of a firm issuing equity over 
debt. Moreover, the results indicate that the effect of managerial ownership on 
firm financing decisions changes under different stock market valuations. Chapter 
2 classifies the market into hot and cold periods based on three-month moving 
averages of scaled equity issue volume. The results indicates that a hot market 
increases the likelihood of firms with high managerial ownership choosing equity 
issuance over debt, but a cold market significantly reduces this probability. 
 
Second, the evidence also suggests that firms are likely to issue equity when the 
indirect cost is relatively low. The results of Chapter 3 show that announcement 
returns are higher (lower) when SEOs are conducted in favourable (unfavourable) 
market conditions. Further, firms are likely to choose rights offers when the stock 
market is favourable, while they prefer placing under cold conditions. Since 
placing is value certification, overvalued (undervalued) firms are less (more) 
likely to choose placing as the issue method. The results imply that SEOs in a hot 
market are likely to be motivated by firm overvaluation. 
 
The results of Chapter 4 suggest that financial media are a determinant of a firm’s 
financing decision, according to two aspects: SEO price setting and 
announcement returns. This thesis constructs two media variables: media 
coverage and media sentiment. It is shown that higher media coverage can 
decrease the SEO discount. This finding can be interpreted to imply that mass 
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media news attracts more investors to participate in SEOs, thereby increasing 
short-term demand for the new shares. Consequently, the offer discount is set at a 
lower level. The results also suggest that issuing firms covered by more positive 
media are likely to price offers with lower discounts and generate higher 
announcement returns. This finding supports the argument that media content 
contributes to sentimental investors’ expectations. More specifically, the positive 
information in the media content will generate more optimistic investors (Tetlock, 
2007). 
5.2 Implications 
The results of this study may provide implications for firm managers, 
underwriters, and investors. Our research increases the understanding of both 
issuing firms and underwriters in SEO activities. This can help them better 
manage firm financing decisions. First, this thesis provides implications on the 
best times for firms to make equity issue decisions. The results indicate that 
market reactions to SEO announcements are more favourable in a hot market. 
Therefore, managers and underwriters should make equity issue opportunistically 
during hot market periods, since they can take advantage of the lower indirect 
costs. Moreover, the results suggest that better pre-issue stock performance could 
decrease the discount of the SEO offer and generate favourable SEO 
announcement returns. This finding suggests that a firm’s prior stock performance 
is an important factor to determine the timing of SEO activities. The implication is 
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that the optimal time for equity issuance is following the run-up of the firm’s 
stock price. 
 
Second, this study also proposes implications on a firm’s choice of equity issue 
method. The results indicate that the offer price discount in placing is much lower 
than that in a rights offer. Moreover, market reactions to announcements of 
placings are significantly positive, but the announcement returns of rights offers 
are negative, on average. This implies that rights offers induce higher indirect 
costs, while placings induce lower indirect costs. Thus, managers should choose 
placing as the seasoned equity issue method if the firm’s stock is not overvalued. 
Furthermore, these implications can in turn help investors readjust their 
estimations of stock value according to firm SEO performance. 
 
Third, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 clearly demonstrates that positive news 
about the issuer is associated with a lower offer price discount and a higher SEO 
announcement return. Thus, the manager and underwriter can create more positive 
media news about a firm prior to the SEO announcement date and benefit from 
the higher offer price and favourable market reaction. 
 
Understanding these implications is also important for investors. For instance, 
knowing when firms make equity issue, or which issue method is chosen, it helps 
investors evaluate what drives firm financing decision to avoid negative price 
reaction at the issue announcement.  
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5.3 Future Research 
The results have some limitations and suggest some interesting avenues for future 
research. In Chapters 2 and 3, our research emphasizes ownership concentration, 
managerial share ownership, and institutional ownership as proxies for ownership 
structure. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) find that pension and mutual funds, 
hedge funds, and insurance companies have different influences on leverage 
decisions. Therefore, this study could further consider types of institutional 
shareholders in future research. For the same reason, it is also unclear that how 
different types of institutional shareholders affect firm external financing 
decisions. 
 
Moreover, this thesis has not considered the impact of optimal capital structure. 
On the one hand, some studies argue that firms have strong incentive to move their 
leverage ratio towards to optimal ratio when making financing decisions (e.g. Fama 
and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005). It suggests firms’ financing decision is 
determined by the difference between the actual leverage ratio and optimal ratio. 
Thus future research could examine how ownership structure affects the speed of 
firm capital structure adjustment according to dynamic trade-off theory.  
 
One the other hand, this study has addressed the effect of marketing timing on firms’ 
financing decisions. Some studies find that the market timing has a long-lasting 
effect on capital structure (e.g. Baker and Wurgler 2002; Welch, 2004). Such effect 
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may vanish within several years after equity issue, consistent with dynamic 
trade-off theory (e.g. Leary and Roberts, 2005, Alti, 2006). Therefore, further 
research could examine how persistent is the impact of market timing on capital 
structure.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the choice of UK SEO methods, pricing setting, and 
market reactions to announcement returns. However, the long-term stock 
performance of SEOs remains unexplored, which could be addressed in future 
research. Additionally, Chapter 4 suggests that a future study could investigate the 
impact of the media on other corporate financing decisions, such as debt issuance 
and share repurchase. 
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